ORBIS

SEP 1970 4
SEP 1970 10
Mr. Burnham
Mr. Watt

quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XIV Spring 1970 Number 1

The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades — *Victor Basiuk*

Critical Choices for the UN System: The Second Development Decade — *Leon Gordenker and Harold Karan Jacobson*

Robert Strausz-Hupé: Scholar, Gentleman, Man of Letters — *Morton A. Kaplan*

The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf — *Robert R. Sullivan*

Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential — *O. M. Smolansky*

Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in the Middle East — *Ciro Zoppo*

The Soviet Naval Challenge — *Donald W. Mitchell*

West Germany and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation — *James H. Wolfe*

The Czechoslovak Communist Party: The Limits of Reform — *Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic*

The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution — *George D. Damien*

Reviews — *James C. Davies, Kurt L. London, Stuart S. Malawer, Willard Barber*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
University of Pennsylvania

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs

published by the

Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania

EDITOR: William R. Kintner
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Margaret M. Capotrio
CIRCULATION MANAGER: Marsha Palitz

EDITOR EMERITUS: Robert Strausz-Hupé

EDITORIAL BOARD: Hans Kohn, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Arthur P. Whitaker.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: James E. Dougherty, Morton A. Kaplan, Lawrence B. Krause, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, Frank N. Trager, J. K. Zawodny.

EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF: Heino Beckmann, Diane A. Kressler, Harvey Sicherman.

SECRETARIAL STAFF: Betty Armstrong, Barbara Maser, Marcia Rose.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to ORBIS style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising to the Assistant Editor and communications relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1970 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania

Out-of-print issues of ORBIS, volumes I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, at $90.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16.00 a volume, paperbound. Individual issues and complete volumes from Volume VI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager; please note, however, that Volume VI, No. 4, Volume VIII, No. 4, Volume X, No. 2 and Volume XI, No. 4 are now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $6.00; individual copies are $2.00. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are 25 cents each.

ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Subscription rates: one year, $6.00; two years, $11.00; three years, $16.00. Single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa. and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XIV SPRING 1970 NUMBER 1

Reflections on the Quarter 7

The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades . . *Victor Basiuk* 17

Critical Choices for the UN System: The Second Development Decade . . . . . *Leon Gordenker and Harold Karan Jacobson* 43

Robert Strausz-Hupé: Scholar, Gentleman, Man of Letters . . . . . *Morton A. Kaplan* 58

The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf . . . . . *Robert R. Sullivan* 71

Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential . . . . *O. M. Smolansky* 92

Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in the Middle East . . *Ciro Zoppo* 109

The Soviet Naval Challenge . . . . . *Donald W. Mitchell* 129

West Germany and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation . . . . . *James H. Wolfe* 154

The Czechoslovak Communist Party: The Limits of Reform . . . . . *Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic* 180

The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . . *George D. Damien* 192

Reviews:

Individuals, Classes, Institutions and Revolutions . . . . . *James C. Davies* 218

Amalrik's Complaint . . . . . *Kurt L. London* 221

International Law Studies and Foreign Policy . . . . . *Stuart S. Malawer* 224

Professional Views of the Foreign Service . . *Willard Barber* 229

Books Received 235

Contributors to this Issue 247

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Yale Asian Studies

A View From New Delhi

Selected Speeches and Writings

by Chester Bowles

For all of Chester Bowles' passion for ideas, he anchors his most speculative thinking in solid fact. Both because of his analysis and interpretation and because of the wealth of interesting facts about India, the United States, and the Far East built into every page, this volume contains much of consequence for anyone concerned about the role of the United States in Asia. It also reflects the new India emerging at the moment of the generational change in the leadership which led it to independence.

cloth $7.50; paper $1.95

John Morley at the India Office, 1905-1910

by Stephen E. Koss

No appointment to the Secretaryship of State for India could have aroused more speculation and widespread enthusiasm than that of John Morley in the Liberal Government of 1905. Yet those who held highest hopes of the new Indian secretary were to suffer greatest disillusionment. Mr. Koss points out that although Morley succeeded in introducing a more representative element into Indian government he recognized what many of his Indian critics found it inconvenient to recall—that Gladstonian Liberalism contained no provision for its export to non-Western societies.

$8.50

League of Nations

Betrayal From Within

Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-1940
by James Barros

During the critical seven-year period that witnessed the failure of disarmament discussions, the rise of Nazi Germany as a world power, the outbreak of World War II, and the defeat of France, the League of Nations was led by a former French bureaucrat, Joseph Avenol. Mr. Barros analyzes the role Avenol played in hastening the upsurge of the antidemocratic powers and the demise of the League. In conclusion, he discusses to what extent the Secretary-General of the League or the United Nations should take political initiatives. $10.00

Colombia

The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement

by Miguel Urrutia

As much a political history as a labor history, this study analyzes the growth of organized labor against the background of economic, political, and social change in Colombia since 1850, and, conversely, the impact of organized labor on the economic and political development of the country. Tracing the roots of labor organization back to the middle of the nineteenth century and the first organizations of workers in Colombia, Mr. Urrutia contends that a labor movement cannot attain strength in a country with as much surplus labor as Colombia without the toleration, and in some cases the active support, of political institutions. $10.00

Yale University Press New Haven and London

in Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Library Catalogs
of The Hoover Institution on
WAR, REVOLUTION, and PEACE
Stanford University

International in scope, the Institution's outstanding collections contain approximately one million books and pamphlets on political, social and economic change in the 20th century.

Catalog of The Western Language Collections
Estimated 1,101,000 cards reproduced in 63 volumes.
Price: $4800.00

Catalogs of The Western Language Serials and Newspaper Collections
Estimated 46,000 cards reproduced in 3 volumes.
Price: $215.00

Catalog of The Chinese Collection
Estimated 201,000 cards reproduced in 13 volumes.
Price: $900.00

Catalog of The Japanese Collection
Estimated 125,000 cards reproduced in 7 volumes.
Price: $550.00

Catalog of The Arabic Collection
Estimated 18,900 cards reproduced in 1 volume.
Price: $80.00

Catalogs of The Turkish and Persian Collections
Estimated 14,000 cards reproduced in 1 volume.
Price: $70.00

10% additional charge on orders outside the U.S.

Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Mass. 02111

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFTOSA

A Historical Survey of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Inter-American Relations

By Manuel A. Machado, Jr.

Epidemics of *fiebre aftosa,* or foot-and-mouth disease, have periodically struck livestock in Latin America, limiting the production of meat for both domestic consumption and export. Methods of controlling aftosa have been a source of serious quarrels among the American nations.

Professor Machado's extensive investigation of diplomatic correspondence and official reports reveals many bold plans for eradication which were thwarted by domestic political conflicts, livestock raisers' opposition, lack of funds and staff, or failure to recognize the serious consequences of the disease. The United States' policy of forbidding importation of meat from aftosa-stricken countries was the result both of livestock raisers' efforts to exclude foreign meat products and a justified fear of spreading aftosa to livestock in the United States, concludes the author.



ISBN 0-87395-040-2 $10.00

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik

Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

Seit 1945 erfüllt das EUROPA-ARCHIV die Aufgabe eines aussenpolitischen Fachblattes, das anhand von Beiträgen und Berichten, Wiedergabe wichtiger Dokumente, Besprechungen von Neuerscheinungen und einer Chronologie des politischen Geschehens dem Leser die Möglichkeit bietet, sich selbständig ein Urteil über die Weltlage zu bilden.

Alle 14 Tage bietet das EUROPA-ARCHIV dokumentarische Analysen der Ereignisse, die für die Weltpolitik entwicklungsbestimmend sind.

Das EUROPA-ARCHIV ist dadurch in den 25 Jahren seines Erscheinens zu einer "Miniatur-Enzyklopädie für die wesentlichen Tagesfragen" der Politik geworden.

Jahresabonnement (24 Folgen): DM 75,—zuzüglich Porto. Probehefte auf Wunsch kostenlos

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.
EUROPA-ARCHIV, Vertrieb, 6 Frankfurt, Postfach 3685

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

William R. Kintner, Director

Research Monograph Series:

No. 3. *Nationalism in the Atlantic Community.* By Hans Kohn. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 4. *Soviet Politics Since the Fall of Khrushchev.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 5. *Measuring International Alignments.* By Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt. $1.00. April 1965.

No. 6. *Aggression and Self-Defense: The Legality of U.S. Action in South Vietnam.* By Stefan T. Possony. $2.50. September 1966.

No. 7. *The British Common Market Decision and Beyond.* By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $1.50. March 1966.

No. 8. *To the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $2.00. October 1965.

No. 9. *New Trends in Soviet Policy and the 23rd Party Congress.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. August 1966.

No. 10. *A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum.* By Alvin Richman. $1.75. March 1967.

No. 11. *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid.* By Karl von Vorys. $2.00. August 1967.

Recent Books in the Institute Series:

Man and International Relations: Contributions of the Social Sciences to the Study of Conflict and Integration. Edited by J. K. Zawodny. (Two volumes.) San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. 728 pp. and 960 pp. $45.00, the set.

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

Constituency Labour Parties in Great Britain. By Edward G. Janosik. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 222 pp. $6.50.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

An International Research and Study Center, Founded in 1950, with Headquarters in Munich, Germany

In addition to books and monographs, the Institute regularly publishes the following periodicals devoted to all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy:

BULLETIN ..... $6.00 per year
(in English, 12 issues per year)

STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION ..... $6.00 per year
(in English, 4 issues per year)

ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA .. $1.00 per year
(in Spanish, 4 issues per year)

MAJALLAH ..... $1.00 per year
(in Arabic, 3 issues per year)

REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES .. $4.00 per year
(in English, 2 issues per year)

DERGI ..... $1.00 per year
(in Turkish, 4 issues per year)

PROBLÈMES SOVIÉTIQUES ..... $2.00 per year
(in French, 2 issues per year)

SOWJETSTUDIEN ..... $2.00 per year
(in German, 2 issues per year)

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
(in English, 40 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Russian, 40 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Spanish, 20 issues per year) ..... $ 5.00 per year

SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA ..... $5.00 per year
(in Russian, 5 issues per year)

For information, subscriptions, samples:

Munich Office • Mannhardtstrasse 6 • 8 Munich 22, Germany

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections on the Quarter

American Dilemma and Crisis

AS one reviews the external and internal problems facing the United States at the beginning of the 1970's, it is difficult to be optimistic concerning this country's future. The core problem is whether democracies in general, and the United States in particular, have the capacity for dealing over the long haul with a sophisticated, many-pronged threat to the fundamental freedoms they value.

The Soviet Union appears to be one of the most stable polities on earth, whereas the United States is torn with internal dissension, if not paralyzing polarization. Furthermore, the Soviets have always pursued their objectives by means of a variety of political, psychological and military instruments, so that when they had to conduct their policy from a situation of military inferiority, they could focus their efforts in an arena which would not provoke a significant military counter on the part of their stronger opponent. The United States is still in the habit of relying on its military power to rescue it from the consequences of policies and programs that tend to neglect the psychological and political aspects of international relations.

The structure of the two societies has also affected their management of the confrontation between them. In the United States there is a fundamental exchange between any Administration and the American electorate. Every move the American President makes is subject to scrutiny from Congress, the press, many pressure groups, and the public-at-large. Although he can occasionally lead American opinion, on the whole he must be responsible to it even when it is generated by factions outside his control or completely antagonistic to him.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is governed by an elite group who rule either by indoctrination or coercion. That the coercion has become more subtle in recent years does not alter the Communist Party's dictatorial character. Because the Soviet structure is designed to optimize the operational value of secrecy and control, Western observers are severely hampered in their efforts to find out what is happening inside the Soviet system. Less than one per cent of the land area in the Soviet Union can be visited by outsiders, and even where permitted visits take place under supervision or guidance of the Potemkin Village variety.

Historically, democratic nations and open societies, such as the United States, have responded vigorously to clear and direct challenges to their survival. Since 1962, the Soviet Union has carefully refrained from presenting such chal-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lenges. Instead, Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the secrecy and dictatorial controls afforded by their society, now pursue policies of an indirect and ambiguous nature, often viewed in America as benign and born of simple national interest.

As the years have gone by, the Soviet Union has become far more sophisticated in analyzing her American opponent and adjusting her policies so as to exploit American structural and psychological weaknesses. In an article entitled "American Policy at the Threshold of the 1970's," G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the United States, made a comprehensive analysis-in-depth of the American psyche. Arbatov's incisive appraisal of the contemporary American mood should be a source of great concern to all American citizens. He pays special attention to the fierce political divisions within the United States in the past few years, a factor which makes the conduct of a coherent foreign policy extremely difficult. In their appearance before a panel on the subject of the arms race, which took place in conjunction with the National Convocation on the Challenge of Building Peace, at the New York Hilton Hotel on April 29, 1970, Arbatov and his Soviet colleagues reflected supreme confidence that the Soviets were well on the way to replacing the United States as the leading world power.

The thinking American public now seems to fall into two groups: (1) those concerned with the external threat but who are, at the same time, aware of the impact of domestic issues on the capacity of the United States to conduct foreign policy; and (2) those who are primarily concerned with domestic issues, i.e., the racial question and the urban crisis, and who regard foreign threats and problems as essentially secondary or highly exaggerated. This domestic split is related to the apparent inability of the United States to view and react to foreign problems as an organic whole, in contrast to the Soviet theoretical concept of the world political process as a series of interrelated phenomena. Even though the Soviet theoretical concept may not be accurate in all particulars, Soviet actions on the global chessboard tend to move in the same direction, whereas ours are frequently contradictory in character. For all the above reasons, the currently evolving balance of world power and the foreseeable trends do not appear to augur well for the United States.

Externally, the United States faces several major problems. The first is the unfinished war in Indochina. If President Nixon's gamble in Cambodia proves not to have resulted in clear advantage for the United States, the prospects for the success of his Vietnamization policy will be greatly reduced. He would have to continue his withdrawal despite the risk of a military disaster and a precipitate decline in U.S. world prestige. Moreover, domestic reaction to a Cambodian failure would seriously jeopardize his capacity for conducting a vigorous foreign policy, even one designed to salvage as much as pos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sible from the wreckage of the U.S. world position.

The Middle East poses perhaps an even greater danger. Despite U.S. forbearance in refusing to sell additional Phantoms to Israel in the spring of this year, the Soviets have introduced SAM-3 weapons and crews as well as Soviet fighter pilots into Egypt. The aim of this move is apparently to force an Israeli withdrawal from the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Israel's calls for a permanent cease-fire indicate her concern over this possibility. For without such a cease-fire, the Egyptians could continue their harassing activities against the Israeli position east of the canal, while Israel's ability to restrain Egypt would be inhibited by the knowledge that ultimately the Israeli air force would have to tangle directly with Soviet pilots or Soviet SAM defenses. It is unlikely that the Egyptians will acquiesce in a cease-fire at this time, which means that the United States will be placed in a quandary: whether to neutralize the Soviet escalation in Egypt by selling additional planes to Israel now and to make a unilateral guarantee to secure presently-occupied Israeli territory until a settlement is reached in the Middle East, thereby destroying our remaining influence in the Arab world; or whether, by doing nothing, to suffer a gigantic political defeat from a demonstration of impotence.

Likewise, because of the Brooke-Cooper resolution, the United States is under tremendous pressure to reach some sort of moratorium at the Vienna SALT talks. Reports emanating from Vienna suggest that both powers are negotiating a limited ABM system for command and control centers, combined with a freeze on land- and sea-based ICBM launchers. The Soviets have an obvious need to protect their great urban concentrations in Moscow and Leningrad against possible Chinese weapons developments. A "true area defense" would be equivalent to our "dense" ABM system; by providing population protection, it would be an essential element in a first-strike capacity.

Should the United States agree to limit its ABM system to Washington and freeze its ICBM launchers, American Minutemen would remain vulnerable to the Soviet SS-9. Our reliance on the Polaris as our second-strike weaponry might then be eroded by Soviet technical advances in locating our Polaris submarines or disrupting communications links. In any event, the SALT talks, by ratifying nuclear parity at a moment when Soviet conventional maneuvers are reaping fresh dividends in the Middle East, enhance further the impression of Moscow's ascendancy.

These dangers are coincident with a resurgence of neo-isolationism in the United States—even open resistance to U.S. commitments and engagements overseas, not only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere in the world.

Against this overall bleak appraisal one should ask what the chances are for the reversal of these trends—and for an accompanying regeneration of American society—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and how this reversal can be accomplished.

Internally, there would have to be an adroit shift of government policies and programs in public education and communications, to assure the American people that the United States can do all that is necessary to survive and prosper while dealing with its domestic and foreign problems. This would demand a much clearer recognition than presently exists of the inescapable relationship between internal and external actions.

Externally, the United States must demonstrate the will as well as the means—which we still possess—to convince our adversaries that we will not permit a significant adverse shift in the balance of forces between the two superpowers. Simultaneously, Washington must make it clear that détente will have to be more than "a mood in the West," if the Soviet Union expects to reach a modus vivendi with us. Finally, the United States will have to seek, by means of bold national leadership, to restore a measure of consensus within the country and to assure the credibility of U.S. military forces.

The Middle East: The Soviet Escalation

WHILE the United States remained divided over Nixon's Cambodian "escalation" in the Indochina war, another escalation —this time by the Soviet Union— was occurring in the Middle East. Events in that potentially explosive conflict may eclipse concern over Cambodia, for the Middle East situation holds the danger of a dreaded confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the Middle East which will demonstrate just how much the superpowers are prepared to compromise for the sake of preserving peace, if not in building the détente that so many analysts of East-West relations have predicted.

Soviet strategy in the Middle East is masked under the cover of providing Egypt assistance in defending the West Bank of the Suez Canal. The Soviet goal appears to be to force Israeli withdrawal from the East Bank. If this maneuver succeeds, the tenuous balance of power that now exists in the Middle East will be shattered beyond repair.

Moscow's policy in the Middle East since 1967 has been persistent and logical. By supporting the Arab position morally, militarily and politically, the Soviet government has eliminated the possibility of any American overtures to the Arabs which do not compromise, or appear to compromise, Israel's bargaining position. From President Nasser's viewpoint, Soviet help serves to sustain his country's precarious position until the United States (the only power able to pressure the Israelis) weighs its interests against Soviet influence and finds Israel not worth the cost. If the Soviets could obtain sufficient credit for thus reversing U.S. policy, Moscow's position would be enhanced and Egypt could resume her "neutrality." The Soviet government appears to understand better than Egypt's leaders that Egyptian "neutrality" after such a Soviet triumph would be illusory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How could the USSR isolate the United States and Israel, and thereby pressure the United States? The first part of such a policy, masked by the Four-Power talks, was easy enough. The French opposed Israel for the sake of re-establishing a special relationship with the oil-rich Arab states in North Africa. The French settlement plan would not only restore the pre-June 1967 conditions; it would change the nature of Israel by returning the Palestinian refugees without any guarantee of their allegiance or numbers. Whatever the origins of this policy, its conclusion would mark the end of Israel as now constituted. Britain's contribution to the Four-Power deliberations remains the November 1967 United Nations resolution, supposedly governing the Four-Power talks and source of the Jarring Mission undertaken under UN auspices. This resolution calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" in the Six-Day War of June 1967. The document, so composed as to obtain the grudging assent of both Israel and the Arabs, has no timetable for implementation. Clever legal minds on both sides have managed to interpret matters accordingly in their own favor.

As for the United States, the Nixon Administration decided that a show of detachment from Israeli policy might help to restore American influence in the Arab world, while incidentally enabling the Soviets to disengage from the Arab states. Then the two powers could negotiate a Middle East settlement. This was the rationale for the plan put forward by Secretary of State Rogers on December 9, 1969. The plan contained the proposal that the Israelis withdraw to "negotiated and secure" boundaries in exchange for "binding" Arab commitments to peace, and made the point that the new boundaries might involve only "insubstantial adjustments" in territory. While peace and security were thus established, the problems of the refugees and the status of Jerusalem could be resolved. The refugees would be either compensated or repatriated to an Israeli state with pre-June 1967 frontiers, since the West Bank would be returned to Jordan. Jerusalem should be administered in keeping with "its international character."

Since the plan was proffered without reference to the immediate situation in the Middle East, the Soviets were spared a dilemma. Working against time, Nasser had convinced himself that he could not await the deliberations of the Four Powers in New York and survive. Palestinian guerrillas were already active on other Arab fronts. Occasional artillery barrages along the Canal Zone were not enough to return Nasser to the forefront of Israel's opponents. In April 1969, the Egyptian government proclaimed the end of the cease-fire. The Egyptian Army opened an artillery offensive. Despite the testimony of UN observers that Nasser was not bluffing when he took this responsibility, neither the UN nor the Western powers made an effective response. Nor were the Four-Power talks made contingent upon the official cessation of hos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tilities. In short, the war resumed, while the diplomats behaved as if they were considering peace.

When Nasser's troops proved inadequate to the task, Soviet artillery was used against the entrenched Israeli positions on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. In this atmosphere, the Soviets must have been astonished to receive the Rogers peace plan, which not only called for the strengthening of King Hussein—whose position had become almost hopeless between the guerrillas and the Israeli Army—but necessitated Soviet-American cooperation to make it work. It was evident that the United States feared to be alone with Israel, and wished to avoid the necessity of making a clear choice between Israel and the Arab states — hence the new "neutrality."

The Soviet government might have considered the Rogers plan if it had not been so openly an American plan; that is, if both powers had arrived at it through joint discussion. However, with no pressure brought to bear against the cease-fire violations, and with the spirit of compromise in the Rogers plan, why should the USSR allow advantage to accrue to the United States? Would Brezhnev compel the Arabs to abandon their 1967 Khartoum summit conference position of no negotiation, no recognition and no concession for the sake of restoring American influence with the Arabs? Should Moscow pay for a détente in the Middle East with the compromise of its clients?

The Soviets thus had proof, buttressed further by Washington's delay in deciding about supplying Phantom jets to Israel, that their initial premises were correct. American policy would not stand on Israel alone for fear of jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Arab world. At the same time, the United States would not contest Egyptian renewal of the war, so long as the Soviets were not "directly" involved.

Nasser's policy, in turn, became easier. He had only to proclaim the beginning of coming Arab victories. When the inevitable Israeli retaliation controverted these proclamations, he had only to threaten the Soviets that he might be "lost" without fresh evidence of their support—artillery, missiles, and eventually MIG aircraft, all of which had to be Soviet manned or directed if they were to be effective.

The Israeli government, a coalition unable to decide minimum or maximum terms, settled upon a diplomacy fit for the least likely situation: both victor and vanquished should enter negotiations, and seek to bargain out the extremists in either camp. The only act Mrs. Meir's government seemed able to countenance was political inertia, while meeting force with force. This last policy went seriously awry when Israeli bombing in central Egypt provided the justification for introducing Soviet pilots and SAM-3 defenses into the UAR.

In three years, Israel's policy of "waiting for the phone to ring," in Moshe Dayan's words, gained no new friends. The United States repudiated its main premise of di-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rect negotiation without previous commitment. Mrs. Meir was embarrassed at home and abroad by the quixotic Goldmann peace overture, which gave the impression, at least, that one ringing telephone had found Israel unwilling to answer. Since reversals have their own inertial properties, any concessions made by the Israelis now in the hope of peace are likely to be regarded as signs of weakness.

While the Soviets have helped to isolate Israel and the United States, they have chosen physical involvement to save Nasser from himself. The major risk they face lies in the fact that, should Nasser's cry for Soviet protection not be heeded when he finds fresh trouble, he is likely to be ousted from power. If he fails because the Soviets flinch from supporting him in a crisis, the expensively acquired Soviet prestige will evaporate simultaneously. Soviet policy is caught in the toils of "necessary" escalation. The latest Egyptian offensive, aimed at driving the Israelis from the Canal Zone without delivering "Egypt the Unready" up to general war, sets the circumstances for a climax to these maneuvers.

Should the Soviets fear U.S. military intervention, even through military supplies alone, they may not extend their pilots or soldiers to Suez. But if they do not make this extension, and the Egyptian Army is worsted by the Israelis over the next several weeks or months, Nasser's position, and the Soviet position with it, will be seriously compromised. If the Soviet Union, in backing Nasser to the hilt, underestimates the willingness of the United States to intervene militarily, the potential consequences of the Middle East crisis are even more explosive.

This is an extraordinarily dangerous situation. *Aviation Weekly* reports that a quarter-million Egyptian troops have been drawn up along the canal. The Israelis must counter this force with their jets and current troop levels along the canal, estimated at 40,000 soldiers. Unless they can disrupt the air cover, dislocate the communications and disorder the artillery of the Egyptian concentration, they will be dislodged from the Canal Zone. This necessity explains the intensity of recent Israeli air strikes against Egyptian installations. If Israel cannot disrupt the Egyptian concentration with existing forces, she must mobilize, and that would mean general war.

The Israelis foresee such a situation. On the one hand, General Dayan has stated unequivocally that Israel will "not budge from the cease-fire lines under military pressure, no matter who the source of the pressure is." On the other hand, Foreign Minister Eban has called for an unconditional general cease-fire. It should be obvious from these statements that the Israelis are loath to fight Soviet-manned MIG's over the Suez Canal but are prepared to do so if necessary.

Were Israel to succeed in thwarting the Egyptian Army's buildup without engaging the Soviet pilots, Nasser could probably not survive. Under these circumstances, the Soviets would have to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bail him out or lose their gamble and prestige in the Middle East.

What are the prospects for decisive U.S. action to maintain the peace and the balance of power in the Middle East? We cannot expect much help from our allies in NATO. The Atlantic Alliance has contented itself in the Mediterranean with bolstering its fleet against the growing Soviet Navy. Outside of Western Europe the United States and its European allies have never been able to agree on a unified policy. Furthermore, the Greeks and Turks are only momentarily quiescent in their incessant feud over Cyprus. Italy appears to be paralyzed by political instability and internal division.

A U.S. decision to make additional jets available to Israel, Nasser has warned, would mean "irrevocable damage" to American-Arab relations. It is reasonable to assume that this step could jeopardize Western oil holdings, the Four-Power talks, hopes for détente, and the Rogers peace plan. The Soviets, after all, can portray their pilots as defenders of Egyptian soil while American Phantoms enable Israel to deliver bombs on central Egypt.

Another war in the Middle East can be of benefit only if one side or the other wins a "total" victory for its political position. The Israelis, through recent declarations by Dayan, do not intend to yield the Canal Zone unless they suffer military disaster. Nasser may incur political disaster if he does *not* inflict such a defeat on the Israelis—in which case Moscow may find it necessary to throw Soviet pilots into the fray. The Soviets also stand to lose all unless they win all when the latest Egyptian effort fails, as fail it must if the Israelis are not to lose themselves.

In order to save Nasser, then, the Soviets may conclude that intervention by air and land would not run the risk of confrontation with the United States. This might be the case if they calculate that their vastly increased nuclear rocket arsenal precludes an American replay of the 1962 Cuban missile face-off. By launching a desperate foray over the canal, Nasser could "rush" a decision. He could either force the Soviets to his aid or expose them as fainthearted, thereby neatly collapsing their Middle East position in the collapse of his own.

Should the Israelis lose, will it not be too late then to speak of "power balances" in the Middle East? Will not both the impression and fact of ascendance thus established by the USSR erode the rest of the Middle East position of the United States, as regimes rally to the victors? And what will happen to the cherished détente, the foundation of possible improved relations with Moscow?

The "détente" thesis derives from simple logic. The United States and the Soviet Union are equal in their capacity for mutual nuclear devastation. Serious confrontations chance this devastation. These confrontations are therefore to be mitigated or avoided.

It has been held that fear of confrontation prevents either major power from unilateral intervention with its own forces in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East. The notion of détente in this area therefore rests upon the presumed willingness of one power to meet the other's intervention with its own intervention. Should either the United States or the Soviet Union conclude that the other is unwilling to intervene with its own forces, then the fear of confrontation sustaining the logic of détente recedes or disappears.

President Nixon's Cambodian adventure has thus been portrayed, among other things, as an "assertion of will" pertinent to the Middle East. Subsequently, Administration spokesmen denied this connection. In view of the American constitutional crisis over Presidential powers in foreign affairs, the Soviet government may be excused if it regards Cambodia as merely another manifestation of the "inherent contradictions" in U.S. foreign policy or a desperate sideshow to divert attention from waning American power. As Bernard Gwertzman reported to the *New York Times* from Moscow on May 12, Soviet aims "appear to include the isolation of the United States and the gradual erosion of its influence on the world scene." If this analysis is valid, the ability of the United States to achieve its goals in Southeast Asia, especially in the next several months, will have important implications for U.S. prospects elsewhere, not least in the Middle East.

In any case, Soviet escalation in the Middle East proceeds against the thesis of détente in U.S.-Soviet relations. The immensity of the booty at stake must sorely tempt the Soviet leaders. Nevertheless, at this eleventh hour the United States must communicate to the Soviet Union its conviction and determination that the basis of détente, the fear of mutual confrontation, will be upheld in the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

sommaire

No. 1—1970

Numéro spécial sur l'économie européenne

André MARCHAL	Les problèmes du Marché commun
Jean-Paul PIGASSE	Bilan et perspective de la coopération européenne
	Bilan et perspective de la politique commerciale de la C.E.E.
Mario LEVI	Les exportations de produits industriels dans les pays d'Europe occidentale (France, Italie, Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne)

sommaire

No. 2—1970

René MASSIGLI	Georges Catroux
Jacques VERNANT	Gabriel Le Bras
Ian M. H. SMART	Dissuasion et maîtrise des armements stratégiques
Walter SCHUTZE	Retour sur la sécurité européenne
Henrick BIRECKI	Le mécanisme de formation de la politique étrangère dans les pays de démocratie populaire
Henri PIATIER	La politique nucléaire française

Prix de l'abonnement:

France ..... 48 F

Etranger ..... 64 F

Le numéro: 9 F

Publiée tous les deux mois

Adresser les abonnements au Centre d'études de Politique étrangère 54, rue de Varenne—Paris 7ème—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE NEXT DECADES*

by Victor Basiuk

LOOKING ahead a quarter of a century, one can discern technological developments certain to affect the economies of every advanced industrial society: (1) Development of large-scale generation of power to meet expanded needs, accompanied by important reductions in the cost of energy. (2) Growth of telecommunications by means of global satellites ringing the earth. (3) Exploitation of the untapped marine resources of the world. (4) Refinement of weather prediction and expanded capability for weather and climate modification.

Significant in themselves, they loom even more important because of the way they will interact with and shape some dominant scientific and technological trends: e.g., the change of scale on which science and technology have to be conducted today and the impetus to integration—economic and perhaps political. For the essential fact is that the cost of developing these new technological areas is so great that only giant industrial nations, or combinations of nations, will be able to afford to do so. The unfolding of the new technology of the next twenty-five years and its enormous political ramifications are the subjects this article will explore.

Decline in the Deterministic Effect of Resource Location

Historically, technology has always played a major role in creating new resources or helping to exploit the traditional ones, but in most instances it tended to be tied down to its physical resource base. Major industrial centers were built around coal-iron ore complexes, such as those in the Durham-Cleveland, Great Lakes-Pennsylvania, Ruhr, and Krivoi Rog-Donbas regions. The development of railroads was fairly closely tied to the availability of resources—either mineral or agricultural—on the land the

*This article is based in part on research sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract with the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and in part on research sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Columbia University. The judgments expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other agency of the U.S. government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

railroads crossed. Electricity made water power a significant source of energy, but hydroelectric stations and the economic activity stimulated by them were narrowly confined to rivers and their vicinity.

What is noteworthy today is the decline in importance of the location of raw materials and sources of energy as a determining factor in economic development and the rise of new power centers. No single invention was responsible for this decline, but the most significant technologies initially responsible were chemistry and transportation. By combining and recombining elements and thus converting them into more useful products, chemistry undertook to make "resources" out of the most ubiquitous materials, such as air, water and sand. Substitution of raw materials became relatively easy and prevalent; e.g., if natural rubber was not locally available, synthetic rubber could be produced from coal, oil or foodstuffs.

Technological advance in transportation, resulting in the reduction of costs, greatly increased the mobility of raw materials. Perhaps the most striking example in this respect is the post-World War II development of the steel industry in Japan, which by 1964 had become the third largest in the world (after the United States and the Soviet Union). In 1965, Japan imported 88 per cent of her iron ore and 64 per cent of her coking coal at an average distance of 5,500 miles. The magnitude of Japan's achievement (aided, besides transportation, by other technological improvements) was driven home in April 1969 when the merger of the two largest Japanese steel companies generated serious concern on the part of both American and European steel manufacturers about their ability to compete with the Japanese. It has been estimated that if the two companies, Yawata Iron and Steel and Fuji Iron and Steel, merge and continue to grow at their present rate, they will overtake United States Steel by the middle 1970's, thus becoming the largest steel company in the world.

In brief, the availability of superior technology—and not the location of raw materials or sources of energy—has become the principal factor in the emergence of new industrial centers and the economic viability of nations and regions. The extent of this trend is illustrated by the nuclear agro-industrial centers which have been proposed for the 1970's.[1] These centers, located on the

[1]See Oak Ridge National Laboratory, *Nuclear Energy Centers—Industrial and Agro-Industrial Complexes; Summary Report* (Oak Ridge, Tenn., July 1968). The concept was developed at Oak Ridge and the feasibility study undertaken produced encouraging and economically attractive results. The Indian government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coast of a water-deficient area, would combine desalinization of water for irrigation purposes with large-scale production of those chemicals, fertilizers and metals which require cheap and abundant electricity. Seawater and air would provide the raw material for such chemicals as hydrochloric and nitric acids and ammonia, while other raw materials (e.g., bauxite and phosphorus) would be imported. These centers would offer many millions of people new sources of food and employment.

The decline in the deterministic effect of resource location has a number of implications. The vistas for organized human will backed by advanced technology have broadened immensely. On the other hand, the historically built technological superstructure of advanced societies creates rigidity and a deterministic effect of its own. Thus, what will increasingly matter in producing differential benefits from science and technology among the advanced nations will be not so much the extent of the present advance, but rather farsightedness in planning, determination in the pursuit of selected goals, and willingness to reshape and restructure the existing social institutions and technological superstructure to meet the requirements of future technology.

The Integrative Effect of Technology

With the freeing of technology from a resource base has come a different trend: the integrative effect of technology on society and the integrative process within technology itself. Many loose statements have been made in this connection: e.g., progress in transportation and telecommunications has "shrunk" the world; the peoples of the world or a given region have become interdependent. In fact, the integrative influence of technology is a highly complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has not been fully understood and probably will not be for some time. It operates on different levels, and its impact on society frequently runs at cross currents.

One level is the integration of human activity and spatial units into one global geo-technical system. The advanced industrial societies are highly interrelated, technologically and politically. The three remaining areas which have not been fully—or at all—integrated into the global system are the underdeveloped regions,

was sufficiently interested to participate in the Oak Ridge study. At present, Oak Ridge National Laboratory is conducting a detailed study of uses for large energy centers in the Middle East, and a study has been undertaken for a large energy center for Puerto Rico. See also Edward A. Mason, "Nuclear Reactors: Transforming Economics as well as Energy," *Technology Review,* March 1969, pp. 32-33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the scarcely inhabited regions (the Amazon, the Arctic), and the ocean floor. Technological developments in the next decade or so will contribute significantly toward the integration of these areas.

Thanks largely to satellites, costs of telecommunications are rapidly decreasing; by 1980 it may be possible to telephone anywhere in the world for one dollar during off-business hours. The drop in telecommunications costs will be a major factor in the process of integrating the less developed countries internally and with the world system. A satellite-based television network for less developed nations as large as India could be developed, built, and made operational in about four years. To construct a comparable terrestrial network would take perhaps as long as two or three decades and the cost would be about twice as great.[2] Provided the government of the receiving state cooperates, such a network would make possible direct transmission of programs from an advanced nation into community receivers of the less developed countries. If the presently available receivers are appropriately augmented (at a cost of at least $40 each), a global television network, involving direct transmission through satellites into home receivers, could be operational by the late 1970's.[3] Without such augmentation, a highly advanced country could develop, at substantial cost, the capability for transmitting programs directly into home receivers of foreign nations by the early 1980's.

Preferences of the public in advanced countries for local programs, the time differential, and political considerations will probably hinder the establishment of a truly global television network in the next twenty-five years. It is likely that a greater interchangeability of programs among the advanced nations will take place in the near future; selected programs from abroad will be transmitted, with the aid of a satellite, through local television

[2]The cost of constructing and operating a satellite broadcast television system for India for ten years, with 500,000 ground community receivers, has been estimated at $87 million. A terrestrial system, including ten years of operation, would cost $150 million. Assumptions of the study included a 1971 technology base. For details on a satellite community TV network for India, see General Electric Company, Space Systems Organization, *Television Broadcast Satellite (TVBS) Study; TVBS Technical Report* (Prepared for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Contract No. NAS 3-9708, November 15, 1969), Vol. III, pp. 2-19, 7-81, 7-106, 7-108. An agreement has been concluded between the United States and India to establish a smaller experimental network of 5,000 ground satellite-broadcast community receivers, to be operational by 1973. India will transmit its own programs from a ground station, but use an American satellite for relay to community receivers. See "India/United States Experimental Satellite Project," UN Document A/AC.105/72, December 11, 1969.

[3]Cf. "Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites," UN Document A/AC.105/51, February 26, 1969, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stations. Since the less developed countries have only limited resources for their own programs, they will rely to a greater extent on programs from abroad, beamed into community receivers or perhaps directly into home sets. New audio-visual techniques of instruction, combined with satellite-aided television, promise not only a much more rapid integration of the less developed societies with the rest of the world, but a social transformation whose effects are not entirely clear.

The nuclear agro-industrial complexes described above will contribute to the integration of arid and hitherto sparsely inhabited areas. Even now, conventional means of desalinization of water combined with controlled-environment greenhouses of air-inflated plastic are beginning to be used successfully to convert deserts into economically productive areas.[4] The techniques for controlling rainfall will improve significantly by 1980,[5] thus helping to increase geographic areas capable of sustaining agricultural productivity and possibly to expand the areas of human habitat in general. It appears that, by diverting the flow of ocean currents, large-scale changes in climate are economically feasible even at the present cost of energy.[6] As the cost of energy declines, projects designed to implement such changes will become increasingly

[4]See Carle O. Hodge, "The Blooming Desert," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* November 1969, pp. 32-33. This was a project developed by scientists at the University of Arizona which resulted in bumper yields of tomatoes, cucumbers and other crops harvested from a virtually rainless Mexican beach. Their achievement prompted the ruler of Abu Dhabi, a sheikdom on the Arabian Peninsula rich in oil, to offer to finance the inauguration by the Arizonans of a power-water-food center using engine-driven electric generators in his own country; he also agreed to support further research in this field in Arizona. The goal of the project is to produce perhaps two million pounds of high-quality vegetables a year at about twenty cents per pound, as compared with the presently air-freighted vegetables sold at $1.50 per pound. The principal advantages of air-inflated plastic greenhouses are their extreme conservation of water (moisture is trapped and evaporation is minimal) and their relative cheapness. The University of Arizona scientists expect that the Abu Dhabi installation will be a prototype that should be applicable to vast regions where almost nothing now grows.

[5]See Thomas F. Malone, "New Dimensions of International Cooperation in Weather Analysis and Prediction," *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society,* December 1968, p. 1138.

[6]P. M. Borisov, "Can We Control the Arctic Climate?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* March 1969, pp. 43-48. This is a translation of an article by a Soviet scientist which received currency in both the Soviet Union and Canada. The author points out that the Gulf Stream system, the most powerful warm current of the entire globe, pours into the depth of the Arctic basin. Since the water of the stream is more saline and heavier than the Arctic waters, it sinks and spreads under the cold and less saline Arctic waters. Borisov calculated that if the Bering Strait is dammed and the water is pumped from the Arctic Ocean, the warm water of the Gulf Stream would not sink; instead, it would be diverted into the Bering Sea, thus ameliorating the climate of Northern Siberia, Alaska and Northern Canada. By increasing and decreasing the rate of pumping the water, climate could be controlled in much more remote areas: e.g., the climate of the Sahara could eventually be changed by increasing rainfall and thus stimulating vegetation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more attractive; eventually, they may lead to freeing huge areas of permafrost for agriculture and other economic activity and improve the means for converting present deserts into productive regions.

The use of the earth resource survey satellites, to be introduced in the early 1970's, is expected to facilitate the discovery of mineral resources, thus generating economic activity in geographic regions hitherto not considered to be economically attractive and perhaps not even habitable.[7]

Exploitation of oil and gas from the sea bed has advanced rapidly in recent years; the present gross annual revenue of the U.S. offshore oil industry exceeds $9 billion. Human underwater missions of long duration at a depth of 600 to 1,000 feet are expected to take place in the near future. It has been predicted that commercial capability for extensive and prolonged engineering operations on continental slopes as deep as 3,000 feet will take place by 1980, while commercial deployment of vehicles and machines at 6,000 feet and beyond is expected sometime in 1980-1990.

Computers, capable of processing vast amounts of data, provide a major instrument of in-depth integration. They greatly facilitate large-scale organization, control of both men and materials, and regional and national planning. Computations on a scale that would have taken months and years before—or could not have been made at all—are either possible now or will soon become possible within seconds and at very low cost. Sometime in the period between 1976 and 1981, computing is likely to become a public utility, with many thousands of remote terminals for the use of individuals and organizations to obtain the information they need. A concomitant development will be the replacement of money and checks by the computer-controlled credit card. The present trend in computer technology is great increase in memories and the speed of retrieval. The main memories of some

[7]The first experimental Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) will be launched by NASA in 1971-1972; this will be followed by an operational system by the mid-1970's. The satellites are expected to provide multiple benefits, on the order of perhaps many billions of dollars. They will help to identify potential areas where mineral resources may be found. They will provide repetitive coverage of snow distribution and vegetation, thus assisting in the control of floods and in power and irrigation planning. They will help in prediction and prevention of crop diseases over wide areas and will also provide repetitive coverage of ocean currents, arctic ice and ocean temperature for scientific and economic purposes. For the potential of satellites with respect to earth resources, see National Research Council, Division of Engineering, *Useful Application of Earth-Oriented Satellites: Summaries of Panel Reports* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two million characters and the auxiliary memories of half a billion characters are considered to be large in the present generation of computers. In the next computer generation, to become available in the late 1970's, the main memories will contain hundreds of millions of characters, while the auxiliary memories will have many billions of characters. The retrieval of information will be increased to about twenty to forty million characters per second between the auxiliary and the main memory, as compared with the one to three million per second now.

Last but not least, integration proceeds within science and technology itself. The combination of computers, satellites, atmospheric sciences and oceanography opens up broad vistas for weather prediction and modification. Transplantation of body organs and their increasing substitution by synthetic items—which is revolutionizing medicine—represents the meeting of medicine, mechanics and chemistry. The combination of electronics and chemistry, electronics and physics, biological sciences and chemistry are further examples of the growing trend. It appears that the synergistic effect resulting from the meeting and integrating of two or more sciences and technologies produces the most rapid progress.

What are the implications of this integrative trend? Instrumentally speaking, the capability to understand and control the integrative trend of technology is highly important and will be increasingly crucial in the future. There is a growing need for conceptual instruments on how to integrate various technologies to achieve particular social goals. Systems analysis is but one such instrument, and it has not yet been adequately developed. The ability to control the forms and phases of the integrative trend—particularly on the "horizontal" level—is an increasingly important leverage of international power and influence. A better understanding and the fostering of integration between the various sciences and technologies will accelerate technological innovation and progress.

The integrative trend of technology creates an appreciable measure of global, regional and local interdependence, but it does not necessarily create unity. Indeed, in a number of its forms this trend can create or exacerbate conflict. A growing settlement and integration of Northern China and Eastern Siberia may increase rather than diminish conflict between the USSR and China, and the better integrated instruments of military force are likely to intensify a clash. There is no conflict for the sea

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bed in the deep ocean areas at this time, but such a conflict looms as a definite possibility in the future as the ocean floor begins to be integrated into global economic activity.

These examples are not intended to confirm the somewhat simplistic statement that "technology unites, while humans divide." Technology itself, as an independent variable, may divide. Computers, by integrating human and material resources of educational institutions, make it possible to create a mega-university, but these same computers, by facilitating impersonality, may split asunder the mega-university and even the entire society. In terms of political division or unification or political impact in general, it is not always clear what the general integrative trend signifies for the future. The rise of multinational corporations[8] (of which the Intelsat is but one) and the technological integration of the ocean floor—which may involve companies of various nationalities working, and eventually multinational personnel living, side by side on the bottom of the sea—are truly major developments. They might modify, if not undermine, the present nation-state system in the next decades. But it will take some time before the exact nature of their political impact becomes clearly discernible.

Global Projection of Influence Through Technology

The integrative impetus of technology is accompanied by the increasingly versatile, global projection of national influence and power through technology. In the nineteenth century this phenomenon was manifested by Great Britain's global projection of power, first through the Royal Navy and later through telecommunications (cables and radio). In the post-World War II period, the United States eclipsed all other powers by a wide margin in the magnitude of its global projection and the multiplicity of its instruments. After the massive display of U.S. military power in both Europe and Asia during World War II, the United States made an effort to withdraw, but was compelled to stay. The forms of its military power grew in variety and size—from bombers to ICBM's and Polaris IRBM's trained on

[8]An indication of the magnitude of this development is provided by figures of U.S. participation in multinational corporations. The value of output (sales) from U.S. subsidiaries abroad and from the U.S. share in foreign-owned companies has been estimated at over $200 billion in 1968. The value of U.S. exports, on the other hand, amounted to only $34 billion in 1968. The Department of State is currently considering the advisability of reorienting the focus of its economic activity toward multinational corporations and foreign investment, as distinguished from its traditional concern with foreign trade.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various targets in Eurasia. Global military operations have been improved—and are continuously improving—through nuclear propulsion in naval vessels, better communications systems, more effective logistics support, worldwide surveillance through satellites and other means, and long-range airlift.

On the nonmilitary level, the Voice of America provides another form of projection of global influence. Physically, the recent lunar landings were aimed at the moon, but politically they were aimed at Earth. Foreign aid is, in part, a means of extending America's influence through more advanced technology into the less developed world. The multinational corporation—primarily a subsidiary of the technologically and managerially superior American companies—is a projection mainly into industrialized nations.

The Kremlin imitated the American global strategic nuclear projection, and now the Soviets are expanding their global capability in subnuclear military technology. The Soviet Union is roughly equal to the United States in global extension of its influence through outer space technology (but not communications satellites), broadcasting and oceanology. In other respects, its efforts at projecting Soviet power are less significant than those of the United States.[9]

In comparison with the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe has not scored conspicuously in the global projection of its power and influence. In the first place, Western Europe lacks the unified political will required for such an undertaking. The foreign aid programs of the largest West European states have grown recently from about a half to almost two-thirds of that of the United States,[10] but they are not effectively coordinated. Europe participates in Intelsat, the Europeans have an

[9]Soviet economic foreign aid, actually delivered (as distinguished from commitments), has amounted to about $300 million annually in recent years, while American foreign aid has been about ten times this amount. (For an analysis of Soviet foreign aid, see U.S. Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, *Communist Governments and the Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967,* Research Memorandum RSE-120, August 14, 1968, especially pp. 1, 4-6.) Soviet air transport, welded into a single company, Aeroflot, has been estimated as being twice the size of the largest U.S. airline (United), but it carries only about 45 per cent of the traffic of all the major domestic airlines of the United States put together. "Top Airlines of 1967," *The Economist,* October 5, 1968, p. 100.

[10]In 1968, the total net official development assistance of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy amounted to $2,002 million, as compared with $3,314 million for the United States. The increase in European foreign aid was more relative than absolute: American foreign aid began to decline in 1968. See OECD, Development Assistance Committee, *Development Assistance* (Paris, 1969), pp. 45, 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outer space program of their own, and Great Britain and France have a nuclear striking capability; but, on the whole, the present capability of Western Europe to project its power and influence globally is small when compared with U.S. and Soviet capabilities. Perhaps the only exception is the large West European merchant marine. In 1967, the gross tonnage of the merchant fleets of the EEC countries and the United Kingdom amounted to 44,194,000 tons, compared with 19,179,000 tons under U.S. registry and 8,562,000 tons flying the Soviet flag. Under peacetime conditions, however, a nation's merchant marine is not one of the most important instruments of power and influence. By shipping goods (rather than people) and having low visibility, the merchant marine has relatively limited impact on human psychology and values and is basically at the disposal of the customer, of whatever nationality he might be. One European power with formerly global interests, Great Britain, is in the process of retrenchment rather than augmentation of her projection capabilities.

Technological instruments for projecting one's power and influence globally will be significantly improved in the next decade or two, and entirely new instruments will appear. We noted above that global voice communications will become cheap and readily useable within the next ten years. In the 1970's, some highly advanced nations will have the technological capability for beaming television programs directly into the receivers of the less developed world, and this capability will probably be used. It is conceivable that in the 1980's the superpowers will increasingly project themselves through television broadcasts directly into the receivers of the more advanced countries, such as those of Western Europe. Computers, global communications and high-speed transportation make it possible to control a scattered international enterprise from a central point; further progress in all of these areas will enhance the role of foreign investment in extending a nation's influence. The era of global mass travel is just beginning and will witness rapid growth with the introduction of "air buses" and, later, supersonic aircraft.[11] Control of the means of telecommunications and of mass travel—through ownership of manufacturing facilities, the media themselves, or both—is an important lever of power. Quite apart from

[11]Present projections of revenue passenger-miles by the Federal Aviation Administration for U.S. air carriers anticipate an almost fourfold increase between FY 1968 and FY 1980 (from 106.5 billion to 379.0 billion). Federal Aviation Administration, *Aviation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1969-1980* (Washington, January 1969), p. 23. These projections are considered to be fairly conservative; projections by nongovernmental authorities are higher.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this leverage, proliferation of global mass travel and mass communications tends to favor those who are technologically more powerful, affluent and numerous: they have much more to project, and can afford to project more. The influence exerted may produce important modifications in the value systems of those who are the primary objects of the projection.

Major developments will likely occur in large-scale climate modification, perhaps as early as the late 1970's, and with a correspondingly greater certainty in subsequent years.[12] If unilaterally developed, climate and weather modification provides a valuable instrument for projecting one's power externally. The cost of energy is likely to be dramatically reduced in the next ten to twenty-five years. According to present and admittedly conservative projections based on "surprise-free" developments in nuclear technology, the cost of power to U.S. industry will decline from about 8 mills/kw-hr. to 1.5 mills/kw-hr. (in 1968 dollars) by the year 2000.[13] However, technological breakthroughs might reduce the cost of energy to this level—and possibly below—much sooner than estimated. The nations that capitalize on technologies where major breakthroughs are likely to occur—which would include such areas as controlled thermonuclear reaction (CTR), superconductivity, and magnetohydrodynamics (MHD)—and possess the capability of utilizing them on a sufficiently large scale, will be in a position to control world markets through superior and cheaper products. Marine resources development represents still another important area. It will permit the projection of national substance into hitherto unoccupied and unexploited parts of the globe, and its geopolitical impact will grow in the next decades.

We live in a period when attributes of power and influence become increasingly diffuse; differing from attributes in the pre-

[12]See Thomas F. Malone, "Current Developments in the Atmospheric Sciences and Some of Their Implications for Foreign Policy," in *The Potential Impact of Science and Technology on Future U.S. Foreign Policy* (Papers Presented at a Joint Meeting of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, and a Special Panel of the Committee on Science and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, June 16-17, 1968, Washington, D.C.), p. 91. Malone points out that interface processes between the atmosphere and the underlying surface appear to be important to large-scale modification of the climate; if these expectations are justified, "there is a high probability that the technology could go through explosive developments during the period 1975 to 1995."

[13]See James A. Lane, "Rationale for Low-Cost Nuclear Heat and Electricity," in *Abundant Nuclear Energy* (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1969), pp. 3, 23. Eight mills/kw-hr. is an average generating cost for 1967. The low generating cost of 1.5 mills is expected to be achieved through the development of very large (5,000 megawatts) high-performance breeder reactors. In the case of industry, sales costs of power are about the same as the generating costs, although they are more than twice as high for residences and commercial customers (because of transmission and distribution costs).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World War II decades, they do not necessarily accrue narrowly to individual nations. In an integrating world, where regional differences are perhaps more important now than national, it would be an oversimplification to equate each manifestation of ability for global projection by a nation with the actual attainment of power and influence. The effect of some external projections of national substance will be neutralized by other developments, and still other projections are likely to be counterproductive in terms of power and influence. This, in particular, may pertain to the potential impact of global projections on the values and motivations of those peoples who become their targets. However, we are still far from attaining a homogeneous world, and, on balance, the ability for global projection through technology will be an important attribute of power of nations, regions, and those international institutions capable of commanding the necessary resources for it.

The Growing Scale and Costs of Technology

To this list of basic consequences of the new technology one has to add its growing scale. Large economies of scale entail enormous costs and require enormous resources. Even in such "conventional" items as transformers for power networks, the minimum economic size of a plant needed to produce the huge transformers to take advantage of the economies of scale is pushing producers into cooperation or mergers. Most European companies are incapable of producing the huge transformers needed for the continuously increasing voltage in the networks. This development has forced even such giants as Siemens and Telefunken to join forces in the heavy electrical engineering field. In the United States, five producers supply the entire market, while in Europe there are as many as thirty.

The scale and cost of the present advanced technology—outer space, particle accelerators for advanced nuclear research, supersonic transport, and nuclear weapons development—are of gigantic proportions, and they are imposing a heavy burden even on a country of America's wealth and resources. Future technologies will become even more demanding in this respect. The benefits from the nuclear agro-industrial complexes are expected to be important, but the economic scale of operation requires an investment of between half a billion and a billion dollars for each complex. Economies of scale are important in advanced technology of power generation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent progress in controlled thermonuclear reaction led to anticipation that operational prototype reactors would be ready in the United States perhaps as early as the late 1970's.[14] While these reactors are expected to be relatively small (2,000 megawatts), commercial fusion reactors may have a capacity as large as 10,000 megawatts, and reactors of 20,000 megawatts are conceivable and would be even more economical. A reactor of this size would have a generating capacity more than twice as large as that of Poland in 1967. MHD power is particularly responsive to economies of scale. If the expected progress in the technology of MHD power materializes, the economies of scale might push the size of generating plants even higher than the above figures suggest; furthermore, huge MHD plants are likely to become operational before commercial CTR becomes a reality.[15]

There are other technologies on the horizon which will require major initial outlays. Current projections anticipate the availability of nuclear-propelled surface-effect ships, perhaps as large as an aircraft carrier, in 1985-1990. These vessels, moving at a speed of 100 knots, would have both land and sea mobility. Since there will be no need to construct roads and dock facilities and since they will be highly automated, they are expected to be attractive commercially after the initial R & D costs are met.[16] Various schemes for large-scale climate modifications will demand immense expenditures. The present exploitation of ocean resources is limited to relatively shallow depths. To move to greater depths and to widen the scope of exploitable resources, the neces-

[14]In a letter to the author dated May 21, 1969, Dr. Amasa S. Bishop, Assistant Director (for Controlled Thermonuclear Research), Division of Research, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, stated that, according to an "optimistic" schedule, the operation of a prototype fusion reactor in the United States could begin in 1978. However, since the Soviet Union has a considerable lead in this area, the Soviets may build a prototype fusion reactor ahead of the United States. For the Soviet breakthrough in CTR, see "British Verify Russians' Strides Towards Taming H-Bomb Power," *New York Times,* October 31, 1969, p. 1.

[15]It should be pointed out that huge size in generating plants is not peculiar only to such advanced technologies as CTR, MHD or fast breeder reactors. The study by the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, on "Considerations Affecting Steam Power Plant Site Selection" shows that 147 thermal generating plants for the year 1990 will have capacities of from 2,000 to 10,000 megawatts. (Quoted in Dr. Bishop's letter to the author, May 21, 1969, *op. cit.*) By comparison, the largest thermal plants at present have a capacity of about 1,000 megawatts, while plants of 500 megawatts are still considered to be huge.

[16]Small vehicles carrying about fifteen people, moving on a variant of the surface-effect principle (aircushion) and having both land and sea mobility, are currently operational. They use a gas turbine engine and can clear obstacles up to five feet. Three such vehicles have been used in Viet Nam. See "Monsters that Float on the Air," *Army,* June 1968, pp. 80-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sary exploration and research and development will require billions of dollars.

In a somewhat different category—but nonetheless real—are the costs generated by undesirable by-products of technological progress. The present highly advanced nations have been developing and applying science and technology with little or no heed to how this activity might affect the environment in the future. The result has been badly polluted rivers, lakes and the air; ecological imbalances that annihilated, or threaten to annihilate, certain species, vegetation and other substances important to man's livelihood, health and the beauty of his environment; and direct hazards to human health and life through such phenomena as excessive chemicals in food and unsafe means of transportation. These characteristics of technological advance in the highly developed nations are no longer tolerable. It will require vast expenditures to compensate for many years of neglect and to effect the necessary planning and readjustment for the future.

The foregoing discussion suggests at least three points. First, rising costs are such that even the superpowers will not be able individually to take advantage of the full potential of future technology. This factor will increasingly generate pressure for international cooperation in technological development among the middle-rank powers, between the superpowers and the middle-rank powers—and perhaps between the superpowers themselves. Second, huge scales of effort will be needed to utilize advanced technology. This will put pressure on the middle-rank powers and smaller nations to cooperate in its utilization—a step that would involve restructuring institutions and the existing "technological superstructure"—or to forgo the advantages of the technology altogether. Third, some forms of future technology—such as large-scale climate modification—will require international cooperation not so much because of the costs involved but because more than one geographic region will be affected and the participation of those concerned will be essential. All three considerations have significant implications for functionalism either as an independent variable affecting the future world order or as an instrument of national policy for the attainment of specific objectives in international affairs.

The Rapidity of Technological Change

The continuously accelerating growth of technological innovation and change constitutes another major trend. Over half of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

products manufactured by American industry today did not exist twenty years ago. Only ten years ago it used to take from five to seven years for a chemical product to advance from the laboratory to the production stage; the process has now been shortened to from one to three years. When the Communications Satellite Corporation was established, it was viewed as an investment in a technology several years away; its operational capability and earnings potential proved to be much faster and greater than originally anticipated. Only a year ago it was expected that commercial use of controlled thermonuclear reaction would be available sometime after the year 2000; now nuclear scientists are thinking in terms of an operational prototype reactor in the late 1970's, which would make CTR economical perhaps in the late 1980's or the early 1990's.

The total body of currently existing science and technology is so large and so versatile that a particular socially significant impact need not depend on progress in one area of technology. It may come from an advance or a breakthrough in one area or another, or it may come from all of them at about the same time, in which case the impact is likely to be truly revolutionary. This can be illustrated by the case of future progress in reducing the cost of energy. It can be achieved by technological advance in the application of superconductivity; indeed, major progress in that area is currently taking place.[17] Cheap energy can be obtained through controlled thermonuclear reaction. Progress in the tech-

[17]Application of superconductivity to the reduction of the cost of power involves the use of superconductors (pure unstrained lead, tin, mercury, or the "non-ideal" superconductors like niobium and vanadium) at very low temperatures (absolute zero); this results in a complete, or nearly complete, elimination of resistance in the transmission of electric current through the metal. The area where progress has been slower—but promising—is the application of superconductivity to the transmission of power. Here electric current can be transmitted over large distances with no, or virtually no, loss, but the cost of refrigerating the lines still remains too high for commercial use at this time. Major strides, however, have been made in the application of superconductivity to the generation of power and motors. International Research and Development Company, Ltd., is building a 3,250-hp motor for the British government; it will be one-tenth the size of the conventional d.c. motor, will need much less power to run, and will cost roughly the same to build (not counting research and development). The economies of scale are important in the application of superconductivity to generation of power. The IR&D believes that an 8,000-hp motor would be 40 per cent cheaper to build than a conventional d.c. motor. The market in the application of superconductivity to transmission and generation of electric power is expected to be big business in the late 1970's. For recent developments in superconductivity, see "Tapping a Cool Idea for Power," *Business Week,* September 7, 1968, pp. 53-54. For a more fundamental discussion of the subject, see Richard McFee, "Application of Superconductivity to the Generation and Distribution of Electric Power," *Electrical Engineering,* February 1962, pp. 122-129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nology of MHD power would also result in lower costs of energy.[18] But if significant advance is achieved in all of these, the cost of energy would be drastically reduced, since the three technologies are complementary and can be applied in a single power station. Quite apart from any major technological innovation that may take place in a particular field, synergistic effects involving innovations from various fields which reinforce each other provide a major dynamic force in modern technological change.

Technological Impact and Social Discontinuities

In the past twenty-five years, the incidence of the technological impact on society was in the military field: through nuclear weapons and missiles, it revolutionized military planning and warfare. It is only recently that advanced technology has begun to affect the daily lives of individuals and the work of institutions. The case may well be that the impact of technology on society will produce some important discontinuities in social and political trends in a not-so-distant future. There are signs that these discontinuities might be taking place in the United States now. They are reflected in the changing values of American youth.

Recent *Fortune* magazine surveys of college and non-college youth shed some light on this subject.[19] According to the surveys,

[18]MHD power requires a brief explanation. In a conventional fossil fuel power generating station, for each input of thermal energy one gets only about 40 per cent of its energy equivalent in electric power; this is due to the loss in the conversion from thermal energy to mechanical energy and then to electric energy. The MHD principle employs superheated gases (about 4000° F.) which, when passed through a magnetic field, produce electric energy. The exhaust gases are further used to produce steam for conventional generation of electric power. When electric power from both sources is used, the total efficiency in early large MHD generators is expected to be increased to about 50 per cent, and to 60 per cent in advanced generators. Even a 50 per cent efficiency is a major improvement, since it represents about 25 per cent more electric power from a given amount of thermal energy. It has been estimated that potential savings to the U.S. consumer which appear possible with MHD will amount to billions of dollars by the end of the century.

In the present state of the art, relatively small MHD generators have been developed as an economical source for stand-by power, to operate in spurts for an hour or two. The expectation is that MHD power should be economically attractive on a large scale in about ten to fifteen years.

For a recent state-of-the-art discussion of MHD and projections into the future, see William D. Jackson, *et al.*, "Critique of MHD Power Generation," a paper presented at the Winter Annual Meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, November 16-20, 1969 (ASME publication, 69-WA/Pwr-12).

[19]The two surveys commissioned by *Fortune* were conducted by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., in October 1968 and March-April 1969. They interviewed 2,058 individuals and were reported in Daniel Seligman, "A Special Kind of Rebellion," *Fortune,* January 1969, p. 67 ff., and Jeremy Main, "Dissidence Among College Students Is Still Growing, and It Is Spreading Beyond the Campus," *ibid.,* June 1969, pp. 73-74. This and the following paragraphs are based on the data supplied by these two articles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

three-fifths of American college students are "practical-minded"; for them, college is a natural road to career, status and financial success. About two-fifths of college students, however, reject these values, and since they appear to be growing into a majority of college students in the future, the surveys call them the "forerunner group." The forerunners are not concerned about money. They are more likely than the practical students to have privileged backgrounds; they take affluence for granted, are disdainful of "careerist" values and vague about their own career expectations. The forerunner group is most likely to major in humanities and seems to be interested in finding work that is intellectually challenging and related to its social concerns.

About half of the forerunners believe that the United States is a "sick society," and nearly a fifth of them have a sense of "solidarity and identification" with the New Left. They tend to be scornful of patriotism. However, only a relatively small percentage (between 3 and 4 per cent) of college students in general were classified as "revolutionary," and less than 10 per cent as "radical dissidents." The vast majority (76.4 per cent) falls into the categories of "reformers" and "moderates," while a little over 10 per cent are "conservatives." Non-college youth takes nearly as critical a view of society as college youth.

Not all aspects of this development can be attributed to technological impact, but its important role (direct and indirect) is unmistakable. The "affluent society," and the values and attitudes stemming from it, is largely a result of the high productivity made possible by modern technology—a new factor that opens up the option of completely eradicating poverty, something that was unthinkable before. The penetrating influence of technology makes the irrelevance of some old attitudes obvious: what matters now is the skill to operate computers, to conduct research in laboratories, not whether one is black or white, Protestant or Catholic. The rise of what Kenneth E. Boulding calls the "superculture"—"the culture of airports, throughways, skyscrapers, hybrid corn and artificial fertilizers, birth control and universities"[20]—worldwide in scope, with science as its common ideology, induces questions in the minds of young people about the relevance of nationalism in the present world system.

The rapid pace of technological change (practically all of the

[20]Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Emerging Superculture," in Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, editors, *Values and the Future* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 347.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socially conscious life of the "now" generation has been within the last ten years, marked by the impact of such innovations as the transistor radio, worldwide jet transportation, the Pill, the landing on the moon, and other near-miracles) creates among the young a different perspective on how long it takes to get things done. When this perspective is applied to social problems like poverty, racial prejudice and wars, it not only widens the generation gap but makes a large percentage of young people action-prone. Today's affluence provides money, transportation, bullhorns and duplicating machines to translate the propensity to action into organizational and politically meaningful terms. Nearly instantaneous television coverage also fosters organizational efforts: it shows the radically inclined students all over the nation where the action is and makes rapid response possible. Perhaps more important, television compels emotional involvement in the coverage of violence (such as clashes of demonstrators on the streets or the torments of wounded soldiers in Viet Nam), but is much less effective with complex, abstract issues. It thus encourages "commitment" and discourages rational resolution of social problems.[21]

Other factors contributing to the new trend in value orientation, exemplified by the forerunner group, include the high complexity of modern technological society. A young man has to go through many years of schooling and then many years of work in routine or subordinate capacity before he reaches a stage where he can do something important or be influential. The impersonality of the existing institutions, their huge size and complexity producing rigidity and poor adaptability to change, induces a feeling of helplessness and alienation from the society as presently governed. Furthermore, as young people observe the rapidity of change they begin to wonder whether the skills they obtain through long years of schooling will be applicable to the society they will live in. As they try to look into the post-industrial society of coming years[22]—with its emphasis on superior knowledge, meritocracy, and highly complex, even more impersonal, computerized decision-making by increasingly larger organizations —many young people find the picture not particularly reassuring. Hence the shift to social and moral concerns, the humanitarian aspects of life, to "feeling" and "simple justice," as distinguished

[21]Seligman, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[22]For characteristics of the post-industrial society, see Daniel Bell, "Notes on Post-Industrial Society," *The Public Interest,* Winter 1967, pp. 24-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the highly rational, complex, impersonal and, at times, quite arbitrary realities induced by technological advance.[23]

As one examines the impact of technology on the value system of the young generation, one can hardly escape the question: What sort of social discontinuities will result when institutions and daily lives of individuals are much more strongly affected by future technology? The late 1970's and the early 1980's, in particular, seem to be important in this respect. At that time, a number of technological impacts will converge and may produce major, perhaps radical, changes in society. Among the relevant factors can be mentioned the pervasive impact of computers; truly global mass communications and travel; development of ocean resources; the multiple problems of the post-industrial society then in full swing; and the imponderable effects of biomedicine. Moreover, it will be a time when nations will have to begin adjusting their technological superstructure and institutions for the even larger scale of the technologies of the later 1980's and the early 1990's: MHD power; thermonuclear plants; large-size, high-speed, surface-effect vehicles with both ocean and land mobility, and large-scale climate modification.

The nature and extent of the social discontinuities that might result will inevitably depend on a timely appreciation of the emerging problems and on effective policies to cope with them. It will also depend on the recognition of the extent to which the change being introduced by the technological impact is inevitable and legitimate, and on the adjustment of institutions and the creation of new ones to meet the requirements of this change. For a variety of reasons, all societies will not be equally successful in coping with the impact of technology. The price for failure, however, could be large: it may involve extensive social dislocation, widespread personal insecurity, severe social instability, and a serious weakening, if not collapse, of governmental authority and capability for defense.

While the exact consequences of the accelerating impact of future technologies are impossible to foresee, it is clear that the traditional view of technology as producing "long-range impact" no longer applies. Social, political and institutional changes induced by technology may be rapid, either as a result of a pent-up response to the already existing technology which has not yet come to the surface, or as a result of a swift advance in technology itself inducing concurrent socio-political change.

[23]Cf. Seligman, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Growing Importance of Nonmilitary Technology for National Security

Still another trend in the technological impact has been a changing relationship between military and nonmilitary technologies with regard to their effect on national security, especially that of the superpowers. Nonmilitary technology is gaining in importance as an area of direct relevance to national security, mainly because its role in changing the distribution of world and regional power is growing faster than the role of military technology.

Historically, national power has been changed through both military and nonmilitary technology. Through wars and conquest, qualitative or quantitative gains in weapons could change the distribution of power much more swiftly and more dramatically. Hence, it was the military sector on which the nations' concern for security was focused. In the long run, however, nonmilitary technology accounted for at least as much change in the distribution of world power as military technology. In more recent times, the rise of states has been principally determined by the technologies that made it possible for them to become great industrial centers.[24] Military power usually followed in the wake of industrial capability.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States at the end of World War II was a revolutionary development that gave the United States vast superiority in military power over the rest of the world in the immediate postwar years. Politically, however, nuclear weapons have proven to be a "power-unrewarding" area. Their great destructiveness and the unwillingness to use them came to mean that even an overwhelming nuclear superiority had but limited transferability into political power. The picture was further complicated by the progress of the Soviet Union in the development of nuclear technology, which accounted in large measure for the rise of Soviet power in the last two decades. However, after a certain point in weapons technology and the accumulation of "hardware" had been reached, the technological

[24]To illustrate: The initial industrial lead of Great Britain was undermined by the invention of the Bessemer process of steel production (1856) which, by allowing for mass production, made the United States the leading steel producer by the end of the nineteenth century. The Thomas-Gilchrist process (1879) enabled Germany to utilize the phosphoric iron ores of Alsace-Lorraine, thus making Germany the greatest European steel producer by 1893. Railroads were a major factor in the rise of the United States and Russia as great powers. Exploitation of hydroelectric power, chemical resources, telecommunications and cheap water transportation were important in Japan's rise to power before World War II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

achievements of the two superpowers merely tended to neutralize each other, without any serious prospect for changing the distribution of world power.[25]

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by third states will not radically change the picture. If developed by responsible industrial powers (e.g., Japan) and accompanied by advanced means of delivery, they will have prestige value and will enhance the nation's military power to a point. But they will soon be absorbed and largely neutralized in the overall nuclear umbrella. If acquired by smaller states (e.g., Israel, Argentina), the weapons will temporarily change the regional distribution of power, but will eventually result in rudimentary regional nuclear umbrellas also characterized by mutual neutralization of power.

There are signs that, for political, technological and military reasons, the stalemate dominating nuclear affairs is beginning to spread into the conventional military sector as well. Concerned that a local conflict may escalate and trigger a nuclear war, the superpowers appear to be eager to restrict or smother it in an early stage, thus forestalling the stronger party from significantly changing the local balance of power through the force of arms (e.g., in the Middle East). The growing global projection of Soviet military power tends to deter potential American military action at various points of the globe; for example, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean would make the U.S. government think twice before undertaking another Lebanon. The stalemate over Viet Nam suggests that substitution of technology for political solutions in limited conflict does not necessarily provide a solution. Viet Nam also indicates that modern conventional military technology, pitted against itself, has a tendency to manifest symptoms of a deadlock: American technology has been fighting not only the Vietnamese but also the products of Soviet and Chinese factories. Our aircraft, though superior, were practically stalemated by the effectiveness of the Soviet-built surface-to-air missile sites, assisted by anti-aircraft batteries.[26]

Future technology is likely to reinforce the growing stalemate. Nearly instantaneous satellite surveillance will help the United States and the Soviet Union to be well and swiftly informed about

[25]For a good summary of what has come to be called "the nuclear umbrella," see The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 718-730.

[26]See Anthony Verrier, "Strategic Bombing—the Lessons of World War II and the American Experience in Vietnam," *The Royal United Service Institution Journal*, May 1967, pp. 157-158.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the location of each other's forces, particularly at sea. Improving air and sea mobility will afford both sides the possibility of blocking each other's moves. If, as predicted by some sources, lasers are developed into operational weapons,[27] resort to warfare on the subnuclear umbrella level will be further discouraged. However, unlike the case of the nuclear umbrella, the subnuclear umbrella military level can only be partially stalemated; for a number of reasons, changes in the distribution of power on this level are still likely to take place.[28]

While the military sector is thus kept in check, there is no sign of a stalemate—either now or in the future—in the ability of nonmilitary technology to effect a change in world power distribution. To mention but a few examples: Computers can provide a major impetus to the growth of a nation by facilitating economic planning and the investment and marketing strategy of corporations, thus providing differential advantage to the countries and regions leading in this field. Technological capability for the development of marine resources opens up new vistas in three-quarters of the globe that is virtually unexplored, unexploited and unsettled, with concomitant geopolitical implications. Nations that succeed in reducing the costs of energy sooner than others will be able to gain important advantages in the world markets, and strengthen their industrial capability and leverages of influence in the less developed world. The capability for controlling hurricanes, for covertly removing moisture from the atmosphere over a foreign nation, or for interfering with the layer of ozone surrounding the earth (and thus subjecting the ground underneath to severe burns by ultraviolet rays of the sun)[29]—for all of which the technologies could be developed by the late 1980's, if not sooner—would provide a more direct and dramatic means of changing the power distribution. The internal impact of technology on society and the resultant social discontinuities, which we have discussed previously, may also have implications of consequence for national power.

[27]Lt. Col. Martin Blumenson, "The Incredible Laser," *Army*, April 1968, p. 35 ff.; Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 51.

[28]The superpowers may not choose to stalemate each other (e.g., the USSR may let the United States defeat Red China in a localized conflict); or they may not succeed in restraining each other because of certain characteristics of the particular situation.

[29]For potential developments in weather modification and how they relate to national power, see Gordon J. F. McDonald, "How to Wreck the Environment," in Nigel Calder, editor, *Unless Peace Comes* (New York: Viking, 1968), pp. 187-191.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The speed of modern developments, which may prove many present estimates conservative, accentuates the importance of nonmilitary technology to national security. While the military sector may become increasingly stabilized in the next decades, nonmilitary technology might generate serious instability in foreign affairs which would be difficult, if not impossible, to control.

Implications for American Policy

Technology of the future will bring both great benefits and serious perils to society. The problem is to *control* it and its impact; the alternative is to be controlled by it. Control of technology requires a systematic effort by society to maximize its benefits and minimize its harmful effects in the context of social goals and purposes. As a corollary, it also requires analytical insights into the nature of the technological impact and the existence of appropriate institutions capable of generating and implementing the needed policies.

Since the dimensions of the technological impact range from local to global, in the last analysis its control can be effective only if it is undertaken on a worldwide scale. The political organization of the contemporary world does not permit effective control on such a scale at present. This suggests at least two criteria for American policy. (1) It is important that the United States be earnest and persistent in its efforts to subject technology and its impact to control in cooperation with other nations. (2) It is even more important that we as a society concentrate on improving our own capability in this regard. There can be little hope of being able to control technology globally if we are incapable of providing the requisite instruments of control within our own nation.

Improvements in the last twelve years notwithstanding, the United States is still inadequately equipped institutionally for this purpose. At the pinnacle of the U.S. government hierarchy, the principal responsibility for science and technology falls on the Science Adviser to the President and on his staff institutionalized in the Office of Science and Technology (OST). However, they can hardly be expected to cope with the staggering task of controlling technological impact. OST is a small body consisting of some twenty professional people who are mostly involved in immediate problems and issues. Its effectiveness has been strengthened by the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and it has also been assisted by the Federal Council for Science and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Technology (FCST),[30] but OST has been unable to develop, or stimulate the development of, the needed conceptual instruments which would view the impact of science and technology as a continuum from its domestic origins to global implications and would attempt to control it accordingly. In actual operational capacity, OST's power with regard to major governmental agencies dealing with science and technology (such as the AEC, NASA and the Department of Defense) has been limited. OST has not been able to overcome a dispersion of responsibility for science and technology policy or to allocate resources in accordance with an overall plan, as distinguished from merely mitigating some excesses of the existing pluralism.

New institutions have been created in the past year to deal with the problem of controlling technology's impact. In May 1969 the President established a new interagency Environment Quality Council, with himself as chairman and the Secretaries of the principal departments concerned with the environment as members.[31] In January 1970 a three-member Council on Environmental Quality was set up at the White House. According to Washington observers, it is expected to fulfill a role with respect to the nation's environment similar to the one performed by the Council of Economic Advisers with respect to the national economy. At the same time, the President announced that the existing Environmental Quality Council was to be renamed the Cabinet Committee on the Environment and would be used as a forum for consideration of environmental issues by the President and Cabinet members. As of April 1970, the new Council on

[30]PSAC has been helpful in examining issues referred to it by the Science Adviser to the President, but it has certain important limitations in developing a comprehensive science and technology policy: (1) It is a part-time advisory committee with no such broad responsibilities. (2) As a body consisting almost exclusively of scientists and engineers, it has not always provided impartial judgments; at times it has tended to take positions determined by the special background of this group, legitimate as these positions might be.

Unlike PSAC, the FCST consists of "insiders"—the heads of the independent agencies concerned with science and technology (NASA, AEC and NSF) and Assistant Secretaries for Science and Technology or their equivalent from the various departments. The FCST has suffered from the customary ailments of interagency committees, in particular the considerable degree of independence its members have. For a comprehensive discussion of key U.S. institutions for science and technology policy, see Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 226-248 and *passim*, and OECD, *Reviews of National Science Policy: The United States* (Paris, 1968), pp. 63-80 and *passim*.

[31]For a more extensive discussion of the Environment Quality Council, see Luther J. Carter, "Environmental Quality: Nixon's New Council Raises Doubts," *Science*, July 4, 1969, pp. 44-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Environmental Quality was in the process of organizing its activities.

The National Goals Research Staff, established at the White House in July 1969, is somewhat less directly concerned with the problem of controlling the impact of technology, because it covers a broader spectrum of activity involving forecasting future developments and estimating the range of social choice. As a "think tank" for controlling technology, the NGRS is limited in two important respects: (1) considering the breadth of its mandate, its staff of ten professional people is small; (2) it is oriented toward U.S. internal problems, whereas technology needs to be analyzed in a global context.[32]

The proliferation of institutions at the highest level of government dealing with the impact of technology raises questions of the primacy of responsibility, of a sufficient comprehensiveness in approach, and of an effective coordination of activity among the institutions concerned. These questions can be fully answered only over a period of time.[33]

Aside from the need to strengthen our institutions, there is also a need to re-examine our policies with regard to science and technology. Some specific policy issues and problems can be briefly mentioned here.

In the past the United States had adequate resources to develop and take full advantage of practically the entire spectrum of potentially available technology. Because of the rapid proliferation of sciences and technologies and their initially high costs, the United States in the future will have the resources to develop and effectively utilize only a part of the spectrum. This will require a careful selection of priorities. In the postwar decades, priorities for the federally-supported development of science and technology were primarily determined by competition from the Soviet Union

[32]For details about the establishment of the National Goals Research Staff and its functions, see "The White House Looks to the Future," *The Futurist*, August 1969, pp. 99-101.

[33]It should be noted that activity aimed at subjecting technology to greater control is not limited to the Federal Executive. In particular, on the suggestion of Representative E. Q. Daddario (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives), the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering and the Library of Congress undertook studies on how to secure a more effective assessment of technological impact for public policy. Among other things, the NAS Report on this subject recommended institutional innovations for "technology assessment." However, the "assessment mechanisms" proposed by the NAS are limited *ab initio* because they would apply to *publicly funded* technology only. See the Report of the National Academy of Sciences, *Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice* (Washington: Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, July 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(nuclear-missile and outer space technologies) and by the interplay of various constituencies, inside and outside the U.S. government, competing for resources in support of their interest in a particular development (e.g., nuclear energy, marine sciences and technologies). A more rational and comprehensive approach to the determination of priorities in science and technology, which would consider the interests of the nation as a whole and anticipate the future, is needed.

A new look at nonmilitary technology, from the point of view of both control of its impact and priorities for support, might be in order. This is the technology which is not only growing in importance for national security, but is and will remain the principal instrument for increasing the nation's productivity and hence its ability to solve the multiple internal social and environmental problems contingent on the availability of resources. A number of key technological areas of major significance—such as MHD, CTR, superconductivity, weather modification and marine resources development—are currently either inadequately supported by the federal government or almost completely neglected. A comprehensive development of policies is needed with regard to such areas as the effect of technology on environment (including ecology), and the impact of computers, leisure (a result of the growing productivity) and biomedicine on society.

Last, there is a need for a clearer understanding of how technological developments can serve as a functional instrument of foreign policy and how to apply it wisely. In particular, the direct and indirect impact of technology as an independent variable on the future world order deserves close examination. The next step would be the formulation of a conscious policy, involving the use of technological instruments, to steer the development of the world order in a desirable direction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE UN SYSTEM: THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT DECADE

by Leon Gordenker and Harold Karan Jacobson

THE completion of the First United Nations Development Decade, marking both a clear failure to achieve goals and the beginning of a new effort, provides a critical juncture at which governments and international organizations can make significant choices about the future of assistance for development and modernization offered through the UN system. The Development Decade idea evolved from an imaginative proposal made by President John F. Kennedy in 1961. It foresaw a grand effort during the 1960's to link all UN components—specialized agencies, regional commissions, the United Nations itself and hitherto autonomous programs—in work toward a more satisfactory pace in the economic development of the less developed countries (LDC's). Increased financial contributions from governments were expected and would be essential if the goals set for the First Development Decade were to be reached.

Public and private assessments have incontrovertibly concluded that the main target of an annual growth rate of 5 per cent in the economies of the LDC's was not met. The total assistance offered by the developed countries failed to reach the hoped-for levels and, in particular, the United States government, which hesitates to assume but cannot avoid a leading position, gave financial support well below the rate implied by its sponsorship of the Development Decade idea. Nor have the other major donors, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom, shown much inclination to push up their contributions to development assistance in accordance with increases in their own Gross National Product.

With a new administration in Washington and the planning for the Second Development Decade approaching the point of decision, both the UN system and the United States can make choices that will contribute to real progress and enthusiastic cooperation in the LDC's. If the UN system ties together its programs, practices and proposals in such a way as to convince the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nixon Administration of their viability and potential success, subsequent strong support and leadership by the United States could produce an unparalleled global effort. Even if Washington chooses to downgrade its foreign assistance policies, it could still channel enough through the UN system to make the Second Development Decade a much more promising proposition. The decisions made in the UN system and the U.S. government will influence each other. Both will help to shape the policies chosen by other donors.

Although assessments of the First Development Decade rely heavily on economic data, other aspects of its central concept deserve attention. From the beginning, a prominent feature has been an attempt to make existing programs and institutions more efficient and beneficial by means of coordination, selection of priorities and acquisition of firmer knowledge of obstacles and possibilities. Decisions for these purposes can be made without advance commitment to new financial support. They rest pre-eminently within the UN system, rather than primarily within national political arenas. Because these decisions, which make up a large proportion of the deliberations in the UN organs, are reached in a political process, the LDC's can exert a major influence. Because the outcome of this process of deliberation and negotiation, in which the secretariats of the UN system also play an important part, may have a discernible and perhaps critical effect on eventual financial support and general assistance policies of the developed countries, it needs more scrutiny than it usually has gotten. It is therefore useful to review the issues that have arisen in the First Development Decade, to seek the accomplishments as well as the shortcomings, to trace the evolution of the whole UN system, and to give special examination to the UN Development Program (UNDP), which has become a principal international instrument to encourage the progress of the LDC's.

II

The First Development Decade can be regarded as a process of role definition and "tooling up." In the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other United Nations organs, the most extended and controversial debates have concerned what is to be done and which components of the system will perform which roles. The polar extremes in debate generally have been maintained by the developed countries of the West (although

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are some exceptions) and the LDC's. Somewhere between the poles have been found the socialist countries, which vary their exact position with time and issue, usually speaking boldly but acting conservatively. This debate will certainly continue. Nevertheless, a number of decisions have been taken which at least establish certain patterns and approaches for the UN system.

Concerning what is to be done, three important issues have been raised. The first, in order of chronology, emanates from the LDC's and relates to the role of foreign trade, especially exports, in promoting economic development. After a long argument revolving around the doctrine developed by Dr. Raul Prebisch and his associates in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America during the late 1950's and early 1960's, the pressure and voting strength of the LDC's determined that the UN system should step up its activities to use changes in the terms and practices of foreign trade as a means of stimulating economic development. Even though professional economists are far from unanimity on this issue, the LDC's won their point in organizational terms with the convocation in 1964 of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the decision then to create continuing machinery to carry out functions which were in considerable part opposed by the developed countries.

The second issue, also raised mainly by the LDC's, concerns the place of industrialization in advancing development. The LDC's have insisted on increasing the activities of the UN system to drive toward rapid and widespread industrialization, despite the fact that this approach is disputed by an even broader group of professional economists than the trade avenue to development. In 1966 the LDC's induced the General Assembly to create the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), an institution whose establishment reflects their zeal and ambition.

In raising and meeting both these issues, the LDC's have used their voting power to make certain that their point of view would be the basis of continuing institutions within the UN system. They did not succeed in this institution-creating course without opposition and deep questioning by governments lacking faith in the methods they proposed. Nor did they cope with the possibility of competing economic interests between themselves and developed countries. Such competition is inherent in, for example, the promotion of processing and light manufacturing in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dustries in such fields as textiles. Yet the pursuit of industrialization clearly has been given higher priority than rationalization of the competitive and trade problems that may result.

The third issue is whether and to what extent the UN system should become involved, or take the lead, in population control activities. After many years of inability even to discuss the subject, the World Health Organization in 1966 made a tentative beginning on a population control program. The United Nations has contributed in a modest way to population control ventures, initially by fostering understanding of demographic developments and more recently by aiding in planning public acceptance of birth control programs and by sending advisory missions to the field. During 1968, both Paul Hoffman, the Administrator of UNDP, and Robert S. McNamara, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), announced that their organizations would support sharply increased activities in this line of endeavor. In view of ever-widening governmental appreciation of the causal connection between explosive population growth and restricted economic expansion, and the public debate resulting from pronouncements by Pope Paul VI on the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward contraception, it seems likely that the UN system will eventually mount a substantial population control program. Even if the LDC's failed to favor population control programs—and on the contrary many LDC's are deeply committed to them—some major donor countries would probably insist on their establishment as the price for continued or additional collaboration on economic development.

Whatever the doctrinal arguments that remain unsettled, the decisions taken with respect to these three issues have had positive effects on the ability of the UN system to field a more comprehensive program during the Second Development Decade than it could manage in the First. The United Nations has additional institutions covering areas heretofore left with relatively little attention, and in the matter of population control it has made a start on one of the most important substantive problems affecting a global program for economic development.

Concerning which components of the UN system should perform which roles, the central issue involves the provision of capital assistance. Since the 1950's, the LDC's have sought to have at least some of the capital assistance distributed through the UN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system administered by an organization in which they had control or at least a greater voice than they have in the IBRD and its affiliates, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation, known collectively as the World Bank Group. The developed countries have a preponderant voice in these institutions because of weighted voting systems. With the swelling of their ranks in the General Assembly in 1960, the LDC's overrode the opposition of the developed countries and voted in principle to create a United Nations Capital Development Fund. In 1966, again despite the opposition of the developed countries, the General Assembly decided to bring the Capital Development Fund into operation. The limits of the powers of the Assembly majority were demonstrated, however, at the pledging conferences held in 1967, 1968 and 1969. The developed countries from both East and West refused to attend, and on each occasion the LDC's present pledged about $1 million, mostly in nonconvertible currencies. The developed countries are averse to being forced by General Assembly resolutions to distribute, through organizations of which they do not approve, the funds that they may be willing to make available for capital assistance to LDC's. For the time being, therefore, it seems likely that among the components of the UN system the task of distributing capital assistance will remain primarily the responsibility of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. The regional development banks will also have a role, although their formal relationship to the UN system is tenuous or nonexistent.

III

Some of the most important steps in the evolution of the UN system during the First Development Decade involve the UNDP. The mere existence of the UNDP is a major achievement. At the outset of the First Development Decade, the UN system had a variety of separate programs for providing technical assistance, the largest of which were the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the United Nations Special Fund. Although the latter had as its purview so-called pre-investment activities, in terms of the common distinction between capital and technical assistance both programs were confined to the technical assistance area. They were financed by voluntary contributions and were collaborative efforts, involving the UN and several

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

specialized agencies. In addition, the UN and a number of the agencies had their own technical assistance programs, known as the regular programs because they were included in the organizations' regular budgets, financed by obligatory assessments. The creation of the United Nations Development Program in 1966 through the merger of EPTA and the United Nations Special Fund was a noteworthy move in the direction of increasing the coherence of these diverse programs. It has been followed by other steps with similar intent. For example, at its Twenty-third Session in the fall of 1968, the General Assembly voted to place the OPEX program, under which operational and executive personnel are provided to LDC's, within the framework of the UNDP.

Even more important than the creation of the UNDP, perhaps, is the fact that funds available within the UN system for technical assistance to LDC's have increased substantially. In 1958, before the Special Fund had begun its operations, the total costs of EPTA were $33.8 million, and those of the regular programs $10.7 million. Two years later EPTA's financial outlay had increased less than one million dollars, but the regular programs had grown by nearly 50 per cent. By the end of 1960, the Special Fund reported after its second year of operation, 115 projects had been approved with a total allocation of $95.9 million. In 1967 expenditures for the technical assistance component of the UNDP amounted to $50.6 million, regular program expenditures were $45.5 million, and expenditures from special Trust Funds within the UN system totaled $14.4 million. Expenditures of the Special Fund component of the UNDP were $92.9 million. Through 1967 the Special Fund had approved 778 projects, involving a total allocation of $770.6 million. Many of these projects continued as long as five years. The immense increase in the resources channeled through the United Nations system can be seen with even more clarity by comparing the total amount expended on technical assistance and pre-investment projects in 1959 with that in 1967. In the former year, the UN system expended $44.5 million. Eight years later expenditures had reached $203.4 million, representing a growth of more than 450 per cent.

While the capital assistance activities of the UN system have not grown as dramatically, they too have increased. In 1960 the IBRD disbursed $516 million to LDC's, and the International Finance Corporation $19 million, making a total of $535

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

million. The International Development Association had just come into existence that year. In 1966 IBRD disbursed $603 million, the International Development Association $457 million, and the International Finance Corporation $54 million, adding up to $1,114 million for the World Bank Group. Thus in six years the disbursements more than doubled.

IV

By treating these developments as trends that could confidently be projected into the 1970's, the conclusion could be reached that the UN system would play an enhanced role during the Second Development Decade. The resources at its command and the comprehensiveness of its machinery would go far toward providing the LDC's with a vital means for attaining their goal of a rapidly rising rate of economic development. The system would be well on the way toward the role many delegates, secretariat members and scholars have long advocated for it. Unfortunately the period of substantial and successful growth appears to be hovering at a critical juncture and not moving over the threshold which would give confidence to the beneficiaries and advocates of the multilateral program. It remains possible that the apex of expansion now reached could become a base for further construction, but it is just as possible that it could remain the high point.

The decisions of fourteen crucial donor states, grouped in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, will have the strongest single effect on the magnitude of resources channeled through the UN system. In 1967 pledges of contributions by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States made up 87 per cent of the financing available to the UNDP. The U.S. contribution by Congressional mandate may not exceed 40 per cent of the total. As for the World Bank Group, in 1966 the same fourteen countries accounted for 70 per cent of the funds of the IBRD, 78 per cent of those of the International Finance Corporation and 73 per cent of those of the International Development Association. The contribution of the United States was, respectively, 28 per cent, 35 per cent and 32 per cent.

There is no reason to expect a basic alteration in the pattern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of support for the UN system in the foreseeable future. It is possible that the U.S. government, in which influential persons have sought to reduce bilateral aid programs, may prove willing to shift additional resources to multilateral programs. But so far no weakening in the support for a fixed upper limit on American contributions to the UN system has appeared.

The decisions of these major donor countries will be affected by their perceptions of the UN system, its problems and potentialities. Furthermore, the success or progress of the system will depend on more than the level of resources available to it. In this connection, the uses the LDC's make of assistance from the UN will contribute to decisions about the character and level of work to be undertaken in the 1970's.

Put in sharp terms, it is still not clear that the UN system can operate a large and coherent program adequately designed to promote development. The components of the system are legally, geographically and conceptually separate organizations; for them to mount a coherent program requires intricate coordination. The creation of the UNDP, and earlier of EPTA and the Special Fund, were important steps in this direction. The altered structural form has shifted the system toward more central budgetary controls and has enhanced the possibility of coordination. Simultaneously, the size of the programs and their particular emphases have stimulated unanticipated but important growth in the specialized agencies. Indeed, in recent years the annual allocations to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have been about twice as large as its overall regular administrative budget. Although the situation in FAO is the most extreme, other agencies, such as the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), now depend heavily on UNDP funds for their most sought after activities in the LDC's. This dependence has been used as a force for coordination. And in this complex system of overlapping tasks, independent organizations and possibly competing interests, coordination achieves a value of its own, representing efficient use of resources and assignment of priorities according to some known scheme with its own presumed rationality.

Even so, coordination has come slowly. Despite the general statements emanating from the deliberative organs at various headquarters, what coordination there is in a practical sense has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come mainly from the field level. From an institutional point of view, coordination in the field receives much impetus from the UN Resident Representative who can be found in almost all of the recipient countries. Whatever his background—he may be carried as a permanent employee of one of the specialized agencies —as Resident Representative he reports to and receives instructions from UNDP headquarters. His is the sole channel of communication concerning requests for UNDP assistance. His office has the theoretical ability to provide a central clearing agency for information and inspection of all UNDP-financed projects within a country. But even slight acquaintance with the realities of the field situation makes it obvious that mere formal powers do not overcome the administrative independence, pride of expertness and sheer bureaucratic protectiveness displayed by some representatives of the various UN institutions. The independent status of the specialized agencies in itself probably would have provided a nearly unmanageable dose of autonomy or a propensity to bargain in the system. It is further complicated by the increasing tendency to endow the UN regional economic commissions with operating functions.

As for capital assistance, Resident Representatives of the UNDP have almost no authority and sometimes not more than a distant and tenuous connection with representatives of the World Bank Group operating in the same territory. It is quite common for a Resident Representative to hear of an impending visit by World Bank Group representatives only through governmental channels, not directly. Some World Bank Group representatives freely admit, almost flaunt, their lack of interest in consulting resident representatives, although this attitude is far from constant or consistent. Furthermore, the authority—either formal or actual—of the Resident Representative with regard to technical assistance provided by agencies of the UN system outside UNDP is ambiguous. Yet such programs accounted for 29 per cent of the technical assistance provided by the UN system to LDC's in 1967.

Nevertheless, where the government has a firm sense of its own priorities and a willingness and ability to enforce these, a strong and capable Resident Representative can use his position to shape a connected, well-designed program, at least with respect to that portion of it financed by UNDP. Given good will and a favorable situation, he can coordinate the UNDP program with regular programs and even occasionally with those of bilateral agencies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so as to form a coherent whole. The total package can fit and sustain the local development efforts, while advancing the interests and ideas of the several donors.

Where these conditions do not prevail, or if agency salesmen are particularly persistent and can find allies within the bureaucracies of the recipient countries, serious distortions can easily arise. Because requests for UNDP projects result in the expansion of administrative agencies, a constant encouragement to "sell" new schemes is at work. At the same time, the agencies execute UNDP programs and furnish personnel for the recipient countries, which must provide counterpart personnel and assign officials to deal with the substance of agency work. In these circumstances, the growth of client groups naturally takes place. This tendency frequently receives impetus through the presence of a high official who serves as country representative for his own agency and sometimes simultaneously as a principal adviser to the relevant ministry. In addition, the agencies produce a flood of documentation which inevitably tends to support and give credence to specialized (and parochial) points of view. The resulting distortions of the UNDP program or the national program may have serious consequences not only because of using scarce external resources for less than priority tasks but also because they can involve important losses of opportunity in the utilization of internal resources.

In recent years the authority of Resident Representatives has grown steadily. In part this has been attributable to the appointment of men with the requisite skills for such demanding posts. Giving them increased administrative and executive support has helped, and an organizational innovation promises to strengthen their hand further. In several instances, as a result of an agreement between FAO and UNDP, the chief of the FAO program has been appointed as senior agricultural adviser to the Resident Representative, and his salary has been assumed by the UNDP. This arrangement is being extended to other agencies.

But there are limits to what can be achieved through steps such as these, although they certainly should be pursued vigorously. In any recipient country, the technical assistance program of the UN system will tend to appear as a series of discrete, though perhaps coordinated, sectoral projects, undertaken in separate geographic areas. There are few truly collaborative efforts among the components of the UN system. Economic and politi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal modernization cannot always be approached in a sectoral fashion, and if the UN is going to make a maximum contribution to this process there will have to be far more collaboration among the components of the system than there has been in the past. Such collaboration may not be possible unless the UNDP moves beyond its basic concept of appointing one organization as the executing agency for its major projects.

Another difficulty caused by the historical development of the UN system is that the components were not created with the aim of providing comprehensive coverage with respect to the processes of economic and political modernization. Even with perfect coordination, not every aspect of development would be covered by the purposes of the UN agencies. Consequently, new programs have been improvised by the UN itself, which has entered such areas as public administration, urbanization, statistics, and development planning. The creation of UNIDO, in 1966, was a promising step toward closing a major gap, but whether or not UNIDO's record of achievement will fulfill this promise is as yet unclear. It *is* clear that the accomplishments of the UN system in the field of industrialization have up to now been minimal.

This is also true in the field of trade promotion. UNCTAD and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have jointly established an International Trade Center, which conceivably could play an important role. The pressure to have UNCTAD become an executing agent for the UNDP, however, has thus far been rebuffed.

Still another difficulty attributable to the nature of the UN system is that because most of the agencies were not created with the primary purpose of conducting extensive operational activities, the great increase in such activities has seriously taxed their capabilities and has inspired them hastily to construct new administrative structures. Many of them are now administering total budgets several times the size of those for which they were responsible a decade ago. The agencies have grown rapidly, rather than deliberately, and many of them now suffer the consequences associated with such growth.

Moreover, technical assistance programs often are more than an end in themselves. They are intended to lead to capital assistance. This progression encounters a final difficulty attributable to the nature of the UN system. Moving from technical to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital assistance in a project deliberately set up by UNDP and the recipient government to produce such an outcome requires steady coordination. But this is a particularly difficult task, because the structure and membership of the World Bank Group are substantially different from those of the other UN agencies. Fortunately, the World Bank's relationship with the UNDP shows signs of growing increasingly close, but it could be improved still further.

V

Thus far what we have dealt with might be termed administrative and institutional problems. There are also conceptual issues, relating to the role of the UN system in disbursing assistance. These issues can be summarized by the questions of to whom aid should be given and for what purposes.

Traditionally, the UN system has discriminated very little in choosing recipients. Particularly within the UNDP there has been strong pressure for distribution according to some concept of "fair shares." The World Bank Group, to the extent that it has discriminated, has done so primarily on the basis of banking principles.

One consequence of this lack of discrimination is that during the period from 1963 through 1967, some 11 per cent of UNDP funds was given to eleven countries with per capita GNP's of more than $500 per year: Argentina, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Kuwait, Poland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. In 1966 four countries in this category, South Africa, Iceland, Japan and Venezuela, received 20 per cent of the loans made by the IBRD, and three, Greece, Spain and Venezuela, received 13 per cent of the commitments made by the International Finance Corporation. This distribution clearly conformed to a policy of giving assistance as widely as possible, so that recipients at both the upper and lower ends of the per-capita-GNP spectrum were included. But there is little evidence of the application of a doctrine that makes possible distribution of aid either where the need is most pressing or where developmental potentials are highest.

Particularly in the case of the UNDP, questions have been raised about whether there ought to be some level of per capita GNP beyond which countries would have to pay all or a substantial share of the costs of any assistance they received. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDP administration and the United States have resisted moves in this direction, mainly because of the effect they would have on assistance to some communist countries. Without questioning the objective of facilitating contact with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, it is not clear that the UNDP is the most appropriate vehicle for such efforts.

Overall economic performance is already an important criterion in the granting of assistance by the World Bank Group. If the UNDP is to grow substantially, some donor states will undoubtedly insist that more attention be given to performance in decisions relating to assistance under this program also. However, insistence on this qualification may meet strong objections from the LDC's, which would see in it another form of the "strings" they strenuously resist in bilateral programs.

In similar fashion, the UN system has been open-minded about the purposes of its assistance. Within its substantive and resource capacity, it has generally sought to respond to the wishes of the recipients. This was undoubtedly appropriate, for at the beginning the funds involved were minimal, and even as the program grew, it was still to a considerable extent experimental. But by 1969 the United Nations had approved a large body of doctrine, in the form of recommendations from the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, on economic development. While it is doubtful that member governments have been strongly influenced by this outpouring of which the Development Decade idea is a part, UNDP could base its decisions to discriminate among projects on those approved recommendations. Indeed this reasoning suggests that in addition to striving for administrative coordination a similar effort along conceptual lines might pay dividends.

In relationship to the bilateral programs, the posture of the UN system has implied that if it had the money it could do anything better than the bilaterals. It now seems clear that any foreseeable expansion in the assistance administered by the system will continue to be far less than the total of the resources transferred to LDC's. Given this situation, and for other reasons, it will increasingly be incumbent on the system to apply a strategic doctrine to guide its assistance efforts. This doctrine ought to stress the comparative advantages the UN system has.

The chief advantages of the system over bilateral sources are that it is relatively commercially disinterested and politically

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutral. This would suggest that it should concentrate its efforts in fields where these qualities are particularly important assets. Pre-investment surveys and central planning are undoubtedly such areas. The UN system, because of its universality, also ought to have an advantage in fields where regional and interregional collaboration is important. To some extent it already has interested itself in these areas, but it could go even further.

Beyond doubt, a necessary condition for development is the political viability of the country involved. A disorderly and turbulent society, wrecking what is new along with the fruits of the past, clearly cannot proceed to transform itself merely by deliberate planning, technical improvement and investment. Among the most important ingredients in political viability are internal security and innovative political leadership. To date, except for minimal involvement through its programs in public administration and through fellowships for upgrading the skills of government personnel, the UN system has largely steered clear of these provinces. It probably could not enter them overtly and would have to proceed quietly and obliquely. Yet the system, given its concentration on manpower training and planning advice, surely could help governments prepare better and more numerous officials to deal with the special social problems that cause turbulence in the economic development process. So far, it has barely begun to deal with social side-effects of economic development. To some extent, by the adroit use of fellowships and training and orientation tours, it has already begun to help prepare leaders for their roles, but in view of the cruciality of maintaining conditions of political viability, and the comparative advantages of the UN system, perhaps additional activity should be brought about. With the record of the Viet Nam imbroglio all too apparent, a number of major donors might find this a welcome step. Even if such expansion proves impossible, administrators in the UN system should give more attention to the often unavoidable consequences of their own programs.

VI

In the style of the UN system, a number of *ad hoc* groups, committees and commissions have been appointed to review the development activities of the system and to make recommendations for the future. The most illustrious of these are the commission headed by Sir Robert Jackson, appointed to consider the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capacity of the UN and its associated agencies to administer an enlarged program of assistance under the UNDP; Lester Pearson's committee considering the role of the World Bank Group; and the Preparatory Committee of fifty-four governmental delegates appointed to consider the role of the UN system as a whole in the Second Development Decade. The Pearson and Jackson commissions have already issued their reports. Both have called for new action, and the latter particularly for reform of the UN system. Now the system itself must act. The hard questions already posed must be asked again, this time in meetings of governmental representatives. More than is often the case, these representatives have a serious responsibility. The answers they give will determine the role that the UN system will play in the 1970's. The new decade could end as a confusion of futile symbols, diffuse programs and frustrated hopes. Or it could end as a successful effort to deal with some of the pressing problems of international relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ: SCHOLAR, GENTLEMAN, MAN OF LETTERS

by Morton A. Kaplan

PRESIDENT John F. Kennedy began the practice of appointing academics as ambassadors. The well-known scholar, Edwin O. Reischauer, was appointed Ambassador to Japan and the academic publicist, John Kenneth Galbraith, was appointed Ambassador to India. President Nixon has followed in this tradition by appointing Robert Strausz-Hupé Ambassador to Ceylon. Dr. Strausz-Hupé had carved out a career both as a noted academic and as an academic publicist. He brings distinction to his new post as he previously brought it to his positions as professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and as founder and director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Before I met Professor Strausz-Hupé in 1966, I had known him through his scholarly works. Among his other books, *The Zone of Indifference, The Balance of Tomorrow, Geopolitics* and *Building the Atlantic World* had made a striking contribution to political science, and more particularly to the study of international politics. Strausz-Hupé was among the few political scientists who understood fully the importance of culture in political behavior before that subject became popular again in the last fifteen years. He was a pioneer in the application of both the cultural and the geographic analyses of international politics. In addition, he was that rare bird, a literate social scientist.

Yet Strausz-Hupé's reputation was not entirely favorable. As the Cold War receded, his works grew increasingly unpopular in liberal circles in political science. Although his book *Protracted Conflict* was a study of the communist theory of protracted conflict, he was accused of advocating protracted conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In some circles he was denigrated for holding extreme right-wing views.

Though I knew that these extreme views of him were inaccurate, the stereotype held in some liberal circles persisted. Therefore I was entirely unprepared for the man I finally met. I had expected him to be stern and serious, with a sense of important mission. Instead he was a slight, witty, gracious *bon vivant*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— one who enjoyed life and who lived with style, a man of modest mien, so gentle that he had only kind words even for those who attacked him. If I had expected a crusader, I met instead a man who preferred good living and witty conversation to the dismal realities of politics. If I had expected a strategist adept at political intrigue and devoted to military calculations, instead I met a man who found such matters distasteful and inconsistent with the art of life.

I

I hope my readers will forgive me if, instead of studying the work of the professor in some detail, I attempt to solve the riddle of the man. For, if there is a discrepancy between what Strausz-Hupé has written and the liberal stereotype of him, there is an even greater discrepancy between the man and his scholarly work. The task is complicated by an additional puzzle: What is it in his work that has led so many liberals to misinterpret it? Undeniably, if the liberal stereotype is distorted, he has taken positions that precipitated these distortions. Moreover, the style of his scholarly work, which is so contrary to the style of his life, facilitates these distortions.

My own mind tends toward abstraction and logical analysis. If I read biography, I do it as a painful duty in the effort to acquire political knowledge. I find the details of people's lives boring, for what makes them unique has little interest for me and what general instruction for social theory these lives provide is so slight that I find the effort unrewarding. If I desire escapism, I much prefer a bad novel. Therefore I turned to Strausz-Hupé's eclectic autobiography *In My Time*[1] with a sense of trepidation. I would read it out of friendship and because of the task I had undertaken. My distaste for this aspect of the task was increased by my unspoken question: What could have been sufficiently remarkable, other than arrogant pretension, in Robert Strausz-Hupé's life to justify an autobiography?

Yet I found the autobiography interesting and instructive. It was not pretentious; nor did Robert make much of the events in which he participated. Rather, the autobiography revealed a way of life and frame of mind alien to puritanical America. It revealed not a man but a dying epoch in Western civilization. The joys of the body so studiously recited and practiced by our young rebels, and yet so alien to their heritage and mentality, naturally and in-

[1]Robert Strausz-Hupé, *In My Time* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965). Quotations by permission of the publisher. Copyright by Robert Strausz-Hupé.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vidiously belonged to Robert Strausz-Hupé, though there is no mention of sex in the book nor any but the most passing reference to the woman who became his wife. Curiously, or not so curiously, the autobiography ends when Strausz-Hupé returned to a full-time academic career, a career inconsistent with the style of life revealed by the book and with his ambitions or intentions as a young man.

Robert Strausz-Hupé came from the Viennese middle bourgeoisie. His family had money, soon lost. It was assumed that he would either become a diplomat or enter the military, not so much because these careers appeared desirable to him, but because these were the things that sons of those families did. However, the First World War left his family impoverished. He perforce left school in 1920 and for a few months "kept books for a grain dealer, doodling through evening courses in stenography and accounting. My employer suggested that my creative drive and aversion to office routine destined me for intellectual pursuits. I had no choice other than to take his advice." (p. 30.) The understatement and the self-reproachful humor are typical of the man.

He repaired to the Viennese coffeehouses, reading books and earning a few schillings doing translations. He was asked by Otto Distler to verify the German translation of a play by Paul Claudel.

> Otto adopted a few of the minute changes in wording which I had suggested. For the first time in my life I felt the pride of publication — a few lines of verse spoken as I had set them down. I thought my rendering quite superior to the French original. I was probably right at that, for Claudel can be tediously allusive, prone to a hyperbolic symbolism which leaves one waiting for a clue that never comes. Many years later I read his correspondence with Gide. Gide, a far less happy man than Claudel and not possessed of the latter's almost musical facility, stands up much better. A spoiled Calvinist wrestling with vice is just plausible, even if he slugs it out with the devil in the most meticulous and elegant prose; a suave diplomat in mystical communion with Catholic dogma is not. (p. 36.)

Strausz-Hupé

moved from one fitful job to another, improvisations without issue; dreamed my sumptuous dreams of canopied barges on the Nile and throbbing Bentleys in Biarritz; woke with strangers in dank attics; nursed the one undarned but too tightly fitting suit — and plotted my escape. Try as I may, I cannot bring into focus the young man of twenty. If we were to meet today, we would have little to say to each other. His ruthless naïveté, his clammy embarrassments, his lyrical sensitivity in the throes of his own emotions, his stoic indifference toward the feelings of others, his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flustered passions, his tortuous and transparent stratagems — I superimpose image upon image. Yet, no sooner done, the features melt and blur. How would he see me? The husk that he would be? (pp. 37-38.)

There was a generation gap in the 1920's also.

The young had the better of it. Patently, the elders had made a mess of things. They had grown older and more flustered. The truth, the wisdom of the ages and the folly of its living guardians had exploded in the trenches. The young, redolent with the fragrance of latrine and dispensary, returned to tell their parents and teachers of love and death, joy and putrefaction. The over-all effect was stunning. The cord linking the generations, frayed by the attrition of forces on the loose long before the guns played catalyst, snapped with a deafening bang. The five years of the war might just as well have been fifty. (p. 39.)

Yet it was not the generation that fought the war that created the generation gap; it was the generation that followed. "My generation, not the one that had fought the war, supplied the toughs, intellectual as well as brawny, that bludgeoned democracy into insensibility and carried Hitler to power." (p. 42.)

While Robert eked out his precarious existence, savoring the joys of life, more serious and tougher members of his generation helped destroy the world that made his kind of life possible. The military elements of the process

consisted almost exclusively of seasoned professionals, experts in guerrilla warfare — the dirtiest kind even before Asian ingenuity and Western technology refined this bastard branch of war — and in mass execution. Among the officers, not a few carried Rainer Maria Rilke next to the Mauser and, between massacres and muddy retreats, took refuge in Nietzsche, Houston Chamberlain, and drink. Others, the more extrovert type, contented themselves with plying their highly specialized trade, killing matter-of-factly and thus keeping alive that martial spirit which [in their view] should have prevailed over democratic decadence — had it not been for the "dagger thrust" into Germany's back. (p. 20.)

Here we find the beginning of the mission that has bifurcated Robert Strausz-Hupé's life. For the man of sensibility is forced, against his natural inclinations, into the fight against the political reaction which killed the culture that created the sensibility. Yet even in the old Vienna, this sensibility was a marginal affair.

The middle class of Central Europe, somewhat embarrassed by its own tolerance, was hospitable to the intellect, to the arts and to their irregular supporting troops such as actors, the makers of batiqued materials, the *Kunst* photographers — the jacks of all and any aesthetical trade who lived, wrote, drew, conversed, and cross-fertilized in the coffeehouses. Probably more than half of this fringe population was Jewish. . . . How great was the contribution of the Jew to the life of Vienna and the German cities has become plain only now. After World War II, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German-speaking peoples would have relapsed into the dull provinciality of the Germanies of two centuries ago had it not been for the cultural infusion administered by their conquerors. (pp. 18-19.)

Marginal men and their sensibilities can persist only in tolerant cultures. All his life Robert Strausz-Hupé has been a marginal man who has been dependent upon the tolerance of essentially alien societies. Consequently, he is especially cognizant of their fragility.

In Paris and New York, Strausz-Hupé associated with other marginal men, among them Russian emigrés.

I owe my Russian friends a liberal education in the politics of exile and the dynamics of revolution. The more I learned about the ease with which the Communists defeated their opponents, superior in material resources and at least equal in courage, the more I became convinced that the most significant feature of communism is the linkage between theory and action. Marxist-Leninist doctrine is based upon a theory of social conflict and disintegration; Communist strategy and tactics are designed to hasten disintegration — to push what is falling — and exploit conflict. The ethnocentric preconceptions of their opponents have greatly assisted the Communists in executing their wrecking projects. For all practical purposes, though not on the strength of their scholarly achievements, the Communists have been better historians and sociologists than their opponents. They have understood how to exploit social as well as national cleavages and to foster factionalism — the kind of sociological jujitsu that manipulates the heavier opponent into throwing himself. (p. 72.)

Many times Strausz-Hupé saw the rich and the powerful, the "business as usual" types, the businessmen for peace, underestimate the tenacity and durability of their foes. In the house of a rich English financier,

I saw, too late, that what until then had been polite attention changed to incredulity. Finally, the most celebrated member of my audience broke in and asked me whether I took seriously all this trash. Slightly rattled, I said that I did. I tried to explain that it did not matter whether he or I took *Mein Kampf* seriously as long as its author did. And its author was likely to rule Germany provided those who could, the English and French, did not take drastic steps to prevent it. To help me back to the safe shore of common sense, my host asked me what were the drastic steps I envisaged. I suggested that a conference be called to discuss the revision of certain provisions of the Versailles peace treaty which now had become meaningless anyway since they could no longer be enforced. Furthermore, the German government should be given generous economic support instead of being badgered about the repayment of foreign credits which could not be paid off without a substantial increase of German exports.

Silence settled over the room. It was broken by the celebrated grandee, who ventured the opinion that Hitler, even if he were to come to power, would soon forget about *Mein Kampf* and settle down to the business of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

keeping on good terms with Germany's principal trading partners. Not to embarrass the stray young man, he casually added that not only had he talked to His Majesty's ambassador in Berlin but also somebody he knew had sounded out people in Hitler's entourage. These individual Nazi chieftains were not exactly gentlemen, but seemed to hold the English, though not the French, in high esteem. (pp. 113-114.)

We now see the pattern: A man of sensibility, of wit, self-depreciation and humor, finding himself surrounded by the insensible, the obtuse obese, the humorless and the Panglossian. The man of sensibility is shaken to the core and, a marginal man and alien anyway, is now ready to alienate himself from himself in order to sound the tocsin.

Yet the dedicated man of sensibility was not a man of fixed opinions. In 1938, for instance, "defying the logic of strategic geography, French foreign policy did not put teeth into the East European alliance or embrace the Soviets as allies — if only to test their true intentions; . . ." (p. 161.) Nor does he have simple stereotypes of his opponents. In Tokyo a massive, bullet-headed Red Army colonel, seen previously haranguing his comrades with open tunic exposing "a mighty, hirsute chest, inadequately covered by a grayish undergarment," was encountered later in the Imperial Museum.

I had been told to look at the treasure of lacquer ware which . . . the Emperor's bride had brought from Kyoto to Tokyo as part of her dowry; not even the most luminous glaze of porcelain can match the sheen of fine lacquer. I walked from showcase to showcase, delighted with what I saw; a variety of cosmetic jars finished in soft gold held my attention. As I turned away, the hulk of the Soviet colonel barred the way. Beaming broadly, he asked me in careful insular English whether I was interested in lacquer and had seen this particular exhibit before. He had spent some time in Tokyo before the war; indeed he spoke fluent Japanese. With the authority of the scholar and the reverence which finely wrought perfection inspires, he explained techniques and styles, the history and artistry of Japanese lacquer. I thanked the colonel for two hours of masterly and unobtrusive guidance. The spirit dwells in many and not a few improbable places. Having judged, I had been judged. (pp. 224-225.)

Although these random quotations imperfectly portray the man of sensibility, I hope I have adumbrated the main contours and fastened down the turning points, the experiences, that bisected his soul and led him, against his nature and a life-style resonating to a sense of impermanence and fragility, into deadening academia and an insensitive political arena. If at times the man of wit appears shrill, I have at least indicated the experiences that produced the shrillness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

We now turn to *Protracted Conflict,*[2] which has made him a contentious figure in American academic circles and in the contemporary foreign policy debate. This is a collaborative work. His co-authors are the noted William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin J. Cottrell. Even so, it is true to Robert Strausz-Hupé. While he might not endorse every statement in the book, by and large it expresses his philosophy of international politics and his reading of the Soviet Union. Although it contains important qualifications to its main doctrines which pass unnoticed by its critics, it also contains statements that provide some justification for the distortions imposed upon Strausz-Hupé's views. If, at times, I take exception to these views myself, I hope Robert will understand that I am a different person and have a different cast of mind.

The general theme, that of protracted conflict, is not Strausz-Hupé's invention. Communist doctrine, despite obtuseness in high places in the West, *is* based upon a philosophy of conflict in which superior forms for organizing society and politics overcome outmoded forms. The communist philosophy is not one of harmony. Even on those occasions when Soviet leaders ignore the arguments in favor of pre-emptive nuclear war often stated in *Red Star,* and speak of the impossibility of nuclear war, they restress the character of the fundamental conflict between the communist nations and bourgeois democracies.

Perhaps this has become ritual, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, and can change over time. Surely we should never forsake testing Soviet intentions, for we may miss many important opportunities for desirable agreements if we do. The Soviet Union has always been ready to reach agreements, even with its most violent foes, if these settlements provided important advantages. Stalin agreed to a pact with Hitler, and I find it difficult to believe that his successors would be more reluctant to reach agreement with us, provided we maintain the levels of force and bargaining skill appropriate to such agreements. Compacts so arrived at do not have to be produced by mutual love, as some of our more befuddled social scientists seem to believe. Although some day Soviet leaders may accept and believe in universal harmony, there is hardly reason for them to do so now, when the thesis is weak-

[2]Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963; originally published in 1959). Quotations by permission of the publisher.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ened by so much contrary evidence, especially in the internal politics of those nations giving the doctrine strongest support. Indeed, some of our young critics rightly attack American social science for ignoring the realms of power and conflict, and these criticisms, sometimes distorted themselves, are not without their core of truth.

Nonetheless, there is such a thing as political rhetoric, and Robert Strausz-Hupé's rhetoric is not mine.

> The simple fact is that the Soviet conflict managers have either instigated or aggravated almost every international dispute which has gripped the postwar world. For their own part, the Soviets have been immune from outside intervention because American policy-makers have stuck to the mystique of the containment doctrine which established — semiofficially, so to speak — the boundaries of the Communists' untouchable "zone of peace." Even in the Hungarian crisis, the United States took pains to reassure the Soviet Union that it had no intention of exploiting the only real international conflict which had yet occurred within the Communist zone. . . . (p. 22.)

This is correct, but it is also overstatement. The United Nations was kept out of Guatemala; and although the United States worked through a useful fiction — an ostensibly independent invading force — the Soviet Union had its own fiction in Hungary, namely, the request from the so-called Kadar government. Outside of the two blocs — the Warsaw bloc and NATO — the communists have intervened by means of local communist parties but not by means of Soviet troops, whereas the United States has intervened extraterritorially on numerous occasions by means of its own conventional military power. I believe it is true on the whole that the Soviet Union acts and the West responds. The Soviets make demands and the West makes concessions. They are always making demands, e.g., with respect to Berlin and West Germany. Moreover, if someone suggests that Washington make demands on Moscow, numerous voices in the West will say that this is unreasonable because it is well known that the Soviet Union will not accept them. There is surely an asymmetry here, and one that is costly to the West. On the other hand, the "simple fact" presented by the authors of *Protracted Conflict* is not so simple. The assertion has considerable truth value, but the overstatement and the rhetoric in which the truth is couched, in my opinion, provide an excuse for the distortions imposed upon the viewpoint by hostile critics.

Take another example. "The long-run Soviet objectives, too, are the same: namely to isolate the West, deprive it of its sources

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of strategic raw materials and markets, and . . . encircle it via Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, until the West, its economic roots having withered, will fall under its own weight." (p. 24.) This could be inferred from Soviet written doctrine, and the Soviet Union might make these objectives operational if we followed the foreign policy prescriptions and military advice offered by such senators as Fulbright and Mansfield. I can even understand a certain amount of hysteria on the part of an intelligent man as he reads the driveling infelicities that are presented as conventional wisdom by Washington pundits. On the other hand, I agree with John Maynard Keynes that in the long run we are all dead. The Soviet Union unquestionably moves with greater tenacity than the West, and has maintained a far more prolonged campaign, in various guises, against NATO than the West is capable of launching against the communist bloc. Yet to say that the Soviet Union "has" such long-term goals, in my opinion, acquires almost a metaphysical cast. The United States also has a goal, admittedly one to which we are less dedicated, of universal democracy; but to express this as our long-term goal without stating the threshold conditions under which it will become manifest is to excerpt goals from the brute conditions that bring them to life. Again, I find genuine truth in the position but am put off by the rhetoric.

There are places where I believe Strausz-Hupé overstates the USSR's intentions. To illustrate: Stalin's

> purpose was to divide the Western powers into two warring groups and to drive them against each other in a war of attrition. . . . By concluding the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August, 1939, Stalin made certain that Russia would be a bystander in the early stages of the war. Thus Russia would be able to build up her relative strength while the Western nations were expending *their* strength in an internecine conflict. Then, the Soviets could later enter the war and compel one side or the other to accept them as allies whose help was indispensable to winning the war. (p. 44.)

Now it is consistent with everything we know about Stalin, and quite legitimate from a Russian point of view, that these should have been his objectives. However, it is also worth noting that if Stalin had not signed the nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, and Germany had nonetheless attacked Poland, German armies would likely have moved eastward against the USSR rather than westward against France. In that case the French armies would have done exactly the same, as General Gamelin had promised to the Poles: they would have remained behind the Maginot Line. Moreover, it is open to question whether the Soviet Union would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

voluntarily have entered the war on either side except perhaps at its termination. Although many scholars interpret the negotiations leading to the German attack on the USSR as collapsing because of excessive Soviet demands, it is extremely doubtful that Stalin would have desired to become a junior partner in a Nazi-dominated Europe. The same negotiations could be interpreted in a different way, namely, that the Soviet Union, rather than rejecting Nazi overtures for a war alliance and thereby precipitating an attack upon herself, was attempting to forestall the denouement of the situation by hard but inconclusive bargaining.

Nothing that I have said changes the essential correctness of the Strausz-Hupé formulation; yet, placed in a slightly different context and expressed in different rhetoric, it may be less subject to distortions in interpretation.

There are other occasions where appropriate qualifications might have avoided the distortions of liberal interpreters. Consider:

> The international Communist movement, more than a mere political handmaiden of Sino-Soviet strategy, constitutes a major military and paramilitary cog in the Communist conflict machine. In the postwar decade, Communist parties have been used to instigate and fan attritional civil war in China, Greece, Laos and Malaya. Their primary usefulness to Moscow and Peking derives precisely from an unprecedented flexibility which allows them to change, with relative ease, from respectable parliamentary parties into proscribed guerrilla movements, and back again. No one can seriously question the fact, for example, that the hard core of Western Communist parties would, in the event of a general conflict, transform itself into a fifth column at the disposal of the Communist high command. (p. 59.)

Again, the statement is essentially correct. But the rhetoric facilitates distortion. It is highly improbable, for one thing, that the Soviet Union played any major role in the post-World War II Chinese communist campaigns. Although the Soviets released Japanese military arsenals in Manchuria to the Chinese communists, this more likely than not was designed to prevent a repetition of the fiasco in Shanghai in 1927 — a fiasco that resulted from Stalin's orders to the Chinese Communist Party at that early period before the heretical Comrade Mao had taken over. Yugoslav accounts call into serious question the Soviet role in Greece. The trouble with the paragraph is not so much that it is wrong but that it is too neat, that it overstates and removes ambiguities and minor inconsistencies.

Consider the assertion that the policy of "letting a hundred

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flowers bloom" "served ultimately the purpose of ferreting out potential dissidents." (p. 71.) When this statement is placed in a chapter entitled "Deception and Distraction," the qualification that such "internal policy shifts were undoubtedly dictated in no small part by sheer necessity" (p. 71) does not sufficiently modify the remark. Although the official Chinese party newspaper did claim in an editorial that the policy of letting "one hundred flowers bloom" had had the deliberate purpose of ferreting out dissidence, this was more likely a rationalization. The vigor of the "great leap forward" that soon followed may have been in part a response to disappointed expectations concerning the extent to which communism had succeeded ideologically in China. In any event, more careful qualification would have been helpful.

The assertion that "the Soviets deliberately maneuvered the West into concentrating upon the production of long-range bombers at the cost of its embryo missiles program" (p. 74) suggests that the United States is a trifle too easy to dupe and overlooks, as did Secretary McNamara, the possibility that planes might prove useful as part of a mixed nuclear force for a long time to come. To cite General James M. Gavin as an authority on this matter (as *Protracted Conflict* does) is to cite an officer who has not been noted for the accuracy of either his political or his military judgments. All the same, it can be documented that the communists do try to deceive us with respect to both the numbers and quality of their military components.

The rhetoric of this book which lost the liberal academics and which led to distortions of interpretation was a tragedy, for the message is valid. The suggestion that the United States follow a more coldly-calculated policy against the Soviet Union is a good one. We all remember the frustrating inhibitions of the Korean war.

> The longer the conflict dragged on, the more clamorously the critics of the United States' Korean policy raised the specter of general war. Suggestions that the United States take steps to regain the military initiative were invariably rejected on the grounds that they might provoke general conflict. It is, however, almost inconceivable in retrospect that, in 1950-1951, the Soviet Union would have allowed itself to be drawn into a total war with the West had the United States applied additional pressure on Moscow's Chinese ally. (pp. 48-49.)

Not only is this correct, but it is inconceivable that either the Soviet Union or China would have considered general war if the United States had used the military strength at its command in mid-1951 to march back to the Yalu; this could have been done

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

easily, except for political constraints and failures of intelligence in Washington. Another well-argued point is that "The Western nations are still capable of making carefully calculated strategic and tactical moves against which the Soviet leaders would fear to risk decisive counteraction, precisely because they deem the security of their home base more important than the strategic value of a peripheral position." (p. 126.)

Strausz-Hupé is essentially right in contending that

> The Communists have exploited adroitly the legend of their approaching conversion to "liberalism." Each ostensible reversal of their internal and external policies provoked intense debates over the "changing nature" of the Communist system. It would be presumptuous to assert that each detour in Soviet domestic policy represents a Machiavellian attempt to confound the non-Communist world. Indeed, many Soviet policy shifts were prompted largely by the deep-seated ills of Soviet society. (*pp. 67-68.*)

Indeed, indeed! Khrushchev deliberately manipulated this imagery by falsely contrasting the moderation of his own policy with that of Stalin on one hand and Mao on the other. Senator Fulbright bought this mess of pottage, as did many other Western politicians and journalists. Yet, it was Khrushchev and not Stalin who intervened with military force when a satellite moved to withdraw from the bloc, and it was Khrushchev who placed missiles in Cuba. This myth is so persistent in the West that it defies understanding.

III

Protracted Conflict is an admirable handbook of communist strategies and methods. It provides excellent explanations for past Soviet behavior and good prognoses for future Soviet behavior. Its errors are largely rhetorical; but these errors have undercut the book's effectiveness in the liberal academic community.

Yet I would contend that this tendency to rhetorical overstatement is the product of the experience of the young Robert Strausz-Hupé in talking to the politicians, the bureaucrats and the business-as-usual financiers and industrialists of the 1930's — of his experience with their naïveté, their inability to understand the world in which they lived and their imposition of a Panglossian sheen upon it that rationalized their pursuit of individual profits or votes at the expense of important national interests and cultural values. In part at least, it was the obtuseness of these successful people that produced the sometimes shrill and oversimplified rhetoric of *Protracted Conflict*. If such people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would not understand and could not understand — particularly if thoughts were expressed complexly, with appropriate ambiguities — then perhaps the message had to be driven into their heads in a repetitive and simplified fashion. If we were coming into the age of the "horrible simplifiers," as Strausz-Hupé believed, one would need to employ a rhetoric appropriate to that age. Perhaps he was not wrong for the public at large and for the people to whom the book was primarily addressed; but he misjudged the horrible simplifiers of the academic profession, who seized upon his rhetoric to justify their own horrible simplifications.

This, then, is my interpretation of the writings and careers of my friend, Robert Strausz-Hupé, scholar, publicist, man of letters, man of sensibility, and marginal man.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ARCHITECTURE OF WESTERN SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF*

by Robert R. Sullivan

IN January 1968 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain would withdraw her military presence from East of Suez by the end of 1971, a decision which in effect means that the Indian Ocean and many of the unstable areas bordering on it will become a power vacuum in world politics. Shortly thereafter spokesmen for the Department of State said that the United States had no intention of filling the vacuum left by the British departure and would, instead, depend upon local security arrangements among the region's powers to replace the British.[1] Yet in the Persian Gulf Western oil companies have an investment in the pumping and refining of oil adding up to several hundred millions of dollars; they exploit three-fifths of the world's known oil resources, and these provide half of Britain's domestic requirements and two-thirds of continental Western Europe's domestic needs.

Why did the British choose to leave an area so obviously important to the West, and what are the local, regional and global implications of this decision? How have the foreign policies of the Gulf's two major powers—Iran and Saudi Arabia—been affected by the British decision? What indications of active interest may be perceived in Egyptian and Soviet foreign policy, and what is the United States doing about an unfolding situation that indirectly affects its vital interests? Finally, what is the architecture of Western security in the Persian Gulf?

The thesis argued here is that the Western powers—not only Great Britain and the United States but also the West European states—have over the past two years either failed to make political decisions or have made decisions which are mistaken when judged on the basis of continuing Western interests in the Persian Gulf

*The author is indebted to Shaoul Aslan for intelligent criticism and to Candace Watt for incisive editing in the preparation of this article. For another recent study of the international politics of the Persian Gulf area, readers are referred to *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, February 1969.

[1]*New York Times,* January 17, 1968; *The Economist,* February 10, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Indian Ocean areas. If the pattern of political action noted through 1968 and into 1969 remains unchanged, the outcomes will be, first, the continued development of a dangerously unstable bipolar (Iran vs. Saudi Arabia) international subsystem in the Persian Gulf and, second, the consequent temptation to the Soviet Union to make this unstable area the focal point of its Middle East politics. Both outcomes will be unfavorable, if not disastrous, to the Western interest in maintaining a steady supply of oil. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Western powers to act to reverse the local, regional and global effects of the British decision and to replace the dilapidated British security structure with a new and more credible Western security system. In essence, however, since Britain has counted herself out and the West European powers have not yet counted themselves in, this is a diplomatic task which falls squarely on the United States. Approximately how Washington should go about the task will be discussed in the last sections of this article.

I

At face value, the explanations offered by the Labour Government for the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf seem historically inescapable and politically logical; it is little more than the final phase of a collapsed empire's disintegration and a great power's decline.[2] India is no longer the vital terminal point of the British system, and consequently the imperial rationale for being in the Persian Gulf is nonexistent, just as it became nonexistent in earlier years with respect to Suez, Cyprus and Aden. Furthermore, Labour's foreign policy achieved a reorientation for Britain which distinguished it from the misconceived Conservative foreign policy of the 1950's: Britain now sees her destiny to be in a united Europe; she has reason for dismantling the imperial structure so that she can concentrate her limited military power on the defense of Europe and thereby achieve more political influence where it is most needed.[3]

If these rather grand strategic shifts in Britain's international position were not sufficient to move London to take the decision

[2]For details on the British decision, see the *New York Times,* January 17, 1968. For arguments against British imperialism, see the *New Statesman* at most any time, but especially "From Aden to Bahrain" by John Morgan, in the issue of February 25, 1966.

[3]See the report of the British *White Paper* in the *New York Times,* July 12, 1968, for the official position. For an unofficial defense of the decision, see Charles Douglas-Home, "Concentration on Strength," the *Times* (London), January 23, 1968, reprinted in *Survival,* March 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to withdraw from the Gulf, the perennial balance of payments crisis was. In order to make the devaluation of November 1967 stick, the government decided on an across-the-board reduction of domestic and overseas expenditures, and the specific overseas content called for a virtual elimination of the British military presence East of Suez by 1971. This meant dismantling the big, multipurpose base at Singapore and the small Army and R.A.F. stations at Bahrain and Sharja in the Persian Gulf. The Hong Kong garrison was to be left intact, but it was already well known that Britain would not defend that island. In cooperation with the United States, new, small, less costly and more efficient Indian Ocean bases were being built at Gan in the Maldives (R.A.F.), Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands, in the Seychelles Islands, at Cocos Island, and on the northwest Australian coast. The net effect of this changeover would be a substantial foreign exchange saving for the British balance of payments.

For the Persian Gulf states, the political effects of the British decision to withdraw were felt immediately; the main effect was the removal of the foundation stone of stability in the area. Ever since her withdrawal from the larger Aden base, no one had seriously believed that Britain's 6,000 troops in the Persian Gulf could effectively put down any determined nationalist uprising aimed at taking over local governments or disrupting oil production. Aden had been a regional staging post to provide reserves in case British intervention was required. With this second line of defense gone, the task of the small British presence in the Gulf was simply to serve as the source of the area's stability—much as the one performed by a single policeman whose presence alone keeps order among individuals or groups who otherwise might be hostile toward each other. It is easier for local antagonists to defer to the symbols of outside, established authority.

The announcement that the small police force was going to be removed set in motion a political process which has not yet ended. All of the area states immediately began jockeying for position, seeking either security through new alliances or augmented power through greater control of contested or hitherto neutral areas of the Persian Gulf. Iran renewed her long-standing claim to sovereignty over the island of Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia resisted this hardly disguised bid to gain political control over the entire "Persian" Gulf. But this apparently dominant Gulf conflict was mitigated by a community of conservative dynastic interests uniting the Shah and King Faisal in opposition to the pincers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of revolutionary Nasserism that they perceived moving toward the Gulf southward through Iraq and northward from South Arabia. Behind Nasserism, and to some extent in place of Nasserism, the two conservative monarchs fear the expansionism of the Soviet Union, but as yet this threat is too remote to overshadow Nasserism as a mitigating factor in the Iranian-Saudi Arabian competition for primacy in the area. Iran is more inclined to manipulate the Soviet Union so that Moscow will have reason for not supporting the Arabs in the Persian Gulf. In effect, she is reactivating her long dormant tradition of playing off East against West in order to secure her own independence and enhance her local power position.

Interestingly, this diplomatic process was initiated by neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia but rather by the insecure Gulf sheikdoms. Prior to the British announcement of withdrawal, Iran had expressed a willingness to participate in any regional security arrangement,[4] and Saudi Arabia had restrained herself from taking any initiative.[5] But shortly after Prime Minister Wilson spoke in Parliament, the Sheik of Abu Dhabi flew to London to confer with the British and offer—in general terms and in the name of other Trucial Sheiks—to pay the entire cost of Britain's military presence in the Gulf if only she would stay.[6] Although the British declined the offer, it nonetheless served as an indicator of rising insecurity and instability in the Gulf.

Rebuffed in London, the small coastal emirates moved toward the creation of a Gulf Federation designed to secure them against expected claims from Iran and Saudi Arabia and from the revolutionary appeals of Cairo.[7] One of the states included in the proposed federation was Bahrain, the island claimed by Iran. This forced the Shah to act. If he tacitly allowed events to take their projected course, this in effect would constitute a recognition of Bahrain's independence, and Tehran would be confronted with a *fait accompli*. The other extreme would be for Iran to break relations with the Gulf emirates. The Shah chose a milder but nonetheless dramatic way of showing his displeasure: on forty-eight hours' notice, and with no official explanation, he canceled a planned visit to King Faisal in Saudi Arabia.[8] Privately Tehran

[4] *Middle East Journal* (chronology), Spring 1968, p. 179.
[5] *New York Times,* January 22, 23, 1968.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, February 2, 1968.
[8] *Ibid.*, January 17, February 10, 1968; *The Economist,* February 10, 1968. Until this point Iran and Saudi Arabia had been considering allying with each other in an Islamic entente aimed at the opposed ideology of Nasserism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

let it be known that the Shah's action was in response to Faisal's January reception of Bahrain's ruler with the honors normally accorded a sovereign,[9] but Iran simultaneously made it clear that she "would not tolerate" any new international arrangements in the Gulf which abrogated her rights there.[10]

In the weeks following the British announcement of withdrawal, the Gulf Federation continued to take shape. Iran's protests only caused all shades of Arab opinion, embracing the polar opposites represented by King Faisal and President Nasser, to give diplomatic support to the new grouping.[11] Faisal, in addition, appealed to the United States to favor the federation on the grounds that it would serve to fill the impending power vacuum.[12] True to its earlier position, Washington remained noncommittal.

Inactivity did not characterize Soviet diplomacy, however. Iran's response to the budding Arab unity was to turn to the USSR in an attempt to neutralize Moscow's expected support of the Arabs in the growing struggle in the Gulf. She did this by accelerating a process underway since 1962, that of developing mutually advantageous economic ties with the Soviets and with East European states. In addition to the increase in Soviet arms shipments that resulted, the most significant agreements related to the construction by the Soviets of a steel mill and the bartering of natural gas to the USSR, which in turn would most likely re-export it to Europe.[13] Spring 1968 also saw the signing of several economic aid agreements whereby the Soviet Union and East European states extended credits to support Iran's Fourth Plan.[14] The process of engaging the Soviets economically in order to disengage their diplomatic support of the Arabs reached its climax in April when Premier Kosygin visited Iran and gave strong public endorsement to her rejection of the Gulf Federa-

[9]*New York Times,* February 10, 1968.

[10]*Middle East Journal* (chronology), Summer 1968, pp. 328-329.

[11]*New York Times,* February 10, 1968.

[12]*Ibid.,* May 23, 1968.

[13]*Ibid.,* March 15, 1968; see also Geoffrey Wheeler, "Soviet Interests in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey," *World Today,* May 1968, p. 200.

[14]On April 7, 1968 the Soviet Union agreed in principle to expand trade with Iran and to provide assistance for the Fourth Plan, and on April 14 and 24 the Soviets consolidated these agreements by offering $300 million in credits along with assistance in building the natural gas line. Taking their lead from the Soviets, on April 11 Hungary agreed to provide $40 million in credits and to purchase $50 million in Iranian oil in return for Iranian purchases in Hungary, and on May 8 Czechoslovakia agreed to purchase $200 million worth of Iranian oil between 1970 and 1980 in return for equal Iranian imports of Czechoslovak machinery. *New York Times,* May 15, 1968; *Middle East Journal* (chronology), Summer 1968, p. 329.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion.[15] It is to be noted, however, that while Kosygin backed Iran's rejection of the Gulf emirates' design to federate, he did not simultaneously endorse Iran's policy in the Gulf. This was a significant hedge of Soviet diplomatic wagers, for it left the way open for later Soviet support of revolutionary Arabs in opposition to the conservative Arabs of the Gulf sheikdoms.

The prospects for Nasserism becoming an effective force in Gulf politics—which would provide the Soviets with the occasion to seize upon their option—did not appear good in 1968, mainly because Egypt had been forced to retreat from South Arabia militarily and diplomatically in consequence of her defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel. Egypt had intervened massively in the Yemen after the 1962 revolution in that country, and at one time there had been as many as 70,000 Egyptian troops fighting at the side of the Republicans against the Royalists, who were backed by Saudi Arabian gold and arms. Much to Nasser's distress, the Egyptian army fared miserably in the Yemen campaign, and about the best it could do in this blatant attempt to gain a military foothold on the Arabian peninsula was to maintain a stalemate. Even this effort ended with Egypt's defeat at the hands of Israel. Nasser took the first available diplomatic occasion—the Khartoum Conference of August 1967 — to reach an agreement with Faisal that allowed Cairo to withdraw its troops.

It was at this point that the structure of political conflict in Yemen became scrambled and, from the perspective of world politics, interesting. After the removal of the despised Egyptian troops, the Royalists' spirit quickly dissolved, and this change was reflected in a slackening of their attack on Saana, Yemen's capital. Subsequently the Royalist opposition melted completely, and in 1968 Yemen began to reintegrate as a body politic, thereby providing a favorable environment for outside assistance from the great powers. The United States, the Soviet Union and China all have mounted aid projects in Yemen, but on balance it is evident that the Soviets have been gaining the significant political advantages. A Soviet submarine base has been set up in Hodeida, and Soviet influence has spread beyond Yemen into South Yemen, where a close relationship has been established with the governing National Liberation Front.

When one considers the logic in the Soviet penetration of Egypt, it is not difficult to perceive that the Soviet foothold in South Arabia may in the future expand and that Moscow may

[15] *New York Times*, April 6, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have as its goal the deployment of a large naval and perhaps even military force at Hodeida and Aden. Thus, whereas the Egyptian attempt to outflank Saudi Arabia in the Yemen failed, one consequence of the collapse has been a growing Soviet presence in that territory. While this is not yet substantial militarily, the events of the past two years point the way to an increasingly successful Soviet effort to use South Arabia as a base from which to assert influence northward into the politics of the Persian Gulf, and southward into the international political problems of the Horn of Africa.

The point was made earlier that the dominant Gulf conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia was limited by the two states' community of conservative ideological interests in opposition to the revolutionary Arabs based at Cairo and in apprehension of the Soviet Union. Nasser's absence from the politics of the Persian Gulf has meant that the Shah and King Faisal have felt less reason to restrain their competition, but on the other hand both rulers are aware that his penchant for regional troublemaking remains unimpaired and that the Soviet Union has more than filled the void left by Egypt's departure from South Arabia. Somewhere in mid-1968, therefore, Tehran and Riyadh began to find sufficient cause to mute their discordance. The Iranian-Saudi Arabian détente reached its high-water mark in November 1968 when the Shah implicitly accepted the failure of his earlier diplomatic campaign and visited Saudi Arabia.[16] King Faisal consolidated the gain for his firm diplomacy by flying from Riyadh to Jidda to attend an Iranian embassy banquet in honor of the Shah, thereby conferring more honor on the Iranian sovereign than a foreign potentate normally receives in Arabia.[17]

In sum, in the space of little more than a year after the British announced their decision to withdraw, the states of the Persian Gulf went through a diplomatic revolution, developing a configuration of positions corresponding more closely to the underlying balance of military power in the Gulf than that which obtained before January 1968. Whereas the political picture at the beginning of 1968 was one of an unstable center surrounded by two ambitious regional powers, the picture through 1969 showed that center being filled by a structure resembling bipolarity. Iran remains the sole and dominant naval power, but her bid for greater control of the Gulf and its oil resources has failed. Saudi Arabia, thanks to the firm diplomacy of Faisal, is

[16] *Ibid.*, November 10, 1968.

[17] *Ibid.*, November 14, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emerging as the arbiter of the political destinies of the small Arab sheikdoms that border the southern coast of the Gulf. At the same time, the emirates have made some progress toward federation. The Persian Gulf has thus begun a remarkable transition from a unifocal state system in which many local powers and states coexisted easily under the protective and stabilizing authority of imperial Britain, to a bipolar system in which the imperial focus is being replaced by two regional centers of power, the one naval and the other military. Stability of sorts has returned, temporarily at least, but it now depends upon a continued balancing of regional power rather than on the firm policing of the British.

The present tranquillity could be upset without much difficulty. Iran has not fully dropped her claim to Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia still has a number of unresolved problems in her relations with the Trucial Sheikdoms, the dispute over the Buraimi Oasis being the major one.[18] Furthermore, the sheikdoms are not bastions of political stability. Bahrain has a large and sophisticated Arab population that is chafing under authoritarian sheikly government and is vulnerable to Nasser's propaganda. An internal revolt here could bring Iran and Saudi Arabia into a direct confrontation of dangerous proportions; and it is from this small island that Britain is withdrawing her main garrisons by 1971. Farther down the Gulf coast, Abu Dhabi reportedly entertains thoughts of expanding into Dubai,[19] from which the British are also removing forces, and Oman is still not completely in control of the interior tribes that revolted in the late 1950's.

To the north Kuwait presents a source of still more dangerous instability. Her population comprises more foreigners (mainly Palestinian) than native Kuwaitis, and these people—relatively wealthy, well-educated and sophisticated—are also vulnerable to Nasser's propaganda. Moreover, Iraq has a dormant claim on Kuwait, and it would be uncharacteristic if those in power in Baghdad did not reactivate this claim sometime after the protecting British have departed.[20] In terms of the stakes involved (oil), the Kuwaiti problem is nearly as significant as the Iran-Saudi Arabia

[18]George A. Lipski, *Saudi Arabia, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), pp. 139-140.
[19]*New York Times,* November 24, 1968.
[20]W. Luce, "Britain in the Persian Gulf," *Round Table,* July 1967, p. 281. Britain intervened militarily in Kuwait in 1961 to protect the country from a threatened intervention by Iraq. On May 13, 1968, Britain announced that she would not be bound by any defense commitment to Kuwait after the withdrawal of British forces in 1971. *Middle East Journal* (chronology), Summer 1968, p. 332.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

competition—it simply has not yet developed into a diplomatic imbroglio. Finally, the Shatt-al-Arab dispute between Iraq and Iran has the potential to explode into a major conflict, as events in the spring of 1969 indicated.

II

From the standpoint of world politics, the prospective consequences of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf are three: Least likely and least desirable for the West, the Soviet Union may in some fashion replace Britain as the imperial arbiter of the area. Second, the regional bipolar balance of power may break down into inconclusive conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia and thereby become linked to the global system, pitting the Soviet Union and her local clients against the United States and her local clients. The resulting instability would be disastrous for Western oil interests. The third consequence is the only desirable possibility for the West: it is that the British imperial presence be continued or replaced by a Western imperial presence. In contrast to the first two possibilities, this last one demands an active and constructive diplomacy on the part of the Western powers, and implies the firm although not necessarily direct military involvement of the United States.

There are reasons for believing that the Soviets might be entertaining ambitions to expand their influence in the Persian Gulf area. Above all, it is the logical next step in their Middle East diplomacy. They have already gained considerable influence in parts of the southern tier of the Middle East (South Arabia, Egypt and Algeria); more direct control than they now have in those regions would be an unprofitable burden and would further expose them to the resentments of Arab nationalists. In addition, there is nothing for the Soviets to gain from a successful Arab conclusion to the war with Israel, since this would remove the main justification in Arab eyes for the Soviet presence in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, at some point the Soviet Union may seriously desire to stabilize the southern tier of the Middle East, as long as she can do so without alienating her Arabs. Another war might mean another multibillion-dollar military investment lost, not to mention the danger of direct Soviet (and consequent American) involvement should it become necessary to rescue her Arab clients from an exuberant Israel.

The present armed confrontation has also closed the Suez

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Canal more or less permanently, and indications are that the Soviets desire its opening more than the Western powers do. The Western powers are adapting to the closure by building oil tankers larger than ever; they have promised themselves that they will never again become dependent on the Suez bottleneck. They have found the adaptation to be remarkably easy, and now view with confidence the prospect of stable and inexpensive transport around the Cape of Good Hope. For the Soviets, the financial loss to Nasser's Egypt is not to be dismissed lightly, but their major reason for wanting the canal reopened is strategic: they have established a substantial naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and an open Suez Canal under Nasser's control would provide them with rapid and secure access to the Indian Ocean, India, North Viet Nam and the Persian Gulf—transit they now manage only with difficulty from the periodically ice-locked port of Vladivostok and around Africa.

On the other hand, the USSR has much to gain and little to lose through a continuation of the present unstable situation in the hitherto Western-dominated Gulf area. In the final analysis the opportunity in the Persian Gulf may provide Moscow with the most persuasive reason for stabilizing the southern tier. A stabilized south and a reopened Suez Canal would enable the Soviets for the first time comfortably and easily to bring their full influence to bear on the Persian Gulf states. Soviet military and naval power would wedge Iran in from north and south, and, provided Moscow did not crudely attempt to achieve overt political control, the outcome would most likely be a re-evaluation by the Gulf powers—above all by Iran—of their relationship with the West. They would have to make their peace with the Soviet Union, no doubt a *Pax Sovietica* for the entire Persian Gulf. If the Western oil companies were not directly nationalized they would soon be taxed out of business, and the pricing of Middle East oil to West European countries, Israel and Japan would rapidly come under the influence of decision-makers in Moscow.

The prospect of Soviet control of the Persian Gulf is nonetheless improbable because it is based on the assumption that the Western powers will not resist this attempt to gain decisive influence over the Gulf states. Western diplomacy would react, and the consequence would be a bipolar-type stalemate in the area, with the northern tier coming to look like the southern tier in its Cold War divisions. The most likely makeup of such a bipolarization would find the United States backing Saudi Arabia,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Gulf sheikdoms and Kuwait; the Soviet Union behind Iran and restraining for the moment Iraq and Egypt. The situation would be the result of a breakdown of the local bipolar balance of power as a consequence of a local—probably internal—revolt in Bahrain, Kuwait or Oman. In this situation the United States would be compelled in the context of turbulent local circumstances to choose sides between her Iranian and Saudi Arabian allies and would choose the conservative Arabian side. Such a development is possible in the presently unstable configuration of power in the volatile Gulf.

With respect to Western oil interests, there would be little difference between Soviet control of the Gulf and Soviet denial of control to the West. The outcome in both cases would be a political environment unsuited to the processing of oil. The danger in the second case is its potential for Soviet and Nasserite propaganda to stir up trouble in Bahrain and Kuwait that would disrupt the local oil operations. If this occurred, the effect for Western Europe and Japan would be an unsteady and more costly supply of fuel, tempting them to agree to long-term oil-supply contracts with the Soviet Union. The Soviets could then import crude from Iran on a barter basis and export their own oil on a hard currency basis to the West and to the East. Hence, the only desirable option open to the West is control—however remote—of the political environment of the Persian Gulf.

The task confronting the Western powers is the imperial one of maintaining a viable order in the Gulf so as to sustain the political stability necessary for the continued exploitation of the area's vitally important oil resources. This can only be achieved by an active Western diplomacy supported by a credible local and regional Western military presence. Britain and the United States are the natural assignées to perform the local and regional military supervision, respectively. An effective coordination of effort would be for Britain to maintain a minimal military presence in the Gulf and the United States, by providing a related regional military presence, to give this local police force a credibility it has not had since the closing of the British regional staging post at Aden.

III

The proximate cause of the British decision to withdraw was a balance of payments crisis, yet only about $25 million of the $60 million yearly cost of Britain's military presence in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Persian Gulf represents a net outflow on current account of the balance of payments.[21] Most of the $60 million is spent in the sterling area for British equipment, British transportation and British consumer goods. Furthermore, some of the outflow finds its way back to Britain, since the goods and services demanded by British forces and personnel and supplied in non-sterling Middle East markets are often British exports. Finally, the small outflow of $25 million on current account can easily be justified in terms of balance of payments values. In essence it represents insurance premiums paid out to provide security for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of British investments in the oil economies of the Gulf. These investments return a great deal to Britain, and since the alternative to purchasing in the sterling oil market of the Gulf is to purchase in the dollar oil market of the Caribbean or from the Soviet Union, the price of stability and security in the Gulf may be seen as small.

A remote but nonetheless established cause of Britain's withdrawal is her new foreign policy orientation away from empire and toward Europe. It is argued that one of the barriers to Britain's entering Europe is her worldwide imperial commitments, which Europe does not want to inherit. Therefore, if she aspires to maximum influence in post-de Gaulle Europe, she had better act now to dissolve her imperial obligations and concentrate her limited military establishment on the defense of Europe.

The argument assumes, without really asking, that Europe has no wish to take over Britain's imperial commitments. There are two reasons to believe that her imperial commitments may actually be Britain's trump cards for getting into the Europe of tomorrow. The economic argument is that continental Western Europe has an even greater interest in Persian Gulf oil than does Britain; two-thirds of the oil supplies of EEC countries come from the Persian Gulf, whereas only half of Britain's do. A disruption of this supply would compel Western Europe to purchase American oil or to look to the Soviet Union as a supplier. An increased economic dependence upon either the United States or the Soviet Union is unlikely to please any West European government. The economic argument thus blends into a political argument, and to it may be added the unprovable but persuasive assertion that Europe has an interest in influencing the global political actions of the United States, the Soviet Union and China; the inheritance

[21]D. C. Watt, "Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf," *Political Quarterly*, July 1968, pp. 315-316.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and revival in new European garb of the old British presence East of Suez would be advantageous in this regard.

The real cause of the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf is to be located in the political makeup of the Labour Party.[22] Labour's left wing has been opposed to British "imperialism" for decades, and this opposition has become unyielding since India was given independence in 1947. The security of the jugular to India was the classical justification for maintaining all those bases east and west of Suez, and Britain's continued presence therein after 1947 could only mean that she was using her power to shore up the medieval feudalism of sheikly government. When Prime Minister Wilson was compelled to make large cuts in the budget in order to secure the 1967 devaluation, he had to provide the left wing of his party with a cut in the imperial position equal to if not greater than the cuts being made in domestic social welfare programs to ensure himself against a revolt by his backbenchers. Quite simply, the decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf was a necessary part of a political compromise package.

Because the British policy derived so clearly from the internal politics of the Labour Party, there is a good chance that it can be reversed in some measure now that the Conservatives are back in power. In opposition the Tories often promised to reverse the policy, but Mr. Heath's few weeks in office have not yet provided him the opportunity to do so, and indeed it may be seen as unwise to reverse the policy openly or fully. Nonetheless, some change resulting in a prolonged British presence may be expected.

In opposition to the type of argument offered above, Alastair Buchan has asserted that "nothing will erode the foundations of Anglo-American cooperation in Asia more rapidly than any formula whereby the British appear to be becoming the agents or mercenaries of American policy," and that the British would do best to act on the basis of their own special interests and "not by some hypothetical American requirements."[23] His implied premise would seem to be that Britain has no interest so vital as to justify her acting in cooperation with the United States in the Persian

[22]*Ibid.*, p. 317. See also David Vital, "The Making of British Foreign Policy," *Political Quarterly*, July 1968, p. 255. For a stimulating discussion that reaches different conclusions on the influence of British domestic politics on British foreign policy, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, July 1968.

[23]Alastair Buchan, "Britain in the Indian Ocean," *International Affairs*, April 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gulf and the Indian Ocean. But in fact Britain's specific economic and derived security interests in the Gulf and the Middle East are weightier than those of the United States. True, Britain would be acting as an "agent" of U.S. interests if she reversed her course and decided to stay in the Gulf; but the United States would also be acting as a regional "agent," this time for British and European interests. A continued British (or European) presence in the Gulf, backed by an American presence in the Indian Ocean, would unite in purpose allies that have shared interests but different and complementary capacities for securing those interests. If anything, such a division of labor would bring them closer together, not erode the foundations of their cooperation.

Should the British see the way to reverse their course East of Suez, U.S. diplomacy ought to take full cognizance of their contribution to the stabilizing effort and treat Britain as a special ally. In the past, and especially during the Kennedy Administration, the Anglo-American partnership was purposely downgraded in Washington; Britain was treated as an equal of France and Germany, even though these two countries bore no international responsibilities comparable to hers. It has been argued[24] that this U.S. attitude was a factor in the decision to reduce the British presence; why should Britain take on extra alliance burdens only to be treated in precisely the same way as far less burdened France and Germany? The reversal of the substance of U.S. policy toward Britain's role East of Suez strongly implies that there ought to be a reversal of form as well. If Britain agrees to retain the imperial task in the Gulf, she should be treated with deference, and the major West European states and Japan and Australia should be made to understand that they can gain equal status with Britain only by taking on an equal share of the burden of maintaining order in specific regions of Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

IV

If, in spite of the return of the Conservatives to power, Britain does continue to withdraw from the Gulf, some would argue that the United States would have to man the Gulf bases, for the actual presence of force is a more effective deterrent to local adventurers than a remotely located force. But there is also reason to believe that the United States may not be able to re-

[24]See *Round Table,* "Britain's Retreat from Asia" (editorial), October 1967, and "Anglo-American Disintegration" (editorial), April 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

place the British locally. American public opinion, opposed to the lingering involvement in Viet Nam, may not take kindly to a new physical consignment of U.S. forces, and in any case the hypercautious Nixon Administration may not wish to put public opinion to the test in the wake of the Johnson Administration's experiences. Furthermore, a physical replacement of the British, who seem to many in the Gulf to be a benign part of the landscape, by the unknown commodity of the U.S. Army might increase instability and thus defeat its own purpose; the American military presence might give the revolutionary Arabs in Cairo and Baghdad a new lease on life. Remembering the negative role that Washington's direct diplomatic intervention played in the 1950's in relation to the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine, it might be best on balance to avoid a local U.S. presence in the Middle East.

Assuming, then, that the American presence is extraregional and limited to the Indian Ocean, the tasks of U.S. diplomacy in the Gulf area are to stabilize and mediate the bipolar balance of power that emerged in 1968 between Iran and Saudi Arabia and, in addition, to shield this conservative bipolar system from outside intervention emanating from Baghdad or Cairo. If these two tasks can be performed successfully, then the third—shielding the area from the Soviet Union—will be facilitated if not made unnecessary.

The Gulf's bipolar power balance can be further stabilized through evenhanded U.S. diplomatic mediation designed to confirm Iran as the pre-eminent naval power in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia as the pre-eminent military power on the Arabian peninsula. In effect, the present trend toward limited and remote Saudi Arabian political control of the Gulf emirates should be encouraged, and Kuwait ought to be given separate encouragement to ally with Saudi Arabia for her own defense against Iraq. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia, considered as a special client of the United States, should be supported in her aspiration to maintain or gain her entire sphere of influence in Arabia, which implies a measure of political control over Yemen and South Yemen as well as over the emirates.

Only brief attention need be given to the argument that the United States would be supporting a backward, feudal state. The most likely alternative to Faisal's backward Arabia is a revolutionary regime of the Nasserist type, and it is doubtful that this would be an improvement over Faisal or even possible politically.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the Royalist experience in Yemen has demonstrated, the main sources of political cohesion in Arabia are a shared Islamic (Wahabbism) religion and a shared distaste for the Egyptian foreigners. A revolutionary regime of the Nasserist type would place more importance on modern nationalism and socialism than on traditional religious values and tribal interests, and the consequence might be political decay, disintegration and tribal warfare all over Arabia. This might be in Nasser's interest, but it is not in the interest of the Arabs who populate the peninsula. Nor is the alternative to Faisal attractive from the standpoint of Western interests, economic or strategic.

If Iran is given her fair share of the Persian Gulf's oil, she will probably accept with equanimity increased U.S. diplomatic and material support for Saudi Arabian political aspirations in Arabia. The Shah's trip to Riyadh and Jidda in November 1968 was a tacit admission that there was little Iran could do to block growing Saudi Arabian control on the southern shore of the Gulf. Actually, Iran's main reason for renewing her claim to Bahrain at this time is to establish the basis for a subsequent claim to as much of the Gulf's offshore oil deposits as she can gain.

The diplomatic problems surrounding Bahrain and other areas around the Gulf could be lessened if not fully eliminated by a clear-cut division of the Gulf's oil or the revenues from it. It is precisely here that U.S. (or British) diplomacy could be most helpful. *Regionalization* of the entire Gulf rather than nationalization of parts of it would be highly desirable.[25] The Gulf countries could then divide revenues rather than enter into national competitions, and a consortium of Western companies could undertake drilling operations in the name of a regional oil commission, without fear of nationalization. Since the principle underlying the sharing formula is elusive and would have to be negotiated, Washington could argue in support of granting Iran the lion's share of the oil revenues of the "Persian" Gulf. Any opposition from Faisal could be met with the reminder that he is being supported in his political aspirations in Arabia by the United States, and that this support is not given unconditionally.

[25]*In the late 1940's all of the southern shore governments unilaterally proclaimed* that the seabed and subsoil lying beneath the international waters of the Persian Gulf but contiguous to their territorial waters henceforth belonged to their states. Nothing was said about boundaries until 1958, when Saudi Arabia and Bahrain reached an agreement about their offshore boundary. See Sir Rupert Hay, *The Persian Gulf States* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959), pp. 61-62. Regionalization of the high seas of the Gulf is the only solution which avoids the potential conflicts of asserted as well as merely announced nationalization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It might also be politically advisable for the United States to support proposals to give Iraq a healthy share of the revenues, thereby conferring upon that state an interest in preserving the stability of the area.[26]

There is sufficient reason to think that Iran would find such a settlement respecting the Gulf's resources acceptable. More than the other states, Iran's interest is absorbed in internal economic development. Her aspirations in the Gulf are derived from this internal interest and consequently are not at odds with the preeminent Saudi Arabian objective, i.e., denying to others political control over the Arabian rimland. In fact, since Iran has some reason to fear Nasser's expansionist and revolutionary policies, she might accommodate herself with remarkable ease to a strengthening of the Saudi Arabian political position on the Arabian peninsula.

With a stable and prosperous Persian Gulf as her diplomatic hinterland, Iran might then be able to adopt a less contorted policy toward the USSR than she has pursued recently. Rather than attempting an economic engagement with the Soviets in order to disengage them politically from the Arabs, she could seek less politically loaded deals with the Soviets and more economically advantageous agreements.

If Iran did balk at an American mediated settlement of politics in the Gulf, her diplomatic trumps would be economic (nationalization of oil operations) and strategic (neutralization of the country). In neither case need the United States feel endangered. A threat to nationalize the remaining Western oil operations could be countered with a reminder that this action would make it difficult for the United States to support Iran's claim for a large share of the Gulf's oil revenues, and, furthermore, nationalization might result in a loss of Iran's Western oil markets. A threat to neutralize the country might best be received with "interest" in Washington, since from the U.S. point of view the alliance with Iran may be obsolete; its main functions were to foster that country's internal political stability and to deny it to Soviet control. Iranian neutrality undertaken in the context of opposition to the United States might contribute more to internal political stability than the alliance now does, and should in no

[26]An indication that Iraq might be open to such an approach was given on February 25, 1968, when the Iraqi Foreign Ministry protested the Iranian-Kuwaiti offshore shelf agreement because Iraq had not been party to it. *Middle East Journal* (chronology), Spring 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way imply Soviet control over Iran. Tehran is not Cairo; it considers the USSR to be as imperialistic as the West. Altogether, for Western interests, a neutral Iran might well be more desirable than an allied Iran.

To round out the picture, it should be clearly understood that there is no attractive alternative to a U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean. The American reserve is a major rationale for the British to change the course of their policy, since it would make the British presence in the Gulf both viable and credible; beyond that, it would be the military foundation upon which the United States could base an active and constructive regional diplomacy. With or without the British, this military presence is necessary. It is also a means of containing Soviet expansion into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf via Suez and Yemen.

The cardinal principles dictating the type of U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean are two: access to the Persian Gulf (and other international problem areas between the Gulf and Singapore) and management of the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. In essence, the second purpose is assumed in the first, since the aim of the Soviet naval presence would most likely be to deny, or at least hinder, U.S. access to the Persian Gulf and other rimland areas. Access is easy without a Soviet presence, difficult but not impossible with it.

An Indian Ocean Fleet comprising two numbered fleets would be the basic American requirement. Unlike the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, which give the United States forward presence in the Mediterranean and in the Far East, the Indian Ocean fleets need not be strategic (nuclear) in their purpose and weaponry; their task would be not to deter the Soviet Union but rather to maintain regional stability by deterring local political adventurers. Each fleet could therefore be built around the core of helicopter carriers designed to land troops and a full complement of military equipment on short order. Two LPH (Landing Platform Helicopter) of the *Iwo Jima* class or of the (converted) *Essex* class could be assigned to each fleet, and two of the new catamaran-type LPH that may eventually be constructed for the Navy by Litton Systems could be so earmarked.[27] Air cover for these task forces could be provided by two outdated aircraft carriers of the *Essex* class. Such carriers will soon be available as they are retired from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to make way for the *John F.*

[27] *Jane's Fighting Ships,* 1968-69, p. 418.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kennedy and carriers of the *Nimitz* class.[28] The fleets could be fleshed out with an adequate (depending on the Soviet naval presence) protective shield of cruisers, destroyers and anti-submarine forces, as well as a small complement of repair and supply ships.

A second reserve behind the naval task forces might be a large Indian Ocean army base, or several smaller bases. Those at Gan, Diego Garcia, and in the Seychelles are too small or are otherwise unsuitable for army bases; Socotra would be the ideal site if properly developed, but there are political difficulties involved here. If finding a militarily feasible and politically unobjectionable piece of land proves impossible, the problem could easily be solved by technology: developing contingency plans to airlift U.S. Army units from Europe or the Far East into the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas.

V

To sum up, the necessity of providing a security structure for the Persian Gulf is dictated by the British decision to withdraw, taken in the context of continuing Western interests in the area. Ideally, this would be a security system in which Britain continued to play the key role of local policeman and the United States provided a relatively inconspicuous Indian Ocean reserve military force, thereby making the British local presence militarily viable. But if such Anglo-American cooperation cannot be counted on, then vital Western and U.S. interests require that the United States alone move in to fill the vacuum. A prudent view of the situation suggests that in this case the United States should not replace the British militarily in the Gulf, but rather should confine herself to a regional diplomatic presence buttressed by an extraregional military presence. The diplomatic task should be to stabilize and mediate the regional balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia that has been developing naturally in the Gulf, and beyond this to maintain the peaceful environment needed to ensure a steady supply of oil. The extraregional military task should be to maintain ready access to the area in case force is needed to uphold what diplomacy has wrought.

It may be well to consider the imperial principles[29] on which

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[29] For a brilliant and detailed treatment, see George Liska, *Imperial America, The Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) and *War and Order, Reflections on Vietnam and History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this paper is based. The international experience of the United States since 1945 has been a difficult one for Americans to bring into reasonable and satisfying perspective. They have been engaged in no simple black and white struggle between an evil, expansionist communism and a good, defensive democracy, represented respectively by a monolithic Soviet bloc and an equally monolithic Free World. Nor, as the revisionists would have us believe, has their involvement in global affairs been due to a sinister conspiracy hatched in Washington through the connivance of Pentagon generals and General Motors executives. The Cold War can be viewed more realistically as a dangerous bipolar struggle between an understandably insecure and expansionist Soviet Union, anxious to move into the power vacuums that arose out of World War II, and an inexperienced and also insecure America, forced by historical circumstances to move first into many of these same vacuums.

However, in the 1960's the global state system has been evolving away from the ideologically rigid bipolarity of the 1950's toward a more flexible and perhaps more humane multipolarity. Recently, in light of the unsettling Viet Nam experience, a new variation on the realist power theme has been indicated for the United States: If history is compelling her to fill the vacuums left behind by Japan (Korea), France (Indochina) and Britain (the Persian Gulf), it is high time for her to stop fighting the tide of history and accept the imperial mandate being thrust upon her, for the scope of foreign policy decision-making is much narrower than the extremes of "isolation or empire" now being debated in the United States. The core question is whether the United States intervenes late, slowly, and consequently massively (as in Viet Nam) or whether she is willing to intervene in unfolding power vacuums early, rapidly, diplomatically, and consequently easily (as in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1947).

The imperial perspective is less a radical departure from traditional American ways than it is a recognition that the changing world environment demands a changed U.S. response, one that will come closest to providing the ideal international setting for the maintenance of a plural society and a democratic polity at home. The United States cannot afford another Viet Nam. Fissures between her urban and non-urban populations, black and white races, poor and rich, young and not-so-young, are too precariously patched together to bear up under new pressure com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parable to that engendered by the old Viet Nam policy. The bleak prospect of a misconceived foreign policy that leads this country into the fool's paradise of isolation from international politics is later reinvolvement at a much higher human cost, and, possibly, a consequent breakdown of the domestic social order and reversion to parochial authoritarianism in the body politic. The irony of international history is that the only way a great power may escape its onerous burdens is to anticipate and confront them head on by means of creative diplomacy, and the reward for treating politics and diplomacy as art and not as a necessary evil is the satisfaction of having shaped history in one's own time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MOSCOW AND THE PERSIAN GULF: AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AMBITIONS AND POTENTIAL*

by O. M. Smolansky

FOREIGN policy decisions by a great power must rest upon a careful balancing of means and ends: the cost and availability of the requisites for achieving a specific objective weighed against the necessity or desirability of that goal. Apart from preserving its great-power status, other aspirations grow or decline in accordance with its ability to accomplish them. Therefore, in assessing Moscow's ambitions and potential in the Persian Gulf, it is imperative to avoid the view that these two phenomena are unrelated. As Soviet foreign policy in the underdeveloped world during the post-Stalin era indicates, there is a mutually interactive relationship between the USSR's aims and capabilities; pragmatism and realism are the order of the day.

For Westerners, conditioned as they are by decades of their own and communist propaganda, the notion of the Kremlin's flexibility is often difficult to grasp. However, the evidence strongly suggests that Soviet foreign policy objectives revolve primarily around preserving the USSR's position as a superpower and not around spreading Marxist ideology in the noncommunist world. For example, Moscow has consistently backed Nasser, who reciprocated by suppressing indigenous communists in Egypt. It also failed to support Iraqi Marxists during Qasim's rule and insisted that the Syrian Communist Party cooperate with the "revolutionary bourgeoisie." More recently, the Kremlin has been busy undercutting Castroite activities in Latin America.

Theoretically, Soviet objectives in the underdeveloped areas could be said to range from complete communist domination through conquest or subversion, on the one extreme, to complete withdrawal on the other, with maintenance of the status quo and various other possibilities in between. In the world of great-power

*This article is based on a paper presented at Princeton University's Conference on the Persian Gulf on October 25, 1968. The author wishes to thank the Research Institute of Lehigh University for financial assistance in the preparation of the paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politics, neither extreme appears likely nor is the status quo invariably acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union, although it is more acceptable in some developing areas than others. The variance of acceptability is in large part conditioned by the availability of the means to alter the existing situation.

Herbert Dinerstein has outlined three types of Soviet activity in the underdeveloped world: (1) denial of influence in neutral areas to adversaries; (2) intrusion into opponents' spheres of influence; and (3) "promotion of socialist revolution."[1] There have been few Moscow-sponsored attempts at the last, and none has been successful. Further, the Kremlin's enthusiasm for the first choice shows signs of waning, since "victories" of this type have not been so numerous and inexpensive as was initially hoped. With regard to the second category, the USSR does indeed seem to have made some progress. However, its successes were not only due to Moscow's own efforts but were greatly facilitated by the dissolution of the Western colonial empires and the concurrent growth of "anti-imperialist" sentiments in the newly independent nations.

It would thus appear that the major thrust of Soviet activities in the developing areas, designed to undermine the West's influence in noncommitted and even pro-Western countries, is not the result of peculiarly ideological motivations, but is rather a time-tested device of great-power politics. Since the United States and her allies follow a similar line in their approach to the Third World, the result has been the emergence in the developing areas of a traditional-type balance of power model which, in part, dictates the necessity of undermining the power of one's adversary. In the postwar period, the USSR has often sought to dislodge and, if possible, supplant Western influence, thus reinforcing Washington's determination to oppose what it considered communist encroachments into the Free World domain. Not only can such an attitude on the part of the superpowers be extremely expensive (from both a human and an economic standpoint, as is the case in Viet Nam), but it also harbors the possibility of a miscalculation leading to nuclear war. Fortunately, the contestants have thus far exhibited appreciation of the risk factor and a willingness to pull back when the risk outweighed the potential gain. There can be no guarantee that a showdown might not one day take place, but how tragic it would be if a nuclear war were in-

[1]Herbert Dinerstein, "Moscow and the Third World: Power Politics or Revolution?," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1968, p. 52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itiated over some issue which, in the last analysis, was of no vital interest to the respective antagonists.

Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf area must hence be assessed as a question of the means available to Moscow to alter the status quo and the desirability of exercising these means in light of their probable cost. Due to the geographic, cultural, economic and political ties of the Gulf area to its neighbors, the Soviet position and prospects must also be analyzed in relation to the USSR's current and potential status in the Middle East as a whole.

II

To ascertain what policy a great power is likely to pursue in a given region, it is necessary to define and delineate that nation's vital interests. Traditionally, these have been couched in terms of military security, indispensable raw materials, markets and communication routes. But in the nuclear age and in conditions of ever-expanding world trade, such considerations have lost much of their former meaning for the superpowers. Today, an examination of the gains that would accrue from influence in or control over a specific area seems more appropriate. Such potential advantages fall into two categories: intrinsic (direct) and relational (indirect). An example of the first type is the ability to exploit a vital natural resource which is not otherwise available; the capacity to deny one's opponents access to resources vital to them would belong in the second category.

Only in the context of intrinsic and relational interests can the Soviet position and ambitions in the Middle East be evaluated properly. Heretofore, most analysts have emphasized Moscow's direct interests in the area and have uncritically accepted the argument that since Russia historically held territorial ambitions in the Middle East, the Soviet Union must still hold them today.[2] According to this line of thought, the region's geographic proximity to the USSR makes it vitally important to the Kremlin both for reasons of military security and trade route access. In addition, it is important as a major supplier of petroleum — one of the world's great energy sources; traditionalists view Middle Eastern oil as potentially of great economic value to any power that controls the region.[3] How valid are these assumptions or, perhaps more cor-

[2]See, for example, George Lenczowski, "Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East," *Journal of Politics*, February 1958, pp. 162-186; Geoffrey Wheeler, "Russia and the Arab World," *The World Today*, July 1961, pp. 307-318; and John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), Chapter 11.

[3]For a recent exposition see American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *United States Interests in the Middle East* (Washington, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rectly, the emphasis placed upon them? This question can best be answered by examining each of the three factors bearing on the Soviet search for advantages in the Middle East: military-strategic location, access to the rest of the world, and oil.

With regard to military security, it is obvious that current levels of Western strength in the Middle East pose no threat to the Russian homeland. A buildup of allied forces there in such numbers as to endanger Soviet security seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, given the present military capacity of Western Europe and the growing disinclination of the United States to embark upon further initiatives. Potential offensive military aims by the USSR perhaps deserve more attention. The argument that the USSR wishes to dominate the Middle East and North Africa so as to outflank Western Europe has often been cited as a reason why Soviet strategists might be willing to take substantial risks in the area. Even if one could agree that this could be accomplished at a price the Kremlin would find acceptable, such a maneuver seems to be of little, if any, value in an age of predominantly nuclear strategy. The same advantages can be gained virtually without risk by building up the Soviet fleet, both surface and submarine, and increasing the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's).

The second factor, access to important trade and communications routes, may be accorded some consideration. It is no doubt true that a Western takeover in the Middle East or the existence of a unified front of Middle Eastern states intensely hostile to the USSR would seriously restrict the latter's ambitions to become an economic world power,[4] but neither of these contingencies seems likely in the foreseeable future. Probably nothing would bring about either situation except a drastic miscalculation by the Soviet Union or a war, in which access would, in any case, be interrupted.

On the surface, control over and ability to exploit the third factor, oil, would appear to be a distinct advantage. The Middle East contains two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves and produces between 25 and 30 per cent of its current yearly output.[5] The problem here is that control over the region does not automatically ensure the ability to exploit its economic potential. This would necessitate logistical and marketing capabilities far beyond those the USSR now possesses. Furthermore, even if these capabilities

[4]One need only note the adverse effects on Soviet trade of the Suez Canal closure since June 1967 to document this point.

[5]Based on figures supplied by Stephen H. Longrigg, *The Middle East: A Social Geography* (London: Duckworth, 1963), p. 252.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could be attained, most of the oil revenues would have to be poured back into the region to help develop its infrastructure, industry and agriculture. At present, even with rapidly increasing revenues from oil, the economic progress of the Middle East leaves much to be desired.

Thus, on balance, the supposed direct advantages of Soviet control over the Middle East seem hardly worth the risk. What, then, of the indirect advantages vis-à-vis the West? First, while an allied military buildup in the Middle East seems at best unlikely, if changing world conditions should make such a buildup desirable, it would obviously be to the Soviets' advantage to deny the West the opportunity to strengthen its position in the area. Even here, however, the contingencies involved in giving rise to such a situation seem so tenuous as to assign to the problem an extremely low priority in Soviet thinking.

Second, denial to the Western powers of access to the "crossroads" of three continents would no doubt cause them considerable inconvenience. For one thing, it would cut off an important communication link to Africa and the Far East. But viable alternative routes exist for the West, as became evident in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. If Soviet actions designed to accomplish such an objective entailed much risk (as they surely would, given the Western view of the proper balance of world power), the goal would seem to be too much of a gamble.

Finally, it could be argued that since Western Europe is the major consumer of Middle Eastern oil, the ability to deprive it of oil might prove a decisive factor in time of crisis. Yet here, too, a closer examination of the probabilities diminishes the seeming benefit. The West, alert to this danger, long ago assigned high priority to the development of its capability to withstand such pressure.[6] Moreover, oil dependence is a two-way street: while Western Europe could not hold out indefinitely without Middle Eastern oil, the economies of most oil-producing countries and their economic dependents would soon collapse without oil revenue.[7] No alternative market of comparable size exists or seems likely to develop in the near future. The assumption, of course, is based on crises short of actual war. In a nuclear confrontation the

[6]For a detailed explanation of the steps needed to meet this problem see Harold Lubell, *Middle East Oil Crises and Western Europe's Energy Supplies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), Chapter 6.

[7]Arab leaders themselves seem to realize their vulnerability due to the interdependence of consumer and producer. Nasser is quoted as having once said in reference to his oil-rich counterparts: "After all, they can't drink it."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oil issue becomes irrelevant. In any future conventional war, Moscow would be able to shut off the flow of Middle East petroleum whether or not it controlled the area prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The strong probability is that in peace the oil will flow to Western Europe and in war it will not, no matter whether the Soviets or the Arabs control it.

There is some evidence to indicate that the Soviet government is aware of all this. It is currently engaged in a concerted drive to increase its oil exports to Western Europe.[8] As the Arabs attempted to boycott Western consumers following the June 1967 war, the Kremlin even endeavored to encroach upon former Arab markets. Although this action was eventually stopped because it carried a high risk of undercutting efforts at building good will in the Arab East,[9] the Soviet oil offensive has continued in the post-boycott period.[10] If Moscow's aim is control of Middle Eastern oil, why would the Soviets undertake the cost and effort of supplanting the area's supplies? They would, in effect, be building a situation in which they would ultimately be in competition with themselves. Their actions in this respect would certainly seem to rule out any plan or hope to control the Middle East in the short run, though perhaps not in the long run.

A final issue must be examined before any conclusions regarding Moscow's objectives in the Middle East can be reached. Assuming for the moment that domination of the area is what the Soviets desire, how could they hope to achieve it? Since the West is certain to find such an ambition objectionable (if not totally unacceptable), what is the current position in the Middle East of both the West and the USSR? Not too surprisingly, most of the advantages the Soviet Union now enjoys stem from the disadvantages of the Western position.[11] Pre-eminent among the latter is the

[8]See D. L. Spencer, "The Role of Oil in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology,* January 1966, pp. 91-107. See also Robert W. Campbell, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).

[9]*U.S. News and World Report,* July 3, 1967.

[10]The latest (and most conclusive) bit of evidence was provided by the joint statement of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR calling for large-scale exploitation of the Tiumen' oil fields in Western Siberia. A tenfold increase of the current production of twenty million tons is envisaged for 1980. The statement is formulated in such a manner as to leave no doubt that the Soviet government has assigned the highest priority to this project. Text in *Pravda,* January 15, 1970.

[11]An exception to this "rule" is the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union to the area. Despite its obvious logistical benefits, proximity is not completely advantageous to Moscow, for to any small country the presence of a superpower as a neighbor seems inevitably to have its threatening aspects, often generating at least latent suspicion and hostility.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legacy of Western colonialism which has produced widespread, intense hatred of "imperialism" and of what the Arabs regard as its most dangerous modern manifestation, the State of Israel. Whether the Arab assertion that Israel is an expression of Western imperialism is correct or not is irrelevant; the point is that the Western powers are closely identified with the emergence and relative prosperity of Israel. The Soviets, having eschewed Israel and, as it were, repented of their past sins in this regard, naturally benefit from the Arabs' hatred and suspicion of the West.

The differing policies of the West and the USSR in the matter of foreign aid also work to the Soviets' advantage. Moscow's aid to the area is widely regarded as being of the "no-strings-attached" variety; in contrast, Western programs appear to be riddled with self-seeking provisos, stipulations and conditions. Yet this "no strings" approach of the USSR is in fact a myth. The basic difference between East and West has been Soviet willingness to accept any benefits that might accrue (or even forgo foreseeable gains and accept short-term setbacks), while the West has tended to offer its aid with specific objectives in mind. In the volatile and sensitive Arab world, the Soviet attitude is the more realistic of the two, for the real motivations of the donor are not as important as the recipient's perception of those motivations. Arab leaders do not really believe that Moscow's aid comes without strings, but its method of presentation allows them to save face with their compatriots.

Another Western shortcoming that works to the advantage of the Soviet Union is the relative lack of unity of purpose among the various Western allies. This was perhaps most dramatically demonstrated in the Suez debacle of 1956. The situation has improved since then, except for France's new independent policy, but even now the short-term aims of the Western powers sometimes conflict, not to mention the diversity of opinion on how best to accomplish objectives that have been agreed upon. Not only are the Soviets in a position to act without the difficulties inherent in having to consult and win consensus from allies,[12] but their system of government gives them added flexibility in policymaking and implementation. The fact that they do not have to consider public opinion at home, as do many Western

[12]France's new policy does not present the same problems to the Western alliance as disunity has in the past, for Paris has become so independent as to remove itself from Western consultations designed to arrive at a consensus.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries, allows them to make the shifts and turns in policy so often necessary in the volatile Middle East.

The rising reputation of the Soviet Union as a superpower on an equal footing with the United States also enhances its position in the Middle East. The continuous Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, coupled with port calls in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, is undoubtedly intended to inflate that impression.

More generally, by seeming to favor any activity designed to upset the status quo, the USSR appears to have reaped greater benefits than the West from the instability of the area. Yet, now that Moscow has acquired some influence worth protecting, it can no longer afford to carry these tactics too far, as chaos could and probably would ultimately run counter to its interests. The Kremlin leaders may by now have learned the lesson that any nation which interferes in the internal conflicts of a country torn by factions will usually get more than it bargained for. Tension, once stimulated with foreign help, cannot be controlled from outside. For example, after a long period of helping to stir up the Kurdish problem in Iraq, the Soviets now appear interested in toning down the quarrel. It has become obvious, however, that while they can stop their propaganda on signal, they cannot turn off its effects.

In light of the above arguments, what can be said of Moscow's probable short-range strategy in the Middle East? One thing seems clear from recent Soviet activities throughout the world and Western reaction to them: any drastic move in this sensitive area is highly unlikely. Even though Soviet analysts may not share this view of their country's limited interests in the Middle East, they are keenly aware that precipitant actions designed to upset the balance of world power can be undertaken only at the gravest risk.

Far more probable would seem to be a gradual chipping away at Western positions, although even in this effort Moscow's chances for success diminish once a certain point is reached. Many of the advantages currently enjoyed by the USSR, contingent as they are upon the recency of Soviet influence in the area, could vanish if the Kremlin persists in extending that influence. Nothing is so likely to unite Western policy in the Middle East as continued and expanding Soviet successes. Nor would anything be more likely to abrogate the Arabs' relative good will toward the USSR, perhaps even to the point of driving them back into the arms of the West, than success of the sort which would include the establishment of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet satellites among them. The Arabs no more relish Soviet domination than the Western variety. With perhaps more wisdom than wit, it can be said that, especially for the outside powers in the Middle East, nothing fails like success.

Since the advantages of domination seem at best marginal and the means to achieve it not at all certain, the reasonable conclusion is that, as long as the world balance of power remains relatively static, the Soviet Union will not seek to dominate the area but will rather seek to increase its influence with a concomitant diminution of Western influence. How will this strategy affect that last British imperial outpost in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region?

III

The Persian Gulf microcosm represents both the problems and the potentials of the Middle East in exaggerated form. The problems are aggravated by the lag in socio-economic and political development compared with most of the rest of the Arab world, though the potential for progress is much greater because the area contains the world's greatest known reservoir of readily accessible oil. The objective basis for future Soviet activities in the Gulf region, therefore, is almost the same as that outlined above for the entire Middle East. Only one element in the means-ends formula seems to differ significantly: the current Soviet position in the Gulf and, with it, Moscow's ability to pursue various courses of action.

The anti-Western feeling of which the USSR has been the chief beneficiary in many Arab states has made little headway in the Persian Gulf countries, with the exception of Iraq. Though most Gulf leaders pay appropriate pan-Arab lip service to "anti-imperialism" and are no doubt sincere in their condemnation of Israel, they do not, for the most part, seem to regard the United States and Western Europe as the chief culprits in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[13] In fact, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can at present be regarded as client states of the West. While in recent years they have shown signs of enjoying more cordial relations with the Soviet Union, it seems probable that, so long as their current regimes remain in power, they will continue in their pro-Western orientation. Thus, any hope of Moscow for a major increase in influence in these countries depends to a large extent upon the

[13]Not being so directly affected by the conflict, they feel less strongly about it than do Egypt and its allies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

viability of the present regimes. Though any experienced observer knows that the only political certainty in the Muslim world is noncertitude, the evidence suggests that all three regimes are relatively stable.

Muscat and Oman, the other sovereign state in the peninsular Gulf region, is something of an enigma. It is the most closed of all of the area's parochial societies. Traditionally, the Sultan has depended upon the British as his intermediary with the outside world.[14] Any overt attempts at gaining substantial influence in Muscat and Oman would probably *at best* produce for the Soviets a situation similar to the one in which they find themselves in Yemen, a by no means happy prospect from the standpoint of Moscow's interests. Subtler attempts to gain influence seem even less likely to succeed.

Iraq, the only state of the Gulf region which does not share with its counterparts the insulation of the peninsula, is separated from them by more than geography. It has become in the last few decades a relatively modern state, cast in the Egyptian and Syrian mold. The modern outlook of its leadership has placed it squarely in the vigorous cross-currents of international affairs. Here the Soviet position enjoys essentially the same advantages but suffers from the same limitations as in the Middle East generally. Recent internal power shifts seem unlikely to make a significant difference in Iraqi foreign policy.

A power shift of much greater potential importance to the Soviet Union — and, indeed, to the rest of the world — is that which is currently occurring in the Gulf emirates. The catalyst for this evolution has not been internal; London's announcement of the impending abandonment of British bases East of Suez occasioned it. The original statement set the deadline for the withdrawal at 1975, but a more recent decision of January 1968 moved the date up to the end of 1971. Since the British have up to now enjoyed the status of protector of the emirates, this decision has created in the Gulf area a power vacuum in its classical form. In an attempt to fill it themselves, leaders of the emirates, in a series of meetings during 1968-1969, announced their intention and took preliminary steps to form a new political entity, the Federation of Arabian Emirates. The new federation, consisting of Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial Sheikdoms, would allow for continued substantial internal control by each ruler in his own

[14]For a detailed analysis of the current status of Muscat and Oman see J. B. Kelly, "The Future in Arabia," *International Affairs*, October 1966, pp. 619-640.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

territory but would provide for joint defense and diplomatic representation, as well as a common currency, a unified postal service, and allegiance to one flag.[15]

As in the case of the monarchist regimes of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran), the Soviet potential in this territory revolves around the viability of the new federation. What are the chances for its success? At this point no final judgment can be passed, for there are both positive and negative factors involved.

A tempting short cut for the prognosticator would be to see the similarities between the situation in the Gulf emirates and that in the Aden Protectorate at the time of its impending independence and thus to predict a failure in the Gulf similar to that which the British sustained in the creation of the South Arabian Federation. There are obvious parallels, the most notable being the presence of traditional rivalries within each region. Already the proposed federation has divided into two major factions, one headed by Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and the other by Qatar and Dubai, but the recent meetings of the Gulf rulers seem to indicate some disposition to compromise in the overriding common interest.[16]

On the other hand, numerous important differences in the two situations should be taken into account: (1) The new federation is not so patently a British creation as was the solution proposed for Aden. The fact that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the rulers of the sheikdoms themselves have taken the initiative in the Gulf seems to be admitted even by Soviet publications, which have noted that, while the idea of a federation was originally advanced in London, there were no British representatives present at the meetings which arranged for its formation.[17] (2) Opinion in the rest of the Arab world (with the exception of Syria) seems favorably disposed toward the new political entity, while most Arabs opposed the British plan for Aden. Cairo, in particular, hopes for stability

[15] *Mideast Mirror,* July 13, 1968, pp. 5-6.

[16] Substantial progress has been made on a proposed constitution, although it has not, as of this writing, been ratified by the rulers. On October 25, 1969, the Sheiks of Qatar and Ras al-Khaymah walked out of a meeting of the Supreme Council ostensibly in protest against the reading of a letter from the British Political Resident in the Gulf. It was reported, however, that conflicts with other rulers on the various issues confronting the Council were really responsible. For details see *Arab Report and Record,* October 16-31, 1969, pp. 430-431.

[17] *Mizan Newsletter,* March-April 1968, p. 57. See also G. Drambyants, "The Persian Gulf: Time of Changes," *International Affairs,* June 1968, pp. 34-39, and V. Bodianskii, "V Persidskom Zalive Nespokoino," *Aziia i Afrika Segodnia,* July 1968, pp. 8-10. For the previous Soviet position see Commentator, "Provocative Imperialist Bustle in the Persian Gulf," *International Affairs,* March 1968, pp. 75-76. The general Soviet view of the Arabian peninsula in the mid-1960's is given in O. E. Tuganova, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1967), pp. 193-199.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Gulf region because it has become economically dependent on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait since its setback in the June 1967 war. Any instability resulting from Cairo's opposition to the new federation would threaten its newly found revenue. Further, the most likely immediate alternatives to the joint emirates, namely, takeover by either Saudi Arabia or Iran of part or all of the area, are totally unacceptable to the UAR and its allies. (3) Aden's major economic asset was its port, while the emirates now enjoy large oil revenues which will probably grow even larger as more and more oil discoveries are made. (4) Unlike Aden, where the port served as a major entrepôt for diverse "foreign ideas," the sheikdoms are better insulated geographically, and this has led to widespread provincialism and resistance to new ways of thinking.

The real "fly in the ointment" for the new federation would seem to be not any similarity to Aden, but the existence of a territorial dispute with Iran. The latter's long-standing claim to the island of Bahrain is already producing clouds on the horizon. In the midst of the emirates' negotiations on federation, while voices of approval and encouragement were heard all over the Middle East, Tehran frequently reminded the world of its own interests in the Gulf, with particular emphasis on its claim to Bahrain. Thus, it was small surprise when, only one day after the July 1968 announcement of agreement on its basic composition, Iran flatly denounced the proposed federation. While the tone of more recent statements by the Shah seems to have moderated, the basic conflict remains.[18]

These diverse factors in the outlook for the new political entity suggest three alternatives with regard to the probable course of events in the near future. One is that some compromise over Iran's claim to Bahrain can be worked out among the disputants to allow for the successful and peaceful establishment of the federation; the second is that the dispute will grow into a minor league "cold war" among the states of the area; the third, that open military conflict will break out between the Arabs and Iran.

Since Soviet publications have abandoned (in early 1968) editorial condemnation of the proposed federation and have given it their guarded approbation (see note 17), it might be concluded

[18]On January 4, 1969, the Shah stated that Iran would not use force to settle the Bahrain issue. He further announced the willingness of his country to let the matter be settled by plebiscite. However, this latter statement is perhaps not so benign and reasonable as it sounds, for the Shah knew full well that such a solution was and is totally unacceptable to the ruler of Bahrain. For more details see *Arab Report and Record*, January 31, 1969, p. 2; August 16-31, 1969, p. 338; September 1-15, 1969, p. 358; September 16-30, 1969, p. 382; and October 1-15, 1969, p. 407.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the USSR is not in principle opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Iranian dispute. On the other hand, this display of moderation may be due mainly to the Soviet leadership's realization that it has insufficient means either to resolve the conflict or to bring about the outbreak of hostilities. In the unlikely event of a peaceful settlement, Moscow can be expected to continue its present efforts toward establishing more cordial relations with the states in the Gulf area. Meantime, Soviet analysis must revolve around which of the other two alternatives is preferable and, once this is established, how to encourage its development. If it is any consolation to Western policymakers, the choice facing their Kremlin counterparts is by no means a pleasant one, as potential advantages and disadvantages are inherent in both situations.

The last option, allowing Iran and the Arabs to "slug it out," would give Moscow the obvious advantage of watching the client states of the Western powers nullify Washington's and London's efforts to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf area. The Soviet government could do little itself to bring about a military showdown except to give Tehran's claim to Bahrain its official support, accompanied by a massive program of military assistance to the Shah. Aside from forcing the hand of the Western powers, however, this option should be unacceptable to the USSR because of the strong anti-Soviet reaction such a policy would be bound to produce in "friendly" Arab capitals.[19]

Moreover, should a conflict take place without any prodding by Moscow and despite the expected opposition of the Western powers, there is a strong likelihood that Great Britain, with or without U.S. backing,[20] would intervene in defense of its former Protectorates (as it did during the 1961 Kuwait crisis), thus usurping the Kremlin's recently acquired role as the chief protector of Arab interests. Recent British pronouncements relating to the area have been careful to use the term "military withdrawal" instead of the "total withdrawal" popular im-

[19]It is noteworthy that, following Kosygin's visit to Iran in early April 1968, "official circles" in Tehran reported that the Soviet Premier "strongly endorsed Iran's rejection of an Arab federation in the Persian Gulf during his talks with the Shah." (*New York Times,* April 6, 1968.) However, *Pravda's* numerous reports on Kosygin's trip did not once mention the subject, and there was no reference to it in the joint Soviet-Iranian communiqué. Text in *Pravda,* April 8, 1968.

[20]Any direct intervention by the United States would doubtless damage Iranian-American relations, at least for a time. While this would not mean that Tehran would automatically turn to Moscow — Iran's fear of Soviet domination is too ingrained for that — it would make British intervention more likely than direct U.S. action.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mediately after the original announcement.[21] In a May 29, 1969, press conference after the CENTO Council meeting in Iran, British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, while confirming the 1971 deadline for British military withdrawal, stated that the Gulf states would receive London's help against outside aggression if they asked for it.[22] Furthermore, since the Conservatives regained power in the June 1970 British elections, even the planned military withdrawal appears by no means certain, according to their past official pronouncements.[23]

Objectively speaking, therefore, a "hot war" between the Gulf antagonists is counter to Soviet interests; both nonintervention and intervention on the side of Iran would undermine Moscow's carefully cultivated position among the Arabs. What about intervention on the side of the Arabs? It is difficult to believe that the USSR, having watched its clients go down in defeat in 1956 and 1967, would reverse its policy of military nonintervention in Middle Eastern disputes, particularly in those not involving its friends, even if its inactivity should result in an Arab rout. The latter is something Moscow has learned to live with. In all likelihood, the Kremlin's considerable political, economic and military investment in the Arab East (as opposed to a relatively minor one in Iran) would dictate diplomatic support for the Arab cause. As implied above, however, this option is not without its probable disadvantages. Should Great Britain intervene, London might be expected to reap substantial propaganda benefits, which would place the USSR in a rather awkward political position.

Hence, in a choice between "hot" and "cold" wars in the Persian Gulf area, the Kremlin's objective interests should recommend the latter alternative. The Soviet Union could continue to appear as the primary champion of the Arab cause while utilizing its considerable expertise in exploiting "cold war" situations for its own purposes. But the trouble with all tension-generating situations of this type is that they often lead to open hostilities. This has been particularly true of the post-World War II Middle East. Does Moscow possess the ability to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf? There are perhaps several ways in which the Soviets could bring their influence to bear. Unfortunately, from their standpoint, the options most likely to have

[21] *Daily Telegraph* (London), June 16, 1969.

[22] *Arab Report and Record,* May 16-31, 1969, p. 198.

[23] *Ibid.*, February 15-28, 1969, p. 71; April 1-15, 1969, p. 139; April 16-30, 1969, p. 159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a significant impact also appear to be the most risky. It could, for instance, be argued that a threat to use force against Iran, accompanied by a naval demonstration in the Gulf and a public invitation to the United States to act as joint peacekeeper in the area, would deter the Shah from attempting to take over Bahrain. However, given superpower reluctance to cooperate on any but matters of the greatest importance to themselves (e.g., the test ban and nonproliferation treaties) and the dangers inherent in the deployment of a Soviet naval force in the Persian Gulf — a recognized Western sphere of influence — this course of action would probably be unacceptable to the Kremlin leaders.

Some Soviet analysts have come to realize the difficulties in this situation. As a recent *Mizan Newsletter* article notes, Soviet scholars are of late describing Iran's claim to Bahrain as a "thorny issue."[24] Still, Moscow's record of activities in the postwar era leads one to wonder if Soviet policymakers will be able to resist the temptation to encourage what would in essence be a military confrontation between allies of the West. Recent limited arms shipments from the USSR to Iran are a case in point. There seems to be a long-standing commitment in the Kremlin's ranks to pursue any policy that might contribute to a breakup of the Western alliance, despite ample evidence that its effects do not necessarily constitute an unmixed blessing from Moscow's standpoint.[25]

In any event, Moscow seems determined to enter the Persian Gulf picture when the circumstances warrant. In the most important official document to date, the TASS statement of March 3, 1968, [26] the Kremlin noted that the "neo-colonialist" activities in the Gulf were a threat not only to the Arab national liberation movement but to the "southern frontiers of the USSR."

IV

It is clear that Moscow's progress in the Persian Gulf is inextricably connected with its activities throughout the Middle East. In the past, significant Soviet gains have more often than not

[24] *Mizan Newsletter,* July 13, 1968, p. 52.

[25] To illustrate that Western disunity is not always advantageous to the Kremlin, France's independent policy makes it a third force in the area, one which puts Paris in direct competition with both Washington and Moscow for influence in Arab countries. (A similar situation exists in the communist "bloc." Much as the West may emotionally enjoy Moscow's obvious discomfort arising from the Sino-Soviet split, the competition between Peking and Moscow complicates the West's own position in the world, especially in the developing areas.)

[26] Text in *Pravda,* March 4, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resulted from Western blunders or from the West's inability to resolve conflicting interests and commitments in the area.[27] Unfortunately for the USSR, it has now attained a position of influence in parts of the Middle East that may begin to invite the same kind of calamities.[28] There have already been instances of burned Soviet fingers as Moscow has become embroiled in inter-Arab politics,[29] and more of the same seems almost inevitable. As the old power blocs become fragmented, the Kremlin must be on its guard not only against Western counterthrusts into its domains of influence, but also against the emergence of third and possibly fourth parties in the competition. French foreign policy since the June 1967 war makes France something of an independent force, providing the Arabs with an additional alternative in their efforts to secure their interests by playing the great powers off against one another. Peking looms as a potential fourth force, though its current internal problems preclude any sizable investment in the Middle East in the near future. However, a strong and stable China with its huge potential oil market is a power of which both the Western powers and the USSR must be wary.

The fact that the Soviets' search for influence in the Middle East has achieved such a degree of success that they must replace their initial tactics designed to upset the status quo was dramatically demonstrated by the June 1967 conflict and its aftermath. First, the war altered the internal balance of power not only between the Arabs and Israel, but, even more importantly for the Kremlin, between the various Arab nations. Second, it contributed to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime while calling into question the stability of many others. The removal of 'Arif as President in July 1968 seems not to have altered Baghdad's foreign policy, but similar changes in other countries may not let the USSR off so lightly, particularly since France has adopted a pro-Arab stance. Third, the war demonstrated that the superpowers cannot control their client states or, by inference, the total situation. Lack of control inevitably must constitute a source of grave

[27]A strong case for this point of view was made by Fayez Sayegh in "Arab Nationalism and Soviet-American Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1959, pp. 103-110.

[28]Dinerstein (*op. cit.*, p. 55) argues that having two or more "clients" with conflicting interests in the same region works to the advantage of a great power because it decreases the pressure each can apply on the sponsor nation. However, this is only true if the great power's stake in each client is roughly equal and if each client is willing to be "reasonable" about the matter.

[29]Soviet involvement in the Nasser-Qasim feud is an excellent example. The USSR finally emerged without crucial damage but not because of its own actions. It might not be so lucky in similar situations in the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concern for both Washington and Moscow. The requirement for stability in the Middle East is indicated by the effect of the Suez Canal closure upon the USSR: During the past decade and particularly since the intensification of both the Viet Nam conflict and the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet Union has become even more dependent than the West upon the Canal.[30]

The question whether the Kremlin leaders have come to appreciate their need for a new strategy and a change of tactics designed to promote stability cannot as yet be answered. One could speculate that they might share this view in qualified fashion. Specifically, Soviet analysts may adopt this attitude toward those areas of the Middle East where Moscow has achieved a position of influence (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) but fall into the trap of regarding the Gulf, with its predominantly traditionalist regimes, as a separate area whose status vis-à-vis the USSR approximates that of the above modernist governments prior to their adoption of "progressive" policies. Two major objections to such an interpretation of the situation immediately present themselves: (1) the traditionalist regimes of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and the other Gulf states are not nearly so morally and politically decadent as were their Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi counterparts; (2) the Gulf regimes have at their disposal economic resources to solve some of the problems that led to the overthrow of the traditionalists in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad.

However, even though the seeming analogy between the two situations is demonstrably false, it would not be surprising if Soviet policymakers accepted it. On many occasions (the most recent being the Czech invasion with its obvious parallel to 1956 Hungary) long-entrenched analysts in the Kremlin have seen parallels where they did not exist and have adopted policies that produced desired results in the past. Unfortunately for all concerned, with respect to the developing areas Soviet planners, along with their Western counterparts, have fallen victim to a "contest mentality" with all the attendant dangers for miscalculation such an outlook entails.

[30]Articles by Kevin Shilleto and J. E. Hartshorn in *The World Today*, April 1968, pp. 158-165 and 151-157, respectively, document this point. Interestingly enough, Moscow does not deny it; see N. Bogatyi in *Pravda*, July 13, 1968, and I. Pogodina, *ibid.*, August 4, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Ciro Zoppo

AS we enter the 1970's the political instability of the Middle East is foreboding because it raises the danger of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is aligned, almost reluctantly, with Israel, and the Soviet Union with Israel's Arab neighbors, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, protagonists of an undeclared war. The fundamental issue of this war is the right of Israel to exist as a nation created a generation ago to solve yet another political problem forged by Hitler in Europe. Until now, the Arabs have been unclear about their primary objective, whether to destroy Israel or contain her. Both rhetoric and policy have fluctuated between these quite different goals.[1]

The United States and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are clearly concerned about their political influence in the Arab East. For the Soviet Union, control of this region would represent an important achievement in her bid for world leadership. For the United States, the denial of such control would be an important way to contain her superpower rival.

But the United States does not enjoy the freedom of action the Soviet Union bought when she jettisoned Israel, after briefly supporting the newly established state. Experience has shown that the objectives sought by Washington in the Middle East—eliminating military conflict from the region, maintaining access to Arab oil, limiting Soviet influence, and guaranteeing the security of Israel—have often been at odds, and the resulting dilemmas remain unresolved.[2] Apart from losing whatever influence the United States retains in the Arab world, especially with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Morocco, the main threat to the U.S.

[1]For an elaboration, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum 5966-FF, October 1969), p. 36 ff.

[2]The constraints on U.S. policy choices in the Arab East are discussed in William B. Quandt, *United States Policy in the Middle East: Constraints and Choices* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum 5980-FF, February 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national interest is the danger of a conflict with the Soviet Union that could escalate to nuclear war.

The development of operational multiple and independently targeted nuclear warheads and the increased accuracy of missiles may severely undermine the current deterrent stability between the superpowers. However, the political impact of such technological changes may not be felt for several years. Meanwhile, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are each capable of unacceptable retaliation against the other is a potent brake to escalation. Short of the imminent collapse of Israel, which could trigger a U.S. military intervention, or further Israeli expansion that threatened the Soviet Union's client Arab states, particularly Egypt, with another humiliating defeat and more territorial losses, a real danger of escalation would seem unlikely.

But what is ambiguous and hard to predict often moves history decisively. The situation in the Middle East is volatile. Confusing signals are easily generated, as the attack on the U.S. communications ship by the Israelis during the Six-Day War testifies. Moreover, the very stability alleged to exist in the strategic balance makes the superpowers more willing to risk conventional conflict. Certainly the doctrine that the participation of the United States or the USSR in limited conflict inevitably raises the risk of a nuclear war has been modified by word and deed. The United States has intervened in local conflict with communist regimes in Korea and Viet Nam, in which Soviet aid was extensive and Soviet personnel participated covertly as technicians. The Soviets have in the process modified their military doctrine by de-emphasizing the inevitability of escalation from local conflicts in which the United States and the Soviet Union are involved.[3]

More to the point, the Soviets have been creating air transport, conventional strike forces and naval forces that endow them with a capability to intervene in conventional conflicts away from their borders. Although this new military capability may not straightaway lead to the achievement of political goals, it permits them to take advantage of opportunities for penetration where before their intention might have been frustrated or inchoate. Most dramatic has been their permanent deployment of a flotilla in the Mediterranean. Soviet ships roaming this landlocked sea have heightened tensions in the already combustible Middle East. The deployment of such forces in a region where Soviet political ob-

[3]Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 119-124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

jectives are ambitious and where the United States has long deployed a naval force of her own underscores Moscow's willingness to pursue a higher-risk policy in the area.

The Soviet naval buildup has evoked considerable U.S. and European concern.[4] It should be emphasized, however, that Soviet interest in the Mediterranean is not novel and that the increase in Soviet naval forces has been taking place for several years. The beginnings of the current buildup go back to at least the 1964 Cyprus crisis, and the number of Soviet vessels was greatly expanded in 1967 following the Six-Day War between Israel and her Arab neighbors.[5] Historically, the Soviet presence is the latest episode in a chain of events that spans two centuries and includes recurrent Russian preoccupation with the Dardanelles. Real Soviet success in penetrating the Arab East had its genesis in 1955, with the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, but active Russian interest in the region considerably predates this event.

Past Russian Attempts to Control the Straits

Although it is the first recorded in this century, the Soviet deployment in the Mediterranean has several Czarist precedents.[6] In 1770 a Russian flotilla of forty vessels was dispatched to the Mediterranean to aid the Greeks in revolt against their Ottoman overlords. It remained until 1774, at the conclusion of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. In 1798 Russia again sent ships to the Mediterranean, this time through the Straits, to fight against Napoleon. In 1806 a Russian squadron of fifteen vessels entered through Gibraltar, to fight Turkey as well as France. A year later it failed in an attempt to force passage through the Dardanelles. Thereafter, the Mediterranean saw sporadic Russian naval activity.

As is the case today, a Mediterranean presence was but one manifestation of Russian aspirations in the Middle East. The sixty-odd Soviet ships[7] now occasioning concern recall a long history of Russian attempts to break out of the Black Sea. Efforts to control the Straits or open them to secure Russian passage have

[4]See, for example, the *New York Times,* May 13, 29, 1969; *Moderne Welt,* December 16, 1969; *Washington Post,* December 19, 1969 and February 18, 1970; and *Christian Science Monitor,* March 19, 1970.

[5]F. M. Murphy, "The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* March 1967.

[6]A general discussion of Russian naval ambitions in the Mediterranean is found in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). The Soviet navy did operate there during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, but with few vessels and pursuing a different role.

[7]*Washington Post,* August 20, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involved war and diplomacy punctuated by numerous treaties: Navarino in 1827; Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833; Constantinople in 1841; Paris in 1854; London in 1871; Berlin in 1878; and in this century Lausanne and Montreux. The 1936 Montreux Convention still governs passage through the Straits.

During World War I, the Russians succeeded in extracting from the Allies a commitment that if they won, Russia would get control of the Dardanelles.[8] With the fall of the Czar, the Bolsheviks repudiated the agreement. But once firmly in power, the communists tried again. An abortive secret understanding with Nazi Germany would have achieved the same goal had Hitler not invaded the USSR.[9]

At war's end, the objective remained compelling. In 1946 Stalin strongly pressured Turkey for revision of the Montreux Convention, with the object of putting troops on the Bosporus "to guarantee its protection."[10] These pressures coincided with unsuccessful Soviet attempts to gain UN trusteeships over Cyrenaica, part of Italy's ex-colony Libya,[11] and the Dodecanese Islands.[12] At the time, Yugoslavia had not yet defected from the Soviet orbit, the Greek civil war was raging, a communist takeover in Italy was a real possibility, Turkey was unaligned, and NATO did not exist. Had all the pieces of the mosaic fallen into place, the Soviet Union might have become the dominant Mediterranean power.

Cultivation of the Arabs is of more recent vintage, although it predates World War II. After the establishment of the communists in Russia, the focal point of Soviet interest continued to be Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. However, the universal pretensions of communist doctrine extended Moscow's gaze beyond.

Early Soviet Political Penetration of the Arab East

Because Russian territorial expansion had not touched the Arab countries, the Soviet Union escaped association in the Arab mind

[8]The Sykes-Picot Agreement of April-October 1916 was concluded in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the governments of Britain, France, Russia, and later, in April 1917, Italy, in which the claims of each country for the territories of the Ottoman Empire were recognized by the others. The Straits and the south shore of the Black Sea in Turkey were to go to Russia.

[9]A detailed account of Soviet attempts to negotiate with the Nazis the establishment of a base for land and naval forces within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles is in R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, editors, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington: Department of State Publication 2023, 1948).

[10]*New York Times,* August 12, 18, and September 29, 30, 1946.

[11]*Ibid.,* January 20, 22, 1946, and J. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 76.

[12]*New York Times,* March 4, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the imperial powers. This, together with the nature of Arab nationalism, created for the Soviets the opportunity to capitalize on anti-Western feelings and to penetrate the area politically. Soviet interest in the Middle East, though it fluctuated, continued during the USSR's defensive isolationism of the 1920's, the political alliances with the "capitalist" powers of the 1930's, and the collusion with Nazi Germany. It greatly increased after the defeat of the Axis powers.

As early as December 1917, Lenin launched an appeal addressed "to the toiling Muslims of the East," telling them to throw off the chains of European imperialism.[13] The famous Baku Congress of 1920 codified this approach into policy, so that Stalin would write in *Pravda* on August 9, 1921 that "the victory of the proletariat cannot be a lasting one unless the nonsovereign nations and colonies are emancipated from the yoke of imperialism."[14]

British dominance of the area was, however, the most important factor curbing Soviet diplomacy in the Arab East. Even after their nominal independence from Britain in 1930, neither Egypt nor Iraq would admit Soviet Russia to diplomatic relations. The remaining Arab states in their quasi-independence were easily controlled by France and Britain.

Not surprisingly, in 1924 Moscow recognized King Husayn of the Hijaz with great alacrity,[15] and when he abdicated in 1926 and Ibn Saud became King of Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union became the first power to recognize this kingdom in the holy land of Islam.[16] In 1929 the Soviet government negotiated a treaty of friendship and commerce with feudal Yemen, which was renewed in 1939. The heads of Soviet diplomatic and commercial missions at this time, as well as most of their staff, were Soviet "Muslims" who ostentatiously professed their religion, even making the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca.[17]

Wherever the Soviets could not establish diplomatic relations, they sought contacts by means of commercial missions or business firms such as Arcos, Shark and Textilimport. These operated in Egypt, Syria and Palestine and were also used as cover for intelli-

[13]Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs* (London, 1928), p. 359.

[14]For an account of the Comintern-sponsored Baku Convention, see Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Co-existence: A History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 121-125.

[15]The *Times* (London), October 7, 1924.

[16]Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East* (London, 1950), p. 46.

[17]*Oriente Moderno* (Rome), Vol. IX, 1929, p. 91; Vol. XIX, 1939, p. 290.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gence operations.[18] Starting in 1927, regular shipping services were instituted between Odessa and the Arabian coast, and passage was offered to Muslim pilgrims at nominal fares.[19] Moreover, communist parties were organized wherever possible in the Arab countries and Palestine, although none became markedly successful in the early period. The largest and most effective, the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, produced some able cadres including Khalid Bakdash, perhaps today's most influential communist leader in the Arab world.[20]

Temporarily confused during World War II, Soviet diplomacy toward the Middle East refocused its efforts and had established formal relations with almost all important Arab states by war's end. The wartime alliance with the Western powers had enabled the Soviets to propagandize among the Arabs to an unprecedented degree. With decolonization in the area inevitable, the Middle East was finally open to significant Soviet penetration.

The USSR bitterly denounced any attempt by the Western powers to draw the Arab governments into Western defensive arrangements, while supporting nationalist demands that would further dislodge Western influence.[21] Malenkov, in a report to the Cominform in September 1947, reassured colonial and dependent countries that the Soviet Union would pursue a policy of unswerving support of those countries engaged in fighting "for their national liberation from the yoke of imperialism."[22] Concurrently, Moscow fostered the growth of neutralism in the Middle East, notably in Syria and Egypt, where because of the traditional distribution of power neutralism favored Soviet policy.

Still, at the time of Stalin's death in 1953, no definite, comprehensive Soviet program for the Arab East had yet evolved, nor had the Soviet Union gained a sure foothold in the region. The turning away from Israel and the bid for the friendship of nationalist Arab leaders was undoubtedly the most portentous step taken. The subsequent Soviet success in exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict needs no elaboration.

This briefly sketched historical background puts in perspective

[18]A discussion of Soviet intelligence activities in the Middle East during this period is in D. J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

[19]*Oriente Moderno*, Vol. VII, 1927, pp. 281, 504; Vol. IX, 1929, pp. 327-328.

[20]For a discussion of communist parties in the Middle East, see W. Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1956).

[21]A convenient documentation is in *New Times* (Moscow), issues from January 15, 1946 through October 24, 1951.

[22]Cominform, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Belgrade, December 1, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recent Soviet activity in the Mediterranean, and underscores that Russian aspirations in this region are of long standing, transcending questions of ideology. The distinction today is that "ideology" serves Moscow's cause without the opprobrium of "imperialism."

Improved Soviet-Turkish Relations

For the Soviet Union, control of the Straits is a key factor in Mediterranean and Middle East politics. Czarist and Soviet rulers have been keenly aware of this and have repeatedly attempted to gain direct or indirect control over this strategic waterway.

In a situation of nuclear war such control could be easily emasculated. But in large-scale conventional conflict or perhaps a severe crisis, passage through the Dardanelles could become the Achilles heel of any Soviet naval operation in the Mediterranean. A Soviet commander operating in the Eastern Mediterranean would be vulnerable if the Straits were to be blocked by Turkey. Whether such an eventuality occurs depends to an important degree on the circumstances of the crisis or conflict. The prime consideration, however, is that the state of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union will decide whether the Soviet navy will have freedom of passage through the Dardanelles. Turkey is the sole legal guardian of the Straits as part of its national territory.

The Montreux Convention assures Soviet warships and merchantmen free transit through the Straits, but the passage of all ships is strictly controlled by a complicated system of regulations under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey has the right to deny passage to the warships of all powers, including those of the Black Sea, if it is under the threat of war or at war.[23]

The Soviet Union has fleet stations in Latakia, Syria, and in Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt. Moreover, Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean have the capability of maintenance and replenishment at sea, and there have been reports that they might redevelop the former French naval base at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria.[24] But neither modern technology nor friendly Arab ports can completely eliminate the constraint Turkish control of the Straits places on the operations of the Soviet fleet west of the Bosporus. Good relations with Turkey are, therefore, crucial to Soviet freedom of maneuver.

Soviet-Turkish relations have dramatically improved during

[23]League of Nations, Treaty Series, *Convention Concerning the Regime of the Black Sea Straits*, July 20, 1936, Lausanne, Volume 173, pp. 213-241.

[24]L. L. Lemnitzer, "The Strategic Problems of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks," Orbis, Spring 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the last several years as a result of the East-West détente and the changes that have occurred in relations between Turkey and the United States. Once grounded in deep suspicion bordering on hostility, they are now characterized by guarded cordiality.

Following Stalin's death, Soviet leaders reversed their previous antagonistic stance toward Turkey and tried to cultivate neighborly relations. The USSR formally withdrew its claim on Turkey's eastern provinces, Kars and Ardahan, and its demand for a military presence on the Bosporus. This change in Moscow's policy removed two important sources of Turkish anxiety. However, early Soviet pressures and the Cold War had pushed Turkey out of its neutrality into close collaboration with the West and eventually into membership in NATO. No real opportunity for Moscow to exploit the doctrine of peaceful coexistence with respect to Turkey arose before the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

Even if the Cyprus dispute had not taken place, the East-West détente might have resulted in a greater measure of flexibility in Turkey's foreign policy. Domestically, the development of a highly vocal opposition and its unprecedented criticism of Turkey's relations with the United States was making the Turkish government wary of a foreign policy that appeared excessively dependent on Washington. Nevertheless, it was the strong disagreements between Turkey and the United States over U.S. policy toward Cyprus during and following the 1964 crisis which gave the Soviets their first real opportunity to change the course of Soviet-Turkish relations. A secret letter sent by President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu on June 5, 1964, when a Turkish invasion of Cyprus seemed imminent, is generally regarded as a watershed in Turkish-American relations. The American President stated bluntly that if Turkish forces landed on Cyprus and the Soviet Union chose to respond militarily, Turkey could not count on the United States to come to her defense.[25]

In May 1964 the Turkish government had declined an invitation extended to the Turkish foreign minister to visit Moscow to discuss the Cyprus issue. The reason given was that the Soviet position on Cyprus was hostile to Turkish interests. Following the Johnson letter, however, Prime Minister Inonu accepted a renewed invitation and in early November dispatched his foreign minister to the Soviet Union for a week of discussions. The visit led to a Soviet *volte-face* on the Cyprus dispute. A joint com-

[25]The letter and Inonu's reply were released by the White House on January 15, 1966. The texts are published in *Middle East Journal,* Summer 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

muniqué issued at its end stated that *enosis*—or the reunification of Cyprus with Greece—was not the proper solution. Instead, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island should be largely autonomous. The new Soviet stance amounted to a nearly complete acceptance of Turkey's position in the dispute.[26]

In January 1965 the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nicolai Podgorny, visited Turkey. During his visit the Turkish government informed the United States that it would be unable to participate in the American-sponsored multilateral nuclear force, and a few days later it rejected a NATO request for increased force levels.[27] Podgorny was followed, in May, by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who had discussions with the Turkish president, the prime minister and the foreign minister. In August Turkish Prime Minister Urguplu went to the Soviet Union for still another round of high-level discussions.

The turning point in the changing relationship between the two countries came in December 1966, when for the first time since the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia a Soviet head of government visited Turkey. On December 20, as he arrived in Ankara, Premier Kosygin stressed Soviet support for the Turkish position on Cyprus, and paved the way for further agreement with the Turks.[28] Thus the 1964 Cyprus crisis was the catalyst for the rapprochement that has characterized Turkish-Soviet relations in recent years.

The dialogue has since been extended to other matters of mutual interest. By 1968 the veritable procession of Soviet dignitaries to Turkey was being augmented by exchanges of journalists, technicians, and cultural and trade missions. Turkey and the Soviet Union had agreed on a border demarcation long in dispute, and on a joint hydroelectric power project on their common frontier. A Moscow-Ankara air link had also been established.

Equally significant has been the increase in trade and the beginnings of a Soviet aid program intended to forge closer economic ties between the two countries. As a consequence of the visit to Moscow of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, in 1967, and of many Turkish and Soviet economic missions, trade has increased sharply. The USSR has committed more than $200 million in low interest credits and grants to Turkey for various

[26]The joint communiqué was published in *Pravda,* November 5, 1964, and translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* December 2, 1964, p. 18.

[27]*Le Monde* (Paris), January 15, 1965.

[28]*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), December 21, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrial projects.[29] To administer this program it has established an economic aid mission in its embassy in Ankara.

Declining U.S. military and economic aid levels[30] have strengthened this trend, and the improved relations have weathered several changes of government in Turkey. Even the conservative press and right-of-center elements in Turkish politics, most outspoken in their distaste for the Russians, have come to support efforts to promote amity with Moscow. There has also been substantial amelioration in Turkish relations with the communist satellite states in Europe, and Turkey's diplomacy is now distinctly more favorable to the Arab position in the Middle East.

At minimum the rapprochement has resulted in scrupulous Turkish application of the Montreux Convention. Soviet naval units moving between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean can count on unhampered passage through the Dardanelles. Turkey has even acceded to Moscow's request that Soviet submarines en route to the Mediterranean be allowed to enter the Bosporus an hour or more before first light, although the Convention restricts passage for submarines to daylight hours. According to official Turkish sources, 146 Soviet warships transited through the Straits on their way to the Mediterranean in 1969.[31]

By and large, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean has not been viewed by the Turkish government and the Turkish public with the alarm it would have produced only a few years ago. The prevalent attitude, especially among the opposition parties, is that the Soviets have as much right to enter the Mediterranean as the Americans have. Because of U.S. support of Israel, the reasoning goes, it is the United States that has, in fact, opened the Mediterranean to the Soviets.[32]

Clearly, the vulnerability of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, created by Turkish control of the Straits, is a direct function of the relations between these once traditional enemies. The Turkish Straits would be closed to the USSR, it seems correct to infer, only if an essential Turkish national interest were at stake. If Soviet military deployments are careful not to appear to

[29]*Ibid.*, July 8, 1968, and U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968,* Research Memorandum RSE-65, September 5, 1969, p. 3.

[30]Even loans have been curtailed. According to the Turkish State Planning Organization, U.S. AID has just canceled $7,720,000 in project loans previously agreed to with Turkey. *Cumhuriyet,* March 12, 1970.

[31]*New York Times,* January 27, 1970.

[32]See, for example, Sukru Esmer, "Russian Expansion on the High Seas," *Ulus* (Ankara), April 29, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threaten Turkish security, it should be possible for Soviet diplomacy to isolate U.S. and Turkish interests. Consequently, feeling more secure at the Straits, the Soviet Union can exploit its presence in the Mediterranean to further its Middle Eastern objectives.

The Soviet Search for Strategic Mobility

To the historic Russian quest for control of the Straits and the communist contest for influence in the Arab East must be added a new factor—Soviet ambition to gain strategic mobility. All three factors are relevant to U.S. policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

In the military context, the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is not an isolated event. It is the most dramatic recent manifestation of Soviet efforts to achieve strategic mobility in the naval sphere. The immediate consequence is a challenge to U.S. naval supremacy.[33]

To achieve this objective, Moscow for the last ten years has expanded its naval forces, and has been developing ships and techniques which would allow its navy to operate in a self-sustaining way at long distances from home ports. The Soviet Union now has the second largest navy in the world. Its merchant fleet constitutes about 7 per cent of the world's merchant ships and more than 4 per cent of the world tonnage.[34] The conspicuous display of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean marks a development long in the making. The first steps toward becoming a globally mobile power were actually taken under Khrushchev, and coincided with the initiation of Soviet military aid programs to several countries in the Third World, in 1955.[35] Egypt was one of the first recipients of such aid.

Under Stalin, the USSR had pursued a policy essentially directed toward consolidation of Soviet influence and control on the periphery of the Russian nation.[36] Khrushchev reshaped

[33]For an analysis supporting this view, see Christoph von Imhoff, *Duell im Mittelmeer: Moskau Greift nach dem Nahen und dem Mittleren Osten* (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1968). For a dissenting view, emphasizing the defensive aspects of the new Soviet strategy, see Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968).

[34]Office of the Secretary of Defense, News Release No. 278, March 29, 1968.

[35]For a discussion of the development of the mobility of Soviet general-purpose forces, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobile Military Power* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5554-PR, December 1967).

[36]Vernon Aspaturian, "Moscow's Foreign Policy," *Survey*, October 1967, p. 55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military policy to support a political strategy that committed the Soviet Union to global competition with the United States.[37] Toward the end of Khrushchev's tenure of power, there appeared signs of an increasing Soviet interest in developing a capability for amphibious landing, and for airlift. Coupled with the deployment of equipment and accompanying technical personnel, this has led to the creation of potential logistical bases in distant areas—an asset for the time when political developments might permit their use.[38] Egypt, particularly, and Syria are good illustrations of the concrete results this policy has yielded. During the Cyprus crisis in 1964, Soviet naval infantry was reactivated as a force.

The search for strategic mobility and self-sufficiency on the high seas was probably intensified by the humiliating experience of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.[39] The Soviet navy was then unequipped to concentrate sufficient and appropriate naval forces to interpose between the U.S. Navy and Soviet missile-carrying merchantmen. Under Khrushchev's successors, the growth and improvement of the naval arm has continued. A notable innovation has been the construction of helicopter carriers. Three are now operational. One of them, the *Moskva,* underwent its sea trials in the Mediterranean and seems to have become a permanent part of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet.[40] These carriers could be used either in an amphibious assault role for anti-submarine warfare or in a command function.

The Soviet navy has been equipped with significant surface-to-surface missile capabilities. The Egyptian patrol boat that sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath* in 1967 by missile fire was a Soviet-built ship. The USSR has over 150 such boats. Surface-to-air missiles are deployed on twenty surface ships, with more being added via new construction and conversion. In addition, twenty-five destroyers and cruisers are surface-to-surface missile ships. The traditional emphasis on submarines has persisted: there are over 250 Soviet attack submarines, and 100 cruise missile submarines capable of launching missiles with a range of 400 nautical miles. Fifty of these submarines are nuclear-powered, and more with nuclear power, similar to the Polaris boats, are being built at an

[37]Wolfe, *The Soviet Quest . . . , op. cit.,* p. 2.

[38]*Ibid.,* p. 4.

[39]What the Cuban experience may have taught the Soviets is analyzed in "The Bear Learns to Swim," *The Economist,* May 18-24, 1968.

[40]*Christian Science Monitor,* March 18, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accelerated pace.[41] Virtually all of the more than 2,000 operational naval vessels have been constructed since World War II. The current construction program emphasizes well-equipped smaller ships and auxiliaries, nuclear submarines, and qualitative improvements in weaponry.

Soviet leaders have made clear that nothing less than a conspicuous and commanding presence on the oceans of the world will satisfy the aspirations of the Soviet Union as a global power. Since July 1967, just a few weeks after the June Arab-Israeli war, the doctrine that Soviet seapower would no longer limit itself to the coastal defense of the homeland, but must be prepared to extend its reach, has been declared by all the country's leading admirals. That they have acquired "an oceanic vision" is clear from the remarks of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet fleet commander. "The flag of the Soviet Navy," he has said, "now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas."[42]

The theme that Soviet seapower has extended its reach to remote areas of the world's oceans, to cruise and patrol whenever the defense of the national interest requires it, reflects a role for the Soviet navy without precedent. The concept itself is new to the Soviet political vocabulary.[43] The most striking example of the operationalization of this doctrine is the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. The new strategic outlook has led the Soviet Union to insist that the Mediterranean and the Middle East are to be regarded as within its security sphere.

Mating the new doctrine with the attempt to make the Middle East a permanent sphere of Soviet influence was first implied by Brezhnev in a speech to the honor graduates of the military academies on July 5, 1967, in the wake of the June war.[44] On November 5, 1968 Foreign Minister Gromyko explicitly main-

[41]By way of comparison, the United States has 105 attack submarines and 41 missile submarines. The latter are all equipped with ballistic missiles and are nuclear. It has 71 ships equipped with surface-to-air missiles but no surface-to-surface missile ships, and no missile patrol boats. A complete comparison of U.S. and Soviet naval forces is in Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, *The Changing Strategic Naval Balance: U.S.S.R. vs U.S.A.*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, December 1968, pp. 5, 7, and Robert McClintock, "An American Oceanic Doctrine," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1970.

[42]Quoted in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, June-July 1968, p. 12. Similar statements have been made by Marshal Zakharov, Soviet Chief of Staff. See *Izvestia*, April 5, 1969.

[43]Wolfe, *The Soviet Quest . . . , op. cit.*, p. 10.

[44]*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 26, 1967, pp. 3-6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained that the area was within the Soviet security sphere and that the Soviet navy was in the Mediterranean by right. In an interview with *L'Unità,* the Italian Communist Party paper, Gromyko argued that because the Soviet Union was a Black Sea power it was also a Mediterranean power, and as such concerned with the peace and security of a region in direct proximity to its borders.[45] Since then, this thesis has been reiterated often by Soviet admirals and leading Soviet commentators.[46] In the most recent edition of Marshal Sokolovski's *Military Strategy* it is made clear that the purpose of the Soviet navy is to act aggressively against other naval forces and their support lines as well as to intercept enemy vessels on the high seas.[47] The Soviet Mediterranean fleet has such an operational doctrine, and its activities underline these declarations.[48]

The seriousness of purpose with respect to the Mediterranean is suggested by the fact that this sea has been used extensively as a training area by the Soviet navy. Although the Mediterranean squadron has been in existence for just over three years, almost all admirals in the Soviet Black Sea fleet with command function have served with it.[49] Evidently, Moscow wants to make sure that the squadron commander can always be replaced by an officer familiar with the region.

There is other evidence to suggest that the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is a permanent new feature of the situation in the Middle East. As noted above, the USSR has agreements with littoral Arab countries permitting its navy to berth regularly at Latakia in Syria, and Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt. It may, eventually, get the right to develop Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria, the formidable former French naval base that guards, or threatens, access to Gibraltar.

[45] *L'Unità* (Rome), November 5, 1968.

[46] Cf. Vice-Admiral Smirnov, "The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean," *Red Star,* November 12, 1968, translated in *Survival,* February 1969; L. Kosolov, "U.S.S.R. Presence Insures Peace in the Mediterranean," *Izvestia,* November 12, 1968; and the interview with Nikolay Sergeyev, Chief of the Main Staff of the Soviet Naval Forces, by Enzo Roggi of *L'Unità,* February 13, 1969.

[47] V. D. Sokolovski, editor, *Voennaia strategiia* (*Military Strategy*) (Third edition, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), pp. 362-368. Topical translations by Lilita Dzirkals.

[48] In 1967 alone, according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 157 Soviet vessels transited from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Many of these were warships, with the total varying from 31 surface combat ships, 13 submarines (some of them nuclear), and several intelligence ships, closely shadowing the U.S. Sixth Fleet, in the summer of 1967, to a total of 45 in April of 1969, to 52 in March of this year. See *Washington Post,* April 12, 1969; Institute for the Study of the USSR, "The Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean," *Bulletin,* p. 37; and *Christian Science Monitor,* March 19, 1970.

[49] *Bulletin, op. cit.,* p. 40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviets have also made overtures to Malta,[50] even to Spain,[51] and have put a squadron in the Indian Ocean. Reportedly, they have approached India for basing rights in connection with ensuring the security of that area once Britain removes its naval forces from East of Suez in 1971.[52] In any case, Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew has announced that Singapore will open its docks to the Soviet navy for repairs, replenishment and refueling berths, on a commercial basis.[53] These moves would further strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East, although as long as the Suez Canal remains closed, Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean are at a disadvantage. The reopening of the canal is a constant feature of Soviet proposals for resolving the Middle East conflict. While the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean obviously serves Soviet Middle East diplomacy and Soviet military objectives against NATO, it is also concrete evidence of the shift in Soviet naval strategy to global pretensions.

Implications for United States Policy

Soviet ships permanently on station in the Mediterranean are one of the more dramatic indicators of the changed environment affecting NATO[54] and U.S. freedom of maneuver in the Middle East, yet at first no action was undertaken by the United States to cope with the Soviet naval challenge. Not until the Soviet flotilla increased manyfold, in 1967, did members of NATO, especially Italy, begin to feel uneasy and to raise the issue at NATO Council meetings. Although air surveillance was talked about,[55] it took the invasion of Czechoslovakia to galvanize the United States and NATO into action. An air surveillance group became reality, and a special NATO naval force for the Mediterranean was organized to become operational whenever needed. As in the air unit, the naval members are the United States, Britain and Italy, with eventual Turkish and Greek participation expected.[56]

These measures are palliatives, however. They do not meet the

[50] *Christian Science Monitor,* August 11, 1969. They have denied that they are interested in establishing an air and naval base there, *New Times,* November 7, 1969.

[51] Rolf Gortz, "Madrid flirtet mit Moskau," *Die Welt,* November 8, 1969.

[52] *Christian Science Monitor,* May 22, 1969.

[53] *Los Angeles Times,* March 11, 1970.

[54] An analysis of the impact of these ships as specifically related to NATO is in Eugene Hinterhoff, "The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean," Orbis, Spring 1969.

[55] *New York Times,* May 18, 1967; *Christian Science Monitor,* November 13, 1967.

[56] *New York Times,* October 16, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

challenge in the Mediterranean, where the Soviet naval presence has permanently altered the local situation militarily and politically. On the military side, the Soviet presence complicates the defense of NATO's southeastern flank, inhibits U.S. military initiative in Middle East crises and conflicts, and increases the chances of inadvertent escalation from local conflict. The likely inhibitions on U.S. actions are well illustrated by the behavior of the Sixth Fleet during the initial phase of the Six-Day War. Most of the U.S. fleet was in the Western Mediterranean when the crisis broke. It immediately observed three important restrictions: (1) no premature departures from scheduled port visits; (2) deliberate and visible retention of its amphibious forces in the central Mediterranean, at Malta; and (3) purposeful retention of U.S. naval forces south of Crete and well clear of the prospective area of action.[57] Soviet naval forces were in the Eastern Mediterranean, being reinforced through the Straits, with some units on the way to Egyptian ports.

Admittedly, the operational capability of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet is curtailed by Turkish control of the Straits, the blocking of the Suez Canal, and Britain's control of Gibraltar. Moreover, the Sixth Fleet and the Italian, Greek and Turkish navies together certainly outnumber the Soviet squadron. However, the Egyptian navy matches in number of ships the Turkish navy, and is more modern. Of the three NATO European navies on the spot, only the Italian navy is not composed of obsolescing warships. Even U.S. vessels are, on the average, less modern than their Soviet counterparts.[58]

A more serious drawback is the Soviet fleet's seeming lack of air cover. The Soviet navy has no carriers and there are no Soviet airfields near the shores of the Mediterranean. The military, aware of this shortcoming, has sought to surmount it by creating an operational doctrine that emphasizes missile-carrying submarines and missile-carrying aircraft. This, they contend, would permit Soviet naval units and aircraft to attack U.S. and NATO carriers without entering the zone of anti-submarine and air defenses of the carrier force.[59]

A direct U.S.-Soviet conventional confrontation in the Mediter-

[57]For a more detailed account of Sixth Fleet deployment at the time, see J. C. Wylie, "The Sixth Fleet and American Diplomacy," in J. C. Hurewitz, editor, *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East,* Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, March 1969.

[58]*Washington Post,* February 18, 1970; McClintock, *op. cit.*

[59]Sokolovski, *op. cit.,* p. 364.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ranean would not be free from potential escalation to the nuclear level. In this extreme, U.S. land-based airpower may be neither immediately available nor sufficient in numbers. A confrontation in the Mediterranean raises the specter of possible fighting on other NATO fronts. The aircraft in NATO presumably have their target assignments elsewhere. Their diversion to the Mediterranean could leave targets uncovered, degrading the NATO military posture on the central front, and this risk might make it difficult to convince NATO commanders to redeploy their aircraft. It would also take time to reach available fields in the vicinity of the Soviet fleet because NATO aircraft could not overfly Austria, Switzerland, and maybe even France.

Hundreds of Soviet-made aircraft are already in place in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, with suitable ordnance. Moreover, Kosygin has recently hinted that Soviet aid could involve "volunteer" pilots.[60] Aircraft could be mated with Soviet instructors or pilots and technicians, should the situation require it. If the Soviet units were operating within range of Arab airfields they could have constant air cover. This cover would be substantially increased in radius if MIG-23's became plentiful in Egypt.[61] In a desperate situation, the Soviet Union could commit long-range aircraft from southern Russia and Bulgaria, or transfer them to Syrian and Egyptian fields via Iraq. Tupolev-16 bombers, flown by Soviet pilots but with Egyptian markings, already operate from Egyptian fields to reconnoiter and provide some cover for Soviet ships.[62] The recent loss of Libyan airfields by the United States and Britain enhances the Soviet air cover position.

The carrier-based aircraft of the Sixth Fleet—two carriers with 100 strike aircraft apiece—are a formidable force. Their effectiveness is contingent, however. The potential availability of land-based Soviet aircraft and the existence of Soviet submarines in the area may hobble the offensive use of the carrier craft. The current emplacement of Soviet SAM-3, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, manned by Soviet crews, in Egypt further inhibits the use of U.S. carrier-based airpower.[63] The number of planes available to strike at Soviet ships will depend on how many aircraft will

[60] *Washington Post,* February 6, 1970.

[61] MIG-23's, fully loaded, have combat radius well over 500 nautical miles, which means that from Egyptian airfields they can cover the Eastern Mediterranean. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, *Soviet Sea Power,* Special Report No. 10, June 1969, p. 61.

[62] *Washington Post,* February 6, 1970.

[63] *Newsweek,* March 30, 1970, p. 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be necessary to defend the carriers themselves against air and submarine attacks, the strength of inhibitions against using aircraft with a nuclear mission in a conventional mode, the relative distances between the contending fleets, the types and number of land-based craft available to each side, and the political constraints operating at the time of battle.

Clearly, a host of imponderables would operate in the event of a naval confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the thought is compelling that in situations of limited conventional conflict in the Middle East, Soviet ships could strongly inhibit—if not interdict—U.S. naval actions in the Mediterranean.

In ambiguous situations tending toward escalation to nuclear confrontation, the Soviet force could play an anti-Polaris role with its helicopter carriers—e.g., the *Moskva* and the *Leningrad*—and threaten U.S. Sixth Fleet carriers with its submarines. This last is the threat taken most seriously by U.S. naval commanders in the Mediterranean.[64] The Sixth Fleet was stationed in the Mediterranean in the 1950's to complement SAC, and presumably still has a nuclear mission. Should hostilities break out, Soviet nuclear submarines could, at the very least, target the French *force de frappe,* or threaten countercity strikes against France and Italy. But it should be clear that nuclear war and large-scale conventional warfare in the Mediterranean—the latter threatening to escalate quickly to the former—are unlikely contingencies and offer questionable justification for an operational doctrine for either the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla or the Sixth Fleet.

It is more reasonable to assume that the likely contingencies in which the Soviet naval presence will play an important role will not only be ambiguous but sufficiently limited, from a military viewpoint, to preclude extensive engagements of the kind broached above. Already—and this should hold for the foreseeable future—Soviet and NATO ships are constantly engaged in a "war of positions" where actual naval engagements are more a threat designed to inhibit possible deployments than a means to achieve military objectives. This purpose is, or should be, primarily political, inhibiting military actions. For this purpose, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet is adequate even now. The scales could tilt, however. If Soviet aid to Egypt in the form of MIG-23's material-

[64]Admiral Rivero, Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, in a press interview in Naples, *Le Monde,* April 20-21, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

izes, in addition to the SAM-3's, the military vulnerabilities afflicting Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean will be reduced to the point where the Soviets could risk some naval interdiction.

In the past, the utility of the Sixth Fleet went beyond its NATO nuclear role. It was political as well as conventional in the military sense. One need only recall the freedom of action the United States enjoyed, politically as well as militarily, at the time of the Lebanese crisis to realize the telling changes that have taken place in the Mediterranean region. With a Soviet fleet in these waters, it would be perilous to attempt an operation such as the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1958, or a similar operation to aid Israel.

In 1958 there were no Soviet fleet units in the Mediterranean. The Cold War was on and Turkey, already in NATO, unqualifiedly supported U.S. foreign policy actions in the Middle East. The staging area for the U.S. troops who landed in Lebanon was in Turkey. The United States proceeded from the assumption that Turkish territory was available for U.S. use and was not disappointed by the Turkish government's reaction. It had no overflight problems in that or any other Mediterranean NATO country, including France.

Would such unencumbered U.S. intervention be possible in present circumstances? Putting aside whether any Arab government would be likely to request U.S. aid, the answer must be no. Turkish territory may not be available as a staging area,[65] if for no other reason than that the U.S. and Turkish positions diverge on what policy should be toward the Arabs. In fact, the use of their territory by the United States in 1958 has become the subject of acrimonious political debate among the Turks. Thus they have already drawn the distinction between contingencies affecting NATO and those in the Middle East. Using Italian facilities in a situation not explicitly affecting NATO would also be problematic.[66] France—seeking to forge an independent Mediterranean role—might be even less likely to cooperate. Constraints on U.S. actions in the Mediterranean could become severe.

Perhaps the most important purpose of the Soviet ships is to

[65]See, for example, the remarks by Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in *Yeni Gazete,* November 27, 1968.

[66]Italy has a policy of maintaining a "presence" in the Arab countries of the Mediterranean littoral, chiefly through trade and commercial and cultural ties, while at the same time maintaining friendly relations with Israel. Before the Libyan coup Italian exports to Libya equaled those to the Soviet Union. *Lo Spettatore Internazionale,* July-December 1966, p. 311.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enhance and extend Moscow's influence in the Arab countries. As a tangible proof of Soviet power, the Mediterranean flotilla increases the tempo of Soviet political penetration. Today, the USSR is on the verge of becoming the leading outside power in the Arab East. The crushing Arab defeat in 1967 gave it another chance to widen its foothold, and, indeed, it was the Arab-Israeli war that increased the number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean to the point where they have become a political and military issue. Some have gone so far as to label the Arab defeat "a considerable Russian victory."[67] The Israeli victory having inflicted a severe blow not only to Arab pride but also to the Egyptian economy, prostrated Egypt became even more dependent on Moscow's military and economic aid, and on Soviet diplomacy. Immediate Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and other defeated friendly Arab states confirmed that the Soviet Union was eager to exploit and to remedy a defeat for which she bore some responsibility.[68]

The Soviet squadron represents a permanent Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and a firm commitment to the Arabs. Soviet ships in Egyptian ports routinely inhibit Israeli air strikes and remind the average Egyptian that the USSR is involved in his country's fate.[69] Soviet ships roaming the Mediterranean also expand the confrontation of the superpowers beyond Europe and bring into question the military boundary between the Soviet and American spheres of influence. It remains to be seen whether a naval balance of power between the Soviet Union and NATO and the United States—leading to mutual deterrence—can be achieved before another conflict between the Arabs and Israel or another Cyprus crisis spreads to envelop NATO.[70] The asymmetry of the commitments by Washington and Moscow in the region make such an eventuality very real.

[67]Bernard Lewis, "The Great Powers, the Arabs, and the Israelis," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1969, p. 642.

[68]Within a year of the Arab defeat by Israel, the Soviet Union had restored Arab inventories of most major weapons virtually at their preconflict levels. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968, op. cit.*, p. ii.

[69]See, for example, the statement by Hasan Rajab, supervisor for research and information for *Akhbar al-Yom* (Cairo) as reported in *The New Middle East*, November 1969, p. 24.

[70]A thorough discussion of the meaning of recent Soviet policy for the Mediterranean is in Curt Gasteyger, "Moscow and the Mediterranean," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET NAVAL CHALLENGE*

by Donald W. Mitchell

TIME and again since 1945 the United States has allowed itself the luxury of underestimating the Soviet Union. Repeatedly, this nation has been suddenly and rudely shocked to discover that the Soviets were much farther ahead in technology than we had believed possible. While none of these awakenings has so far proved disastrous, the United States is clearly challenging fate in habitually underestimating so powerful an opponent. The speed of Soviet rebuilding and recovery following the war, the four-year period required to produce the atomic bomb, the near-success of the Soviets in being the first to master the secrets of the hydrogen bomb, the launching of Sputnik I, the Cuban missile buildup, have all found many Americans amazed at the evidence of Soviet ability. Far too often the United States has reacted tardily and inadequately.

Since 1966 Americans have been treated to several additional surprises. The establishment of a Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the entrance of Soviet warships into the Indian Ocean, the mobilization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Far East following the *Pueblo* seizure, a series of incidents demonstrating Soviet success in vastly reducing the American qualitative lead in submarines, and several recent examples of American naval ineptitude, have shaken international confidence in American superiority in the one area where the United States seemed absolutely certain to retain primacy, the rule of the sea.

This situation has been clearly foreshadowed by Soviet spokesmen. In celebrating Navy Day (July 31) in 1966, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov declared that "An end has been put to the complete domination of the sea by the imperialist powers." A year later he pointed out that the Soviet Navy was present to defend the interests of the Soviet Union anywhere in the world and warned Americans that "Sooner or later they will have to understand that they have no mastery whatsoever over the seas."[1] For Navy

*This article is based on the final chapter of the author's *History of Russian Seapower*, scheduled for publication in 1970 by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University. Its sources are to be found mainly in English, German, Russian and French publications, and the author was aided in some measure by his stay in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1969.

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, August 9, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Day in 1968 the Soviets had on display new high-performance nuclear submarines which Radio Moscow claimed could strike at a distance of several thousand miles.

Although Soviet leaders have long exaggerated their own achievements, they are essentially correct in announcing that substantial naval forces now challenge U.S. supremacy on the high seas. Soviet merchant vessels, surface craft and submarines are spread widely over the oceans. Their crews are steadily gaining in technical sophistication and know-how, learning in the words of the great Russian Admiral Makarov to be "at home at sea." There can be no question that Russia, for nearly the first time in her history, is employing seapower and understanding its uses. Though well behind the United States in some aspects of naval power, the Soviet Navy has gained sufficiently in others to cause acute and genuine alarm in American naval circles. Thus, following a long and discouraging period of tutelage and inferiority, the Soviet Navy has come into its own.

The navy would probably have reached a high level of development earlier had not Nikita Khrushchev held back its progress. Though friendly to submarines, he regarded large surface vessels as obsolete and money spent on them as wasted. He scrapped several huge cruisers on the building ways because he regarded them as useless except for state visits. Other building programs were halted or curtailed. Informally he ridiculed naval power, and threatened to disband the navy and scrap its surface vessels. Morale suffered.

So did Admiral Gorshkov. This man, who joined the navy at the age of seventeen, was (and is) the ablest naval leader the Soviet regime has produced. An admiral at thirty-one, thanks partly to wholesale purges among officers higher in rank, he was one of the few top Soviet naval officers to establish a creditable record during World War II—first at Odessa and later as commander of the Danube flotilla. His wartime experience in cooperating with the army had impressed Khrushchev and Brezhnev, both of whom held important army commands in the south. Unable to oppose Premier Khrushchev directly, Gorshkov could and did drag his feet so far as the dismantling and reduction of the navy was concerned.

In 1962 the Cuban crisis taught Khrushchev the value of surface vessels as a means of exercising seapower. Greatly interested in destroying the Western presence in Berlin, the Soviet Premier thought he saw a way to use Cuba to achieve this objective. He

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was acutely aware that in nuclear strength the United States was vastly superior in numbers of warheads and means of delivering them. The Soviets could hardly win a showdown, but might win by bluffing. A Soviet edge in medium-range missiles and rockets was then a threat to our European allies but not a direct menace to the United States.

The scheme of planting medium-range nuclear missiles on Cuban soil and poising them against the United States directly, thereby forcing a retreat from her stand on Berlin, was an extremely harebrained strategic ploy. American command of the sea could stop the Soviets at any time. The move could have succeeded only against an opponent too fearful or too irresolute to use force.

The American discovery of Soviet activities in Cuba, the mobilization of American land, air and sea forces, the use of the navy to enforce a blockade, and the ultimatum to Khrushchev constitute a classic diplomatic and naval case history. The Soviets were given a choice between hostilities and a major diplomatic defeat. Except for an American statement that Cuba would not be invaded, there was no way of sugarcoating or explaining away the defeat. So severe was this setback that it probably contributed to Khrushchev's forced retirement two years later. The Soviets, operating in an unfamiliar area, suffered from a shortage of usable forces. They could not support their position in Cuba by air, nor would their surface navy have had a chance against the much stronger U.S. naval forces. Five or six Soviet submarines sent to Cuban waters were tracked easily by American antisubmarine craft and could have been destroyed with little difficulty. One of them developed serious engine trouble. Escalation of the crisis to the point of a nuclear exchange might have brought grave injury to the United States, but it would also have meant a Soviet debacle.

Defeat in the Cuban missile crisis had a profound effect not only on Cold War tactics but also on Soviet military and naval policy. Relations with the United States since 1962 have improved noticeably in many respects. Threats and bluffing and "missile rattling," as Soviet Cold War tactics, virtually disappeared, in part because the improved reconnaissance techniques of the 1960's reduced any chance of employing them with success. Limited accommodations between the superpowers gradually became more numerous.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet military policy was greatly altered. Compared with the United States during the Cuban crisis, the Soviet Union had lacked nuclear parity, the possibility of employing a graduated response, and naval power. The latter shortcoming had been, in fact, twofold. Not only were surface vessels in scarce supply but the few submarines sent across the Atlantic were qualitatively unimpressive.

Khrushchev and his successors learned a great deal from this experience. In the ensuing years they have repaired the major military weaknesses revealed in 1962 and have followed a cautious policy vis-à-vis the United States. Since the United States has exercised similar prudence regarding the Soviet Union, there have been no critical confrontations.

The Soviet buildup has been continuous and rapid and has placed the Soviets in 1970 in a far stronger position than in 1962. To some degree their gains have been made with the acquiescence of the United States. But two other factors have contributed to the speed of the Soviet advance. The first was the war in South Viet Nam. The second was the comparative activity of the two powers in the area of research and development.

II

The war in South Viet Nam, particularly after 1965, came to cost the United States between two and three billion dollars a month. This alone was sufficient to cause a slowdown in vital civilian programs as well as important military ones. Thus, even though a certain strengthening of American forces resulted from combat experience, progress slowed on other fronts.

The matter of research and development is more complicated. American policymakers during the 1960's tended to some degree to look at military research as having reached a plateau and, therefore, were conservative about launching new projects. Generals and admirals complained justifiably about the lack of plans for more sophisticated and powerful submarines and airplanes, or the inaction on such plans. Unquestionably, the hardboiled cost-effectiveness approach of the McNamara scientists and administrators frequently prevented money from being wasted on weapons systems that would have proved unproductive. Yet the result was to slow the tempo of technological advance.

Moreover, this slowdown occurred at a time when the Soviet Union, which did not credit the plateau in weapons development,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was making a supreme effort to catch up with and pass the United States. Lt. Colonel V. Bondarenko, writing in the September 1966 issue of *Communist of the Armed Forces,* was probably expressing the official viewpoint when he argued in favor of a massive and imaginative research and development effort as the factor that would assure military-technological superiority. So zealously did the Soviets pursue this effort that by 1968 the deficiency in military technology as compared with the United States had largely disappeared.

By 1968 the Soviets had constructed a naval force clearly more potent than American naval analysts had predicted. Since World War II the two navies had played deadly serious games consisting of feeling out each other's forces on the high seas. These contacts usually went unreported until the appearance of the motion picture *The Bedford Incident,* in which an American patrol vessel "hunted" a Soviet submarine. Previously, the United States Navy had not made open acknowledgment of this type of war game. In early 1968 a Soviet submarine was engaged in tracking an American carrier crossing the Pacific. The carrier captain, aware of being pursued, gradually increased his speed, whereupon the submarine did likewise, thus revealing greater speed than any Soviet submarine was believed to possess. A later incident, in which a Soviet attack submarine followed an American nuclear submarine, showed the same unexpected speed. The U.S. Navy earlier had reported Soviet development of three classes of teardrop-shaped, high-speed attack submarines. At the 1968 Navy Day review at the port of Baltiisk, the Soviets showed what may have been one of the new class of ships—a large craft whose superstructure towered above conventional submarines anchored nearby. Television photos disclosed what seemed to be a steel bulge around the conning tower. Other reports indicated high speed and a capability for launching as many as eight missiles.

There is no sound reason for the official secrecy the Department of Defense imposes regarding the operational characteristics of the newest Soviet submarines, except that it may want to avoid having to acknowledge DOD blunders in failing to counter these boats, despite the repeated urgings of Admiral Hyman Rickover and others. Soviet leaders certainly know the characteristics of their own submarines. Presumably so do the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence and members of certain Congressional committees. During 1967-1968 at least four or five completely new types of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet submarines were detected and their operational characteristics determined. One of these has subsequently been identified as the Y class, a type carrying sixteen missiles but somewhat handicapped by being unusually noisy, long a weakness of Soviet underseas craft. Underwater speeds have presumably equaled and possibly surpassed the thirty-five knots ascribed to the fastest U.S. submarines. Diving depths of 2,000 feet or more, significantly superior to American performance which is believed to be 1,000 feet, have been reported in unclassified publications.

With regard to new types of Soviet submarines, the *Christian Science Monitor* of July 18, 1968, reported:

> New Soviet submarines are of three types. Ballistic missile submarines capable of launching attacks against the United States and its allies. Earlier submarines of this type were diesel-powered, with only three crude, short-range missiles in the sail, or superstructure of the submarine. Later models have more missiles of longer range positioned in the hull capable of being fired from below the surface, as are United States Polaris missiles. Some sources believe the Soviets may now have a submarine with 16 advanced missiles similar in many ways to the United States Polaris submarine. Last year, the Soviets exhibited a submarine-launched missile with a claimed range of between 2,300 and 3,000 nautical miles and a 1,500-pound payload.
>
> Cruise missile submarines capable of attacking allied shipping and naval forces as well as striking coastal installations. Strategists were taken aback by the sinking of an Israeli destroyer with such a weapon, and the Navy is busily trying to devise more effective countermeasures. The United States has no such missiles, either on ships or submarines, preferring to rely upon guns and airpower to accomplish the same thing.
>
> New, heavily armed, and very fast attack submarines, pose an increasingly serious threat to surface ships and United States attack submarines, as well as to the United States Polaris fleet.
>
> There have been unconfirmed reports of a Soviet submarine capable of operating at a depth of 2,000 feet. If such a submarine were built in quantity, the Soviets would have an extremely useful advantage, for United States submarines are now believed capable of operating only at around one-half that depth or a little more.
>
> Other Soviet submarines have been found operating extremely quietly, and some have demonstrated great speed, it is believed.
>
> To counter the developing undersea threats, the United States is planning to develop a new and very fast submarine with advanced detection equipment and weaponry.

The above report is extremely revealing to anyone knowledgeable in naval affairs. Both carrier task forces and nuclear submarines depend partly on speed to achieve their purposes. If Soviet attack submarines could successfully track and overtake them and report their position, the Soviets would be well on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way to the development of a sophisticated defense against these twin naval threats. Only the rapid production of faster American attack submarines or a new generation of higher-performance missile-carrying nuclear submarines would restore the balance.

This was not the only facet of Soviet development causing American apprehension. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Elath* by a Soviet Styx missile fired by an Egyptian naval officer revealed what close observers had already concluded. Though the Soviet Union lacked aircraft carriers and therefore ship-based planes, she had developed a missile system which at medium ranges was far superior to conventional naval artillery. The Styx with an effective operational range of about twenty miles, and the larger SS-N-1 capable of destroying targets at a distance of 100 miles, were both potent weapons. Torpedo boats ordinarily carry the Styx, while destroyers of the *Krupny* and *Kildin* classes carry the N-CSS-N-1. The 200-mile-range SS-N-3 is used to arm the cruisers and larger destroyers of the *Kresta* and *Kynda* classes. These missiles fly at about 700 miles per hour and steer by either radar or infrared systems. Longer-range cruise missiles are expected in the immediate future, if they are not already in operation. The United States, which at an earlier date had decided against developing this particular weapons system, found herself in the embarrassing position of having to start work on similar missiles.

Another development of importance was the completion of the 25,000-ton aircraft carrier *Moskva* in the Black Sea and the information that her sister ship *Leningrad* would shortly be finished. Some naval analysts initially concluded that the Soviet Union had at last decided to build conventional aircraft carriers, but they were soon proved wrong when more details became available. The new carriers have not been built for conventional planes but rather for helicopters and vertical takeoff airplanes; their landing areas are in the rear behind the superstructure, and anti-aircraft guns and missiles are installed forward. Carrying capacity is estimated at from thirty to forty helicopters and a battalion of naval infantry. These ships appear, therefore, to be intended—along with the 10,000-man black-bereted naval infantry which was reorganized in 1964—to bolster the amphibious capacity of the Soviet Navy. Various types of landing craft and amphibious tanks are used by the naval infantry. Although Admiral Gorshkov boasted in an interview in *The Navy,* June 1968, that 500,000 naval men saw service in land battles during World War II, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comparatively small size of the present force indicates that selective landings far afield rather than service as a corporate ally of the Red Army may be the main function of the naval infantry. The *Moskva* can be used for other purposes: during her first tour of duty in the Mediterranean in the fall of 1968 she was reportedly used almost continuously in anti-submarine warfare exercises—and is, thus, a clear threat to the U.S. Polaris fleet.

III

In recent years the Soviets have made at least equal progress in the three related fields of oceanography, fishing and commerce. Their fleet of 200 oceanographic vessels is by far the largest in the world. When combined with the largest submarine fleet in the world and the most modern fishing fleet—a fleet devoted to intelligence-gathering as well as fishing—it is apparent that the Soviet knowledge of currents, depths, ocean bottoms and other nautical phenomena must be equal or superior to that of any other power.

The progress of the Soviet fishing industry offers an excellent illustration of the nature of the Soviet challenge at sea. Whereas 90 per cent of the 12,000 boats of over five tons comprising the American fishing fleet is obsolete, practically all of the 18,000 Soviet vessels are new, and 1,500 units are being added each year. Between 1955 and 1965 the Soviet Union doubled her catch to an annual total of five million tons. During this time the American catch remained static at about three million tons. In 1967 the Soviet catch was 5.8 million tons compared with 2.4 million for the United States. The 1968 figures gave the Soviets an even greater edge. Soviet fishing fleets act as a unit with free and constant exchange of information, whereas American captains, competitive to the core, keep information to themselves. The Americans find trips to port after five or six days a necessity —but not so the Russians, whose floating factories can salt, can, cook, dehydrate or produce fish meal with ease and speed. Directly off the American coasts, American fishing fleets have been thoroughly outfished by an opponent using the most modern methods.[2]

The Soviet merchant marine, according to most recent figures,

[2]Apparently determined to improve its bad reputation for disregard of sea resources, the USSR between February 14, 1967 and January 31, 1969 joined with the United States in signing two pacts for the conservation of crabs and fish in the Pacific and one pact applying to the Atlantic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consists of about 1,320 ships of over 1,000 tons. It constitutes about 7 per cent of the world's merchant ship tonnage and stands fifth or sixth in tonnage among the world's merchant fleets. These facts are not, on the surface, overly impressive. Nevertheless, the merchant fleet is far more potent than they indicate. Eighty per cent of its ships are less than ten years old. Since 1950, world merchant tonnage has gone up 93 per cent while Soviet merchant tonnage has advanced 435 per cent. The Soviet rate of increase from 1966 to 1970 was projected at 50 per cent as compared with 25 per cent for the world average. Nearly one-quarter of all ships under construction today are for the Soviet Union. Moscow's plans call for a merchant fleet of 20,000,000 tons by 1980. This rate of increase will make the Soviet fleet ever more important.

Soviet ships operate today over the entire globe, making stops at 800 ports. Shore liberty in the merchant fleet and the navy does not trigger an alcoholic celebration in which the sailors blow their money. The men are, by comparison with sailors of other nations, well behaved and restrained in their conduct.[3] Because the Soviet merchant fleet carries far more exports than imports, the ships, rather than traveling home lightly loaded, frequently operate as tramp steamers, carrying foreign cargoes from one intermediate port to another. For example, Soviet freighters, after delivery of war materials to North Viet Nam, frequently stop at Australian ports and carry cargoes to Europe at as much as 20 per cent below standard rates. A shipping agency has even been established in Singapore to promote this trade. The merchant marine is primarily political, only secondarily economic. Hence, a large share of Soviet carrying capacity is expended on such states as North Viet Nam, Cuba and Algeria. Like the Soviet Navy, the merchant marine operates in four main fleets. About one-third of the ships operate out of the Black Sea, another third out of the Pacific, about one-fifth from the Baltic, and about one-eighth from the Arctic.

In the past Soviet shipyards were inadequate to produce both naval and merchant vessels: warships were built in Soviet yards while merchant ships were ordered abroad. The East Germans, in fact, have complained that their yards have been pre-empted to build Soviet ships and that the capacity left over for their own construction activities is too small. While this dependence on

[3]It may be that the regimentation and indoctrination that produce this exemplary behavior are offset by the general inability to mix freely with the natives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign yards is still true to some extent, about one-half of the new merchant ships—probably 500,000 tons a year—are now turned out in Soviet yards. Further, Soviet yards have begun to build ships on foreign orders. In December 1965 a long-term barter deal was concluded between a Greek businessman and the Soviet government which included $105 million worth of agricultural products for 400,000 tons of Soviet-built ships. This deal failed to attract much attention. However, it was followed by the sale of a number of freighters to West Germany. The ships concerned—12,000-tonners that sold for less than $3.2 million each—were clearly both better and cheaper than those being offered by competitors. The price was about a million dollars below the market price elsewhere for a similar vessel, while the ships were so fully automated that only one man was needed for the engine room instead of the usual three or four. They were able to load and unload faster than Swedish- and German-built vessels operated by the Africa Line. In addition, the sellers offered the services of three engineers to make repairs for the first year of the ship's operation and supplied ship-to-ship radio. Minor improvements, mainly to provide better living quarters, cost the buyers about $125,000.

In 1968 the Soviets developed a number of new types of ships, including a 36,000-ton ore carrier with unusual stability; small 1,200- to 3,000-ton ships for the Siberian timber trade; shallow-drought *Ismail*-type ships for use at river ports heretofore considered inaccessible to oceangoing vessels; and the first 100,000-ton tankers to be built by the Soviets, who previously concentrated on small or medium-sized tankers.

IV

Although the gains in the auxiliary forms of seapower, such as the merchant marine and the fishing fleet, and the improvement in new types of warships are impressive, these are but secondary manifestations of a far more important change. Soviet ships are manned by a better trained, educated and experienced group of men than have ever served on Russian vessels. Soviet naval personnel may or may not be fully equal to their American counterparts. Certainly they do not have the same recent naval tradition or successful combat experience. But they are now commanded by aggressive Admiral Gorshkov, who is determined to fashion a capability to operate on the high seas. Behind him

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lies the determination of the leading members of government and party. Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius acknowledged that "They have developed the techniques, the base of experience, and the capabilities to operate, both in peacetime and in periods of high tension, on the high seas."[4]

The gains made by Soviet seamen in experience and know-how are to some extent a product of a changing philosophy. The predominant position of the Soviet Army in the military pecking order has been somewhat altered. Force reductions under Khrushchev hit the army harder than other branches of the armed services. In 1963 a reorganization divided the forces into five major units. The Strategic Rocket forces and the Air Defense organization were added as equals to the three traditional services. The new strategic arm did not include the navy's nuclear submarines. The Air Defense organization was responsible for anti-aircraft defense covering, in U.S. terminology, civil defense, anti-missile defense and cosmic defense (mainly a research and development group concerned with reconnaissance satellites and orbiting weapons). Air Defense was divided into national, troop and fleet commands, the latter given the mission of destroying enemy missile submarines.

The reorganization indicated a new set of priorities. Marshal Malinovski, in an article written immediately before his death and published in *Kommunist* of January 1967, stated that first priority was being given to strategic missile forces and atomic missile-launching submarines. Within months thereafter Admiral Gorshkov was given a fifth star, making him a Fleet Admiral equal in rank to the army's Chief of Staff. The difference between American and Soviet military philosophy is evident in the high status given the various Soviet forces engaged in defense against air, missile and cosmic attack.

The Soviets have made great strides in improving naval personnel performance. In the present fleet 90 per cent of the officers have the equivalent of a college education while 70 per cent of the enlisted force have achieved a specialist's rating. The attainment of a much higher level of competence results from frequent cruises throughout the year, including winter, rigorous discipline and constant training, and the absorption of lessons from foreign navies. Soviet submarines have traveled under the ice to the North Pole and have circumnavigated the globe with-

[4] *New York Times,* March 30, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out surfacing, thus equaling achievements of their American counterparts.

In such areas as mine warfare, electronics and new forms of propulsion, Soviet progress has been most marked. Planning of operations, a weak point in World War II, has been vastly improved. The process of learning from others suggests abandonment of the naval isolationism of the past. Russian translations of American books dealing with naval power have been numerous —greatly exceeding American translations of equivalent Soviet publications. But most of the learning from others has taken place on the high seas, through watching, tracking, harassing and at times "playing chicken" with Western vessels, mainly American. This process evoked comparatively little attention in the United States until described in the February 23, 1968 issue of *Time*.

Warships and electronic intelligence trawlers stalk American and British warships nearly everywhere. Spy ships follow the fleets and task groups and maintain a watch outside Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain, Cape Kennedy, Puget Sound, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, Guam and other important U.S. bases. During the allied naval exercise Silver Tower, held in September 1968 in the eastern Atlantic, the Soviets used nearly a dozen ships plus about 140 long-range planes for spying purposes. Destroyers and trawlers frequently steam into the midst of U.S. formations, cut across the bows of American ships, and at times steer on collision course with them. The U.S. destroyer *Walker* was scraped twice by a Soviet destroyer in the Sea of Japan in 1966 during anti-submarine warfare maneuvers involving Japanese and American units. Soviet bombers, flying far from their land bases, try regularly to approach carrier task forces in the hope of getting within the 100-mile-range at which they could, in time of war, launch air-to-surface missiles. American radars usually report the snoopers before they come this close. Three or four CAP (combat air patrol) fighters are then sent to meet the Soviet planes at a distance of 200 miles or more and escort them along the remainder of their flight over the task force.

Aerial and naval surveillance is not entirely one-sided. Soviet warships and merchant vessels have long been of great interest to the United States and are subjected to close aerial surveillance at all times when outside Soviet waters. U.S. Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii plots the course and location of every Soviet ship in the Pacific. In sensitive areas such as Viet Nam and off the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American coasts Soviet snoopers will often be buzzed by U.S. planes several times a day. During a March 1969 Soviet naval exercise south of Iceland, the vessels were under almost around-the-clock surveillance.

The most dangerous and sophisticated of naval war games is the one played beneath the surface of the sea between submarines and anti-submarine forces, which may include attack submarines, anti-submarine carriers, destroyers, frigates, and other types of surface vessels. In the past it has generally involved Western anti-submarine forces on the offensive as the hunters and Soviet submarines as the hunted. However, the recent appearance of high-performance Soviet attack submarines could alter future games as the latter attempt to track American Polaris or Poseidon nuclear submarines.

The trick is for the submarines to evade the opposing anti-submarine forces, while the latter seek to detect and track down the undersea intruders. Heat- and sound-detecting devices in satellites and planes have generally given good results against the conventional types of Soviet submarines: because of their noise, they leave easily detectable "scars" (traces of their passage through the water) and "electronic signatures" (the total of all the ship's sounds). Sonar cable networks placed in the ocean's depths are also used for detection purposes. Technicians aboard submarines, planes and surface warships use sonar to trace Soviet submarines. Once the sound of an unknown submarine has been obtained, it can be flashed to an American base where a computer can flash back the name and description of the submarine. At times an American destroyer "locks on" a Soviet submarine, tracks its every move and eventually forces it to surface.

Probably the roughest type of future underseas games will be those played between American Polaris- or Poseidon-armed nuclear submarines and Soviet attack submarines. The Soviet Navy contains about 250 attack submarines while the United States has forty-one nuclear submarines fitted for bombardment purposes. The latter operate out of Guam (Pacific), Holy Loch, Scotland (Arctic), and Rota, Spain (Mediterranean). Because submarines operating out of these bases could fire from unknown stations which, unlike land installations, could not be targeted, it is a matter of possible national survival for the Soviets to know the coordinates of each firing station.

From the three bases Polaris submarines move out to sea for sixty-day patrols during which they make no signal that would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provide a clue to their position. However, Soviet attack submarines outside these bases can and do attempt to follow the Polaris craft. At this point American attack submarines enter the picture and slash in to provide a decoy. The attack submarines are fast and by following a scissors maneuver, moving in and out of the wake of the Polaris submarines, they can confuse the sound tracks of the two American boats. At times the game can be extremely dangerous. One American attack submarine is reported to have been so severely damaged in an underwater collision that two months at Rota were required for its repair.

In such games in the past American underseas craft have had the advantage of being quieter and faster. But the advantage in speed has apparently been wiped out as a result of a five-year period during which the U.S. Navy laid down no nuclear submarines while the Soviets developed submarines with greater speed and deeper diving capabilities.

Since World War II, a major part of the naval research and development effort has gone into anti-submarine warfare, a field containing many pitfalls and uncertainties and producing a long and technical struggle between offensive and defensive weapons. The success of detection depends to a large degree upon the skill of the operator in distinguishing between ship sounds and scores of other types of underwater sounds. Success in present efforts to disperse heat and produce silent or very quiet operations will make detection more difficult. Just as a submarine in wartime often spends weeks or months patrolling an empty ocean, so anti-submarine forces are likely to put forth great exertions and efforts for a limited number of kills.

One of the Soviet handicaps in the past was psychological. Against the Germans in the two world wars the navy was disadvantaged by unimaginative direction from the army and inclined to be overawed by the Germans, showing against them far less initiative and innovation than against other foes. Whatever the reasons, the Soviet Navy exhibits little of this inferiority complex at present. At times the behavior of men and ships can best be described as "cocky."

Much of the inner insecurity and fear, which led to demands that only ships of riparian states be permitted in the Baltic and Black seas, has disappeared. The Northern Sea Route was once viewed by the Soviet Union as an exclusively Soviet waterway, yet in 1966 it was declared open to non-Soviet vessels. Following the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, Moscow actually promoted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Northern Sea Route among foreign shippers as a twenty-nine-day voyage to the Far East—about ten days shorter than the canal route and much shorter than the route around Africa. Whether this new route, now open 100 days a year or more with the aid of icebreakers, will "catch on" is a moot question. However, Polish ships carried coal to Japan over it in the summer of 1968.

The foregoing account is not intended to imply that all Soviet sailors have suddenly grown to be ten feet tall. Despite its great progress since 1962, the Soviet Navy is still deficient in certain respects. Two of these, combat experience and a recent naval tradition, have been noted. Geographic handicaps remain. The absence of aircraft carriers and fleet-based airpower on the basis of American, British and Japanese experience is a vital shortcoming. Despite the formidable threat of ship-based missiles, the Soviet Navy is hardly ready for a battle test. Yet the rapidity with which the force has developed, its avid support by the government, and the tremendous R & D effort behind it, all argue that Soviet sailors by 1970 have come closer to being "at home at sea" than ever before. In at least a few respects the Soviet Navy has probably surpassed the achievement of its American teachers. The fact that 456 new warships were under construction in Soviet yards in the summer of 1968 as compared with only fifty-one in the United States indicates no relaxation of pressure.

V

An achievement especially dear to Soviet hearts has been the movement of a sizable task force from the Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean. As an objective of Russian policy this effort possesses a long history. More than a thousand years ago the Varangian founders of Russia launched the first of a series of amphibious expeditions down the Russian rivers and across the Black Sea to attack Constantinople. In 1769 Catherine the Great dispatched a fleet from the Baltic which circumnavigated Europe and, on entering the Aegean, annihilated a much stronger Turkish squadron at Chesma. With a prompt follow-up it might even have taken Constantinople and gained control of the Straits. All through the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Russians sought expansion southward toward warm-water ports.

A legal basis for the transit of Soviet warships from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean had existed for some time. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Montreux Convention of 1936, which ran for twenty years and was then automatically renewed in the absence of objections, provides that Black Sea powers can send warships through the Dardanelles without limit as to number or tonnage, providing only that they notify Turkey of this intent eight days in advance of the passage. During 1967 this privilege was exercised so freely that 157 Soviet warships entered the Mediterranean and only sixty-two made the return trip. Among those not returning were three cruisers, eleven destroyers, nine minesweepers, two submarines, fifty-one minelayers, twenty-one motor torpedo boats, and various auxiliary and supply vessels. Although some of the warships went elsewhere, or were used as gifts to satellite navies, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron often included between forty and fifty vessels.

Paradoxically, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the budding effort to oust the far stronger U.S. Sixth Fleet were the outcome of two stunning defeats. The first was the Six-Day War in June 1967, in which Arab client states of the Soviet Union were speedily and crushingly defeated by Israel. The second was the failure of the Soviet-Arab attempt in the United Nations, made during July 1967, to turn that military rout into a political and diplomatic victory.

Following World War II the Mediterranean became the southern flank of NATO and was dominated by the U.S. Sixth Fleet plus the navies of countries allied with the United States—Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Moscow's demands upon Ankara that two Turkish provinces be ceded to the Soviet Union and that the Soviets be given a share in the control of the Straits were not accepted. As the guerrilla war in Greece was won by the government, and as, later, Yugoslavia became largely independent of Moscow, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean faded. Even the submarine base provided by tiny Albania was unavailable after 1961 when Albania drifted into the Chinese communist camp.

The beginnings of successful Soviet penetration date to Moscow's exploitation of the quarrel between the Arab states and Israel. From the mid-1950's into the early 1960's there were small Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean which might number from three to as many as a dozen vessels. In 1964 the Soviets created a special Mediterranean unit as part of their Black Sea Fleet, and from 1964 to mid-1967 the course of world events played into their hands. In the Soviet view the overcommitment of the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States in Southeast Asia, after 1965, appeared to rule out the possibility of a vigorous response to a challenge in the Middle East. France's independent move from NATO not only weakened allied naval forces in the Mediterranean but brought an able and clever competitor into the scramble for oil concessions; though they had earlier supplied much of Israel's air force, the French now inclined toward the Arabs in the "proper" anti-Israel posture. At the eastern end of the Mediterranean the Cyprus issue promoted NATO disunity between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain's announced future withdrawal from east of Suez created a potential power vacuum between Aden and Hong Kong. In the western Mediterranean the revival of Spain's claim to Gibraltar—a claim the USSR promptly supported in the United Nations—introduced an element of uncertainty. Turkey and Iran, long the major obstacles to Soviet pressures to the south, were being successfully courted by Kremlin diplomacy.

From these developments even leaders as cautious as Kosygin and Brezhnev could reasonably have concluded that conditions were propitious for gaining a political victory: the Arabs over Israel, and the Soviet Union over the United States. Further, the chances of a disastrous defeat were not too great. If this was the expectation, the results of the Six-Day War must have been the rudest of rude surprises. To complete the disaster, when the Arabs and their sympathizers sought to win a diplomatic triumph by moving the case to the United Nations, they again scored a failure. Nasser announced the indefinite closing of the Suez Canal. Several Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain, and others announced —but did not effectively carry out—a selective oil embargo. The Arabs demanded that Israel abandon all conquests prior to peace negotiations, while the Israelis demanded face-to-face bilateral negotiations and the recognition of Israel as preliminaries to any settlement. Neither demand has been met. Meanwhile, as Egypt and Jordan faced economic ruin, the three "reactionary" Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, provided them with financial aid amounting to nearly $300 million, reaching their decision at a Khartoum foreign ministers' conference held on August 1-5, 1967.

The consequences of the Six-Day War nevertheless brought triumphs—though expensive ones—to the Soviet Union. Capitalizing on the grief and humiliation of the Arab states, their need of a strong friend, and their widespread resentment of the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States' pro-Israel role, the Soviets moved rapidly. Concealing whatever chagrin they may have felt at the miserable military record of their protégés, they re-equipped the Syrian and Egyptian forces in a gigantic 800-plane airlift. The value of this arms gift has been estimated by Israeli sources at $3 billion.

There are some indications that the Soviets asked for—and received—certain additional concessions in return for their aid. One of their demands may have been some control over the promotion of officers, since they were critical of the class structure of the Egyptian Army and its entire attitude of pleasure and personal profit before responsibility and hard work. An estimated 4,000 Soviet technicians are believed to be active in Arab countries, training troops in the handling of sophisticated new weapons, while Arab pilots are being taught in the Soviet Union to fly MIG-21's. Although the bulk of equipment has gone to Egypt, Soviet gifts have reached some unlikely recipients, including Sudan and Morocco. The latter country, one of the closest of America's African friends, received Czech tanks and field artillery.

Economic penetration has accompanied military instruction. During the year following the Arab defeat at least 1,000 civilian technicians were reported in the Arab world advising on all types of economic activities. Many barter deals involved the exchange of the Arab state's primary products for Soviet equipment and weapons. Cultural ties were emphasized and an increased number of Soviet scholarships were made available for Arab students. Agreements concluded since June 1967 have provided contributions to the construction of dams and irrigation facilities, an airline, and even Soviet acceptance of surplus citrus fruit. Allied intelligence services report substantial Soviet sums being channeled to key military and political personnel, editors and teachers.

In return for her large outright gifts the Soviet Union has gained the use of certain ports as naval bases. Latakia in Syria, Alexandria and Port Said in Egypt, and more recently Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria (evacuated by the French) have become available as rest and repair stations. The Soviets may have permanent shore parties and repair facilities at these ports. It should be noted, however, that the bases are probably not essential to the support of the Soviet Navy since the latter has adopted a fleet train system for supply of ships at sea, much like the one developed by the United States in World War II.

Another Soviet gain has been a considerable degree of control

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the foreign policy of the Arab states. According to one source a recent Nasser move to renew diplomatic relations with the United States was defeated by Soviet opposition — made palpable by the fact that the USSR is presently the buyer of 70 per cent of the Egyptian cotton crop and supplies 80 per cent of the food Egypt imports.

The Soviets have also lost in certain important respects. The closing of the Suez Canal has directly and deeply injured Egypt, although it has been of little significance to most of the other Arab states. Other than Egypt probably no country has been more unfavorably affected than the USSR. The Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean have all been made less accessible. Shipment of Soviet military supplies to North Viet Nam, already difficult in view of the distance involved and the uncooperative attitude of the Chinese communists, has been made doubly hard. Neither land shipment through Chinese territory nor shipment of supplies to Vladivostok by the Trans-Siberian Railroad or the Northern Sea Route, followed by trans-shipment to Haiphong, has proved a satisfactory substitute in trying to avoid the long route around Africa from Black Sea ports. The Suez closure has not seriously disturbed the United States' supply of oil, but for most of the oil-dependent nations of Western Europe and Japan the long haul around Africa has come to mean an estimated billion dollars a year increase in costs. The building of extremely large tankers whose draft is too great for the Suez Canal has been speeded up.

At present the Soviet Union's naval presence in the Mediterranean has more psychological than military significance. In any conflict with a major power the Soviet forces, lacking air cover, would doubtless be defeated. Their position has, however, been vastly strengthened by the 1969 coup in Libya and the resultant loss to the West of North African air bases, and by the Soviet planes operating with Soviet pilots in Egypt. Though the squadron has continuously altered in size and composition, in the summer of 1968 it included one 20,000-ton cruiser (either *Sverdlov* or *Dzerzhinski*), one *Kynda* and one *Krupny* class destroyer armed with long-range surface-to-surface missiles, five *Kotlin* class destroyers, five escorts of the *Riga, Petya* or *Meska* classes, three landing ships, twelve nuclear submarines—some carrying as many as eight missiles—and support and landing craft. Later the new carrier *Moskva* remained in the Mediterranean for about six weeks.

In comparison NATO has had in the Mediterranean a total of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some 300 ships entirely aside from the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Either British or Italian forces would be more than a match for the Soviets. The Sixth Fleet, organized in three forces (strike, anti-submarine warfare, supply) has comprised about sixty vessels. These have included two large carriers with a complement of about 100 planes each, many planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons to a range of 1,000 miles, one anti-submarine carrier, a cruiser, sixteen destroyers, twelve to fourteen submarines half of which were the Polaris type, a marine landing force of 2,000 men, the usual complement of landing and supply ships, and a land-based (Sicily) air force. Effective November 21, 1968, a new NATO command, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, was formed for the purpose of coordinating aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet. French cooperation with American, British and Italian forces has been quietly arranged.

VI

Without doubt the Soviet move into the Mediterranean represents the assumption of considerable risk. Client states as emotional as the Arab countries are difficult to control. The Soviets may find that their course bares them to commitments, risks and responsibilities with no ideological payoff and negligible influence over the governments involved. Soviet technicians, "advising" native Arabs, are almost certain to create tensions and dislikes on the popular level. Again, while legitimate Soviet interests exist in the Mediterranean, they are not preponderant. Of the approximately 2,600 ships cruising those waters during any typical day, about 200 are Soviet but at least 80 per cent belong to NATO nations. The fifteen nations that border the Mediterranean are diverse in most respects but the great majority are basically anti-communist. The Soviets control none of the three exits from the Mediterranean, though their commercial and fishing vessels have recently made good use of Gibraltar. Under these conditions it would be hard to imagine them severing Western supply lines.

There remain at least three other possibilities for Moscow. One of these was acknowledged openly by Leonid Brezhnev on April 24, 1967 at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, when he concluded that "The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the United States Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean."[5] The same

[5] *The Reporter*, December 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theme has recently been sounded by the Soviet press and to a limited extent by communist parties in Western Europe. Another possible objective is interference with Europe's oil supply. The Soviet Union herself probably is in little need of Middle East oil since she already possesses numerous domestic sources including fields in Siberia that may prove to be exceedingly productive. However, because Middle East sources are nearer and cheaper, it may be to her interest to obtain oil concessions from the Arab states, as in the case of the North Rumeila Field in Iraq in 1969. Nations like Italy, West Germany and Great Britain might then become the victims of Soviet oil blackmail, which could prove disruptive to the NATO alliance. An even grimmer prospect, full Soviet backing of or participation in another Arab war against Israel, could give the United States the unpalatable choice between being drawn into a general war or witnessing genocide in the Middle East.

Though Russian naval ambitions have seldom been projected as far as the Indian Ocean, this has been mainly owing to lack of opportunity rather than lack of interest—one of the lesser known naval projects of Peter the Great involved the annexation of Madagascar. Now, Great Britain's announced intention of withdrawing from the area east of Suez and the apparent lack of American readiness to move into the power vacuum must appear to the Kremlin to spell opportunity with a capital O. A thrust into the Indian Ocean must offer a strong temptation, one that Soviet leaders will find increasingly difficult to resist.

Prior to the Six-Day War Soviet actions in the vast Indian Ocean area had been mainly by proxy. Moscow's foreign aid programs have usually been related to strategic needs, and in this regard Sukarno-ruled Indonesia was thought to be the "open sesame." Indonesia, controlling the straits linking the Pacific and Indian oceans, was the recipient of large Soviet gifts. But this experiment in foreign aid proved to be a failure. Sukarno became more and more favorably impressed with the Peking, as contrasted with the Moscow, version of the gospel of Marx. Further, when the Indonesian communists attempted a coup against the army and it miscarried, no efforts by Sukarno, before his own downfall, were able to spare the party from virtual annihilation.

At the other end of the Indian Ocean Soviet activities have been somewhat more effective. The USSR provided air support for the Republic of Yemen against Royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia. Soviet engineers constructed a harbor at Hodeida

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which enjoys a direct airline link with Moscow. When Great Britain moved out of the Red Sea area in November 1967, Aden swiftly became the South Yemen People's Republic. In June 1968 the Soviet cruiser *Dmitri Pozharskiy,* a missile destroyer, a nuclear submarine and an oiler anchored in the harbor at Aden to pay a courtesy visit to the new country. These ships in a four-month cruise had previously visited Iraq, Somalia, India, Iran and Ceylon. Since the autumn of 1968 other Soviet task forces, from both the Pacific and the Black Sea, have made similar port calls almost continuously. These vessels have been supplied by a Soviet fleet train system much like the American. However, base facilities as well as aerial cover are major needs. The former may well be supplied, in exchange for economic aid, by the newly independent government of Mauritius. Other probings to establish good relations with the small and weak states of the area are now under way. Somalia is benefiting from this trend by securing Soviet aid in constructing the new port of Berbera.

The Soviet Union has established friendly relations with India, and to a lesser degree with Pakistan following successful Soviet mediation of their 1965 war. American withdrawal of military aid to the two countries merely opened up another type of competition, this time between the communist giants. Communist China tendered military aid to Pakistan, while the Soviet Union supplied India. Chinese trawlers and conventional submarines have recently been sighted in the Indian Ocean and Chinese freighters taking goods to Dar-es-Salaam have complained of close-range shadowing by Soviet warships. In February 1968 Admiral Gorshkov visited India, presumably for the purpose of securing refueling and repairing sites for Soviet warships in Indian ports. Regardless of the outcome of these feelers, the Indian Navy had received submarines, patrol and landing craft and destroyer escorts as a climax to the naval aid it had been given by Moscow for several years. Reports have also appeared indicating a possible Chinese gift of five conventional submarines to Pakistan.

In Viet Nam the Soviet Union has from the outset supplied Hanoi with the sinews of war. The main supply line has run from Odessa through the Dardanelles and from the Suez Canal to Haiphong, a distance of well over 7,000 miles. The trip ordinarily took somewhat over a month, employing the largest and fastest Soviet cargo ships (the *Belitsk* class of 14,000 tons and 18½ knots). An average of forty-seven cargo ships a month reached Haiphong, usually following a "hazing" by American ships and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planes which inspected the Soviet merchant vessels from close range. Whether for this or other reasons, a detachment of the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet, including cruisers, was reported in the April 11, 1968 issue of *Pravda* to be operating near Viet Nam.

The Six-Day War and the closing of the Suez Canal lengthened the supply route to more than 14,000 miles a trip. Even at top speed the journey around Africa required seventy-two days, the round trip nearly five months. The number of ships arriving at Haiphong fell to an average of between twenty-two and twenty-five per month. To have maintained the former level of aid would have required employing nearly all the large cargo vessels turned out in Soviet shipyards during a two-year period, probably 300 as compared with about 150 previously.[6]

A fourth role played by Soviet seapower east of Suez has been that of supporting North Korea in some of her more aggressive actions. The American spy ship *Pueblo* was reportedly given the mission of discovering whether ships of the Soviet Far Eastern squadron were basing on North Korean ports due to heavy ice at Vladivostok. Following the *Pueblo's* seizure by North Korean sea and air forces, the United States found herself in the embarrassing position of having too little aerial and naval muscle in the area to take retaliatory action. In an attempt to redress the balance a task force built around the *Enterprise* entered the Sea of Japan. When it became clear that this American force was matched in airpower by the land-based North Korean planes, the *Enterprise* withdrew, but not before a Soviet task force of sixteen cruisers, missile frigates and destroyers had deployed along the North Korean coast. Soviet destroyers closely shadowed the *Enterprise* during her withdrawal. In late November 1968, when the *Hancock* was sent into North Korean waters to block landings in the South by guerrilla forces she too was shadowed; Soviet protests also brought about a withdrawal of American naval forces in 1969 following the North Korean downing of a U.S. spy plane.

From the examples given, it is clear that the presence of an enemy force, even a much weaker force, has an inhibiting effect upon naval action. This "trip wire" role is similar to that played by NATO land forces in Western Europe. In the case of the Six-Day War, Soviet threats to aid the Arabs diminished with the approach of the Sixth Fleet. The United States, rightly or wrongly, has refrained from mining Haiphong harbor or bombing its

[6]Rear Admiral John D. Hays, "Russian Seapower in the Mediterranean," *America*, January 27, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

piers because of unwillingness to sink Soviet merchant ships. Neither the Soviet Navy nor the U.S. Navy issues statements regarding possible damage or loss following grim undersea-game encounters. In the sense that the presence of one party's ships inhibits open action by the other party and tends to neutralize its force, Admiral Gorshkov is on the mark in claiming that U.S. mastery of the seas is at an end. Since Soviet penetration of the world's oceans has so far been in limited measure, however, the admiral would be more accurate to apply this claim only to certain limited areas.

Unfortunately these include areas off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Probably in late 1965 or early 1966 the Soviet Union adopted a patrol system involving the continuous presence of from three to six nuclear submarines off the United States' east and west coasts. In its essentials this operation is similar to the American Polaris system. Cruises normally last six to eight weeks, as compared with the sixty-day standard Polaris cruise, and cover 800 to 1,000 miles. Few American defense officials have expressed alarm at the practice, viewing these vessels as primarily a deterrent to war and as mounting only a small proportion of the 1,000 or so nuclear weapons at Moscow's disposal. They have, however, taken steps to improve radar warning systems, to increase anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and to speed the launching of Strategic Air Command planes from their bases.

Actually the threat is far greater than is commonly admitted by American officials. Soviet submarines now off the U.S. coast carry two to eight missiles each. Most of these may be limited to a range of 600 or so miles, yet if used in a surprise attack they could bring vast destruction. Soviet submarines under construction, and a few already completed, will carry as heavy an armament as American Polaris submarines—sixteen missiles with a range of 2,000 to 3,000 miles. They may also be faster, more difficult to track, and have a better capacity for deep diving. Obviously both their deterrent and surprise attack capacity will be multiplied many times.

VII

Surprising as the recent Soviet achievements at sea may appear to many Americans, they are no mere flash in the pan. They follow a pattern that has existed for centuries. The Russians have shown marked interest in the sea during most of their modern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history, and their record is more commendable than is generally believed. Despite unimpressive performances in World War II and the Russo-Japanese War, they have enjoyed a full measure of triumphs—at times achieved against far superior enemy forces. Few admirals in any navy have equaled the exploratory and scientific work of men like Kruzhenstern, Lazarev, Makarov or Bellingshausen. The victories of Ushakov, Apraksin, Nakhimov, Seniavin, Grieg and others were numerous and on occasion outstanding. Probably no ruler ever outdid the naval achievements of Peter the Great—Russian attempts to develop submarines date from his era—and few have used seapower to better advantage than Catherine the Great. The percussion fuse, the minelayer, the icebreaker, the collision mat for damaged ships and the first torpedo-boat flotillas of history, as well as countless inventions in ordnance, oceanography and engineering, were all attributable to Admiral Stepan O. Makarov, certainly one of the most versatile and brilliant admirals who ever lived.

The Russian Navy has seldom ranked below third among the world's navies, and on several occasions it has ranked second, as it does today. The Soviet Union's program to achieve and strengthen seapower is consistent with this record, carefully planned and effective. For a nation known mainly as a great land power and badly handicapped by geography in its access to the sea, the acquisition of the present level of naval strength has been one of the great achievements of the twentieth century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WEST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR RECONCILIATION

by James H. Wolfe

SPEAKING from Hradcany Castle on February 22, 1968, the twentieth anniversary of the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, the then party secretary, Alexander Dubcek, stressed the determination of his government to build normal relations with all the states of Central and Western Europe regardless of their social systems.[1] The absence of specific reference to the Federal Republic of Germany did not deceive the foreign offices of Europe. It was evident that the eastern policy of the West German Grand Coalition was gaining momentum. In both Bonn and Prague the levers of power were apparently in the hands of men whose approach to questions of foreign policy was one of pragmatism rather than ideological conviction. After a hiatus of twenty years, it could at last be said that Bonn had a policy vis-à-vis Prague, and that the Czechs were reciprocating. The communications void of the Cold War had virtually disappeared.

Then came the events of August 20/21, 1968. The diplomatic progress of the previous eight months vanished, and hope of a rapprochement between West Germany and Czechoslovakia momentarily evaporated.

While the present status of West German-Czechoslovak relations is hardly encouraging, an examination of the nature of the problems impeding a reconciliation suggests a note of realism in Bonn's cautiously optimistic policy of easing tensions in the East.

The Sources of Conflict

When Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vaclav David addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1967, he listed among the goals of his government's foreign policy the desire to resolve its conflicts, however latent, with the Federal Republic. The achievement of this goal was contingent upon West Germany's acceptance of five conditions: she must renounce the claim to be the sole international representative of the German nation, accept the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, sever all governmental ties with West Berlin, recognize the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic as well as the

[1]Gilbert von Aue, "Der Rechtsstaatlichkeit entgegen — Dubcek betreibt 'Europäisierung der CSSR,'" *Politische Welt,* March 1968, p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immutability of its frontiers, and finally acknowledge the Munich Agreement to be void *ab initio*.[2] Beyond these enumerated questions lay peripheral problems arising out of the military and scientific assistance given by the Federal Republic to Israel and Bonn's support of the United States in Viet Nam. On these points it suffices to say that the special relationship between West Germany and Israel goes unnoticed by Prague, and that the position of the two Central European states on the struggle in Southeast Asia appears to be as much a reflection of their membership in rival alliance systems as an indication of their individual national commitments. The five issues identified by Foreign Minister David are the critical ones to be resolved before a rapprochement can be attained.

The policy of the Federal Republic, initiated by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and unchanged by his successors, is that it alone represents the German nation in the world community. The preamble of the Basic Law states that the Federal Republic acts on behalf of those Germans to whom self-determination is denied.[3] Underlying this argument is the theory of the "core state" (*Kernstaattheorie*), which stipulates that unconditional surrender did not dissolve the unity of the German Reich as it existed at the end of 1937, and that its sovereign prerogatives are now exercised by the Federal Republic. Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is viewed as only a facade for colonial domination by a foreign power. Since the East German government cannot justify its authority on the basis of free elections, it is not qualified to represent the will even of a part of the German people.[4] The claim to sole representation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*) remains a cornerstone of West German foreign policy and one that Chancellor Willy Brandt is unwilling to relinquish even in an effort to promote negotiations with Pankow. While the word "reunification" has become less prominent in official statements, the West German government is unprepared to forgo its position on representation and thereby admit implicitly that the goal of politically unifying the German people has been abandoned.

From the Czechoslovak viewpoint, the West German claim to

[2]"Chronik," *Osteuropa*, April 1968, pp. 317-322; "Czechoslovakia," *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, October 1967, pp. 53-54.

[3]*The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany* (New York: German Information Center, 1969), p. 5; Elmer Plischke, "West German Foreign and Defense Policy," ORBIS, Winter 1969, pp. 1121-1122.

[4]Gerhart Scheuer, *Die Rechtslage des geteilten Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1960), pp. 77-78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sole representation and its corollary — reunification — constitute a threat to the historical policy pursued by the princes of Bohemia within the German sphere of influence. Since 805, when Charlemagne first imposed a tributary status on Bohemia, its princes have sought to play a balance of power role in German politics. In the later Middle Ages the kings of Bohemia were electors of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, and they consistently blocked the consolidation of that empire into a power which would absorb their domain. The renowned Emperor Charles IV (1347-1378), himself a king of Bohemia, was careful to preserve the autonomy of the Czech state. Opposition to the unification of the German nation remains a historically sound policy that no Prague regime is likely to disregard. The historian Frantiszek Palacky (1798-1876) set the tone for Czechoslovak foreign policy when he wrote during the revolutionary turmoil of 1848 that the small nations of East Central Europe must preserve their political unity in the form of the Hapsburg Empire, weak as it was. Otherwise they would all fall victim to either German or Russian imperialism.[5] This lesson was not lost on the post-World War II governments of Czechoslovakia. Yet during the first eight months of 1968, as the Dubcek government sought to extend its freedom of action in European affairs by undertaking diplomatic initiatives without the express consent of the Soviet Union, little note was taken of Palacky's warning that an independent role for the Czech nation was impossible at the point of contact between German and Russian power.

The treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons is no longer an issue in West German-Czechoslovak relations. On November 28, 1969 the West German ambassadors in Washington and Moscow received instructions to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby undercut the communist allegation that a "militaristic" Federal Republic would never accept an international system of nuclear arms control. The principal difficulty in the NPT for the West Germans was embodied in Article III, a clause prohibiting the production of fissionable material other than under the control procedures established by the International Atomic Energy Commission.[6] Chancellor Brandt has pledged his government to support the goal of arms control, but has insisted that the necessary arrangements not be implemented

[5]Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 65-69.

[6]For the text of the NPT, see *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1, 1968, pp. 8-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the expense of either European integration or the Federal Republic's interest in developing atomic energy for industrial purposes.[7] In short, the NPT must not jeopardize Euratom or create a virtual monopoly of the nuclear powers over the production and distribution of the fissionable material necessary for European economic growth.

The Federal Republic denied itself access to atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons when it joined the Western European Union in 1954. The Grand Coalition regarded a second German denial of any effort to produce nuclear weapons systems as unnecessary. Moreover, Chancellor Kiesinger feared that the acceptance of the NPT would not be accompanied by a diplomatic *quid pro quo*. In the event of a settlement of the German question through reunification, even in the form of a confederation, Bonn would undoubtedly be required to accept the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. By holding open its options on the NPT, the former West German government sought to retain a bargaining point that might have been of significance had serious negotiations on reunification begun.[8] In response to the demands of Czechoslovakia and other members of the Soviet bloc, the Federal Republic has now acceded to the NPT as an act of good faith which it hopes will establish the preconditions for comprehensive negotiations with its eastern neighbors.

The constitutional relationship between the Federal Republic and West Berlin is unacceptable in Prague, and the fundamental issue is again the permanence of a divided Germany. West Berlin's international legal status is unclear. In many respects the city is a constituent part of the Federal Republic, yet in the final analysis it is a separate entity under the control of the Western allies. The Bonn government subsidizes the city and has established some sixty-five Federal agencies there. Representatives of West Berlin sit in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, but are not allowed to vote. Delegations from Berlin do vote as a part of the Federal Assembly which convenes to elect the President of the Federal Republic. Yet Federal laws do not apply in the city unless the Berlin Senate so legislates. Treaties and other international agreements negotiated by Bonn do not include Berlin, although trade agreements fre-

[7]Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy for Europe*, translated by Joel Carmichael (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 176; and "Venturing More Democracy: Government Declaration by Willy Brandt," *The Bulletin* of the German Embassy, Washington, November 4, 1969, p. 11.

[8]Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Issue of German Nuclear Armament," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science: The "Atlantic Community" Reappraised*, November 1968, p. 97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quently contain a "Berlin clause" which has the effect of making them applicable to the metropolis.[9] In a constitutional sense the undetermined status of West Berlin poses many problems. It is in the realm of foreign policy, however, that the issue achieves its true significance, for any lessening of the legal ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin means a hardening of the status quo and with it an implicit acceptance of a divided Germany.

The Bundesrat has met formally in Berlin, and the convening there of the Federal Assembly to elect the President of the Republic in 1969 emphasized the determination of the Grand Coalition to keep alive the image of a united German nation. East Germany and, above all, West Berlin are not regarded as foreign territories. Conversely, the Soviet Union supports the Ulbricht regime and its demand that the international community extend *de jure* recognition to the GDR, and that West Berlin be neutralized. In solidarity with its allies the Czechoslovak government protested the election of President Heinemann in Berlin. The continued West German utilization of Berlin as a symbol of national unity is denounced as vigorously in Prague as in Pankow.

Diplomatic involvement in the Berlin question on the part of the states of East Central Europe invariably centers around the stipulation that trade agreements concluded with the Federal Republic will apply to the Western sectors of the city as well. The "Berlin clause" was a major obstacle that had to be overcome before West Germany and Rumania could institute diplomatic relations on January 31, 1967. In this instance, both parties simply agreed to disagree, and the matter was left open for further discussion. Willy Brandt, then foreign minister, hoped to employ the same formula in his subsequent trade negotiations with Czechoslovakia.

On August 3, 1967 West Germany and Czechoslovakia concluded a commercial agreement which provided for the establishment of trade missions in Frankfurt and Prague. Although these missions would have the authority only to issue visas, there was little doubt that they had an unofficial diplomatic status. But the East Germans had successfully influenced the Czechoslovak government to refuse the same terms for the resumption of full diplomatic relations on which Rumania and West Germany had agreed. Radio Prague commented on the day the agreement was signed:

[9]Elmer Plischke, "Integrating Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany," *Journal of Politics,* February 1965, pp. 35-65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is well known that the talks could not have been completed over the past three years because the West German delegation raised the unrealistic demand for the inclusion of West Berlin in the agreement for the exchange of goods. Czechoslovakia refused and still refuses this West Berlin clause.

In the priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy, the political requirement to deny to the Federal Republic recognition of its rights in Berlin overrode for years the economic advantages of securing access to the West German market. A month later Foreign Minister David was to stress this point in his address to the UN General Assembly.

The next issue raised by David was the refusal of the Federal Republic to recognize the sovereign status of the GDR. Officially, the Grand Coalition had continued the policy of Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard by asserting that East Germany is not a sovereign state, but a zone of occupation under the control of the Soviet Union. In June 1967 Chancellor Kiesinger broke a precedent when he formally replied to a letter from Willi Stoph, Chairman of the East German Council of Ministers. Kiesinger took the initiative and suggested to his nominal counterpart that ministerial conferences be conducted to facilitate relations between the two German governments. The response from Pankow was almost wholly negative. On January 14, 1970, in an address to the Bundestag, Chancellor Brandt called for a dialogue with the East German government, the result of which would hopefully be an easing of tension along the "bleeding border" that traverses Germany. Despite his willingness to meet at the conference table, however, Brandt emphasized that Walter Ulbricht's demand as chief of state that the GDR receive full international legal recognition was unacceptable. East Germany would never be a foreign state in the eyes of Bonn.[10] Ulbricht denies the premise that his government is not sovereign, and there appears no way out of the impasse.

The Federal Republic's unilateral recognition of the GDR as a sovereign entity would constitute an overt admission of the permanence of a divided Germany and a renunciation of the goal of self-determination for the German people. It is hardly surprising that Czechoslovakia demands this recognition since a united Germany might well become a threat to her own security. The task of West German diplomats is to convince the foreign offices of East Central Europe that a united Germany can be a force for

[10]See Brandt, *A Peace Policy for Europe*, pp. 126-132; *New York Times*, January 15, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peace and stability, while the unnatural partition of the German nation will lead only to increased frustration and international tension.

To American observers of international relations the last demand made by Foreign Minister David — the renunciation *ab initio* of the Munich Agreement — may appear a meaningless and futile effort to rewrite history. Yet for Czechs and Germans the issue remains as current and fundamental as in the months preceding the outbreak of World War II. The international legal problems of citizenship and compensation for property loss are important, but even these are obscured by the question of the political relationship of the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia to any German state, present or future. The Munich Agreement represents an unchallenged acceptance of German hegemony in East Central Europe; denunciation of that accord as having been invalid from the beginning would make clear to all that Czechoslovakia would never again permit herself to be absorbed into a German sphere of influence.

The Munich Agreement and the Sudeten German Transfer

On September 10, 1919 the Treaty of St. Germain formally affirmed the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire into a series of successor states. The governments of these new states each proclaimed the principle of national self-determination while extending their control by force over ethnic minorities to whom little, if any, cultural or personal autonomy was granted. The first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1939) epitomized the tragedy of a multinational state founded on the assumption of ethnic homogeneity. According to the census of 1921, its national composition was 50.82 per cent Czech, 14.71 per cent Slovak, 23.36 per cent German, 5.57 per cent Hungarian, 3.45 per cent Ukrainian (Ruthenian), 1.35 per cent Jewish, 0.57 per cent Polish, and 0.17 per cent gypsies and others.[11] In theory a national state of Czechs and Slovaks, the Republic was in reality an unstable coalition of diverse ethnic minorities dominated by a Czech administrative class. The Slovaks and Germans along with the Hungarians and Ukrainians believed themselves to be the object of a conscious policy of national discrimination. Lord Runciman, who visited the predominantly German Sudetenland in August 1938, as a representative of the British government, reported:

[11]Alfred Bohmann, *Das Sudetendeutschtum in Zahlen* (Munich: Sudeten German Council, 1959), p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is a hard thing to be ruled by an alien race; and I have been left with the impression that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years, though not actually oppressive and certainly not "terroristic," has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination, to a point where the resentment of the German population was inevitably moving in the direction of revolt.[12]

Runciman's assessment suggests that the situation might have been saved had the regime of President Eduard Benes (1935-1938) governed in a different style. In his memoirs David Lloyd George castigated the Czechoslovak government for failing to fulfill the terms of a treaty to protect the rights of ethnic minorities.[13] The British impression of bad faith on Prague's part in the presumed breach of an international agreement provided a background for a policy of appeasing Hitler. Moreover, recent historical research has suggested that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain may well have acted on the assumption that a continuation of the National Socialist regime was preferable to risking a coup d'état by the German General Staff, an event which seemed likely if Hitler's demands for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany had not been met.[14] The scope of this discussion precludes an analysis of the diplomatic crisis that led to the quadripartite Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, and the subsequent transfer to the Third Reich of the German-populated Bohemian and Moravian rimlands. It suffices to emphasize that the Czechoslovak government was not a signatory of the Munich Agreement, but did accede to it. There was at the time no question that the understanding reached by the signatory powers and accepted by President Benes was anything other than legal and binding.

On October 5, 1938 Benes resigned as President of the Republic and left for exile in Great Britain. A Czechoslovak Provisional Government came into being in London on July 4, 1940. From the beginning it had only one Sudeten German member, Karl Kreibich, who in 1950 became Czechoslovakia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. Benes represented the view of the Provisional Government when he wrote, "Our State was born with this prob-

[12]John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 447.

[13]David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference,* 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), II, 904. For the text of Czechoslovakia's minority treaty, see David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris,* 21 vols. (New York: Appeal Printing Company, 1928), XIII, 245-254.

[14]Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, *München 1938: England zwischen Hitler und Preussen* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1965), pp. 32-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lem [i.e., ethnic minorities] and must either solve it at whatever cost or succumb."[15] The Czech leader made his solution public in an article for *Foreign Affairs* in which he urged "a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war."[16]

Great-power support for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans — 20 per cent of Czechoslovakia's population — was forthcoming when the Soviet government accepted Benes' plan for a forced transfer during his visit to Moscow to sign a pact of alliance in December 1943. On January 31, 1945 the United States embassy in London transmitted a note to the Czechoslovak Provisional Government in which the proposed expulsion was approved provided that the actual transfer be effected in an orderly and gradual fashion. The British government agreed with similar reservations on May 8.[17] Article XIII of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference (July 16-August 1, 1945) gave final approval to the principle of expulsion as a means of eliminating ethnic minorities[18]— a process already being carried out in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak cabinet in London had determined during 1944 that all persons regarded by the German government as its citizens would be subject to transfer. The authors of this policy admitted that some exceptions should be made, but they pleaded administrative difficulties as justification for failing to evaluate each individual case. Ultimately, the Provisional Government's argument rested on the assumption that the Sudeten German community was infected with the virus of militant Pan-Germanism and would therefore have to be removed totally from the body politic.[19] In the summer of 1945 and throughout the following winter, nearly three million Sudeten and Carpathian Germans were driven from their homes in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia. The expulsion was neither gradual nor humane. The estimated loss of life among the Sudeten Germans was 241,000.[20]

[15]Eduard Benes, *Memoirs: From Munich to New War and New Victory,* translated by Godfrey Lias (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), pp. 211-216.

[16]Eduard Benes, "The Organization of Postwar Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1942, p. 238.

[17]For the text of these two notes, as well as a comprehensive collection of documents on the Sudeten German question, see Vaclav Kral, editor, *Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, 1933-1947: Dokumentensammlung* (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1964), pp. 548-550.

[18]Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin* (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, 2 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1960), II, 1495-1496.

[19]Kral, *op. cit.,* pp. 538-548.

[20]Bohmann, *op. cit.,* p. 252. For documentation on Sudeten German losses see Theodor Schieder, editor, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today, the overwhelming majority of the expellees is well integrated into the prosperous society of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the expulsion has left an indelible imprint on the mind of a powerful and vocal minority. The historian Hajo Holborn did not exaggerate when he described the expulsion of the German populations from Eastern Europe as the "greatest migration of people in modern European history."[21]

For contemporary West German-Czechoslovak relations the transfer of the Sudeten Germans poses two international legal problems: the validity of the Munich Agreement and the legality of the expulsion itself. Of the two the former is the more fundamental. Benes had argued that the Republic could not survive with one-fifth of its population as a disaffected ethnic minority and had consequently justified the transfer on the doctrinal basis of reason of state. Now, it is surprising to some that, even a generation after the elimination of the Sudeten German communities, the agreement which concluded the September 1938 crisis still raises questions capable of evoking strong feelings among all citizens, past and present, of the Czechoslovak state.

On August 5, 1942 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by diplomatic note that Great Britain no longer regarded the Munich Agreement as valid. The French National Committee expressed the same point of view in a communication directed to the Provisional Government on September 29, 1942.[22] Finally, on September 26, 1944, Italy annulled the agreement.[23] The United States and the Soviet Union, although not signatories to the treaty, had left no doubt as to their position by joining two weeks earlier with Great Britain in a tripartite statement to the effect that Germany's frontiers as of December 31, 1937 were the only ones recognized by the great powers.[24]

Eastern-Central-Europe, Vol. IV: *The Expulsion of the German Population from Czechoslovakia,* translated by G. H. de Sausmarez (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1960) and Association for the Protection of Sudéten German Interests, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* (Munich: C. Wolf & Son, 1953). An opposing point of view is argued by Radomir Luza in *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962* (New York: New York University Press, 1964).

[21]Hajo Holborn, *The Political Collapse of Europe* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 185n.

[22]Charles Pergler, "The Munich Repudiation," *Amercian Journal of International Law,* April 1943, pp. 308-310.

[23]Alexander Uschakov, "Das Münchener Abkommen in den Beziehungen zwischen Polen und der Tschechoslowakei," *Europa-Archiv,* July 25, 1968, p. 517.

[24]Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 119.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More than twenty years later, in an address to the Bundestag on December 13, 1966, Chancellor Kiesinger declared that the Munich Agreement had been made under threat of force and was consequently no longer binding.[25] The current German coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats adheres to the same position: there is no dispute over the proposition that the agreement is void *ex tunc*. The Czechoslovak contention that it is invalid *ab initio* lacks conclusive legal proof.

As Kiesinger pointed out, four arguments exist as a basis for the repudiation of the Munich Agreement: it was concluded under duress, was never ratified in a constitutional fashion by the Czechoslovak government, was in violation of existing treaties, and was voided by the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939. The wartime Provisional Government took the position that the four signatory powers had used illegal force in compelling Czechoslovakia to cede territory to Germany as well as to Hungary and Poland.[26] Primarily, Benes was referring to the Anglo-French *démarche* of September 19, 1938, when both governments communicated to him their support of the proposed cession of the Sudetenland to Germany.[27] Two days later Prague concurred. Although a Czechoslovak delegation was present in Munich on September 29, it did not participate in the conference. Instead Benes was informed of the terms of the agreement and, after some debate, his government issued the following communiqué on the afternoon of September 30:

> The Government of the Republic met at the Hradcany this morning under the Chairmanship of the President of the Republic. At this meeting the international situation as it has developed since the Four-Power Agreement resulting from the Conference at Munich on September 29 was seriously discussed. The decisions of the Munich Conference were announced to the Czech Government this morning.
>
> The Government has closely studied the details of those decisions and the circumstances which must be taken into account in connection with them. After careful consideration and study of the urgent recommendations made by the British and French Governments, and fully conscious of its responsibility before history, the Czechoslovak Government decided, with the unanimous consent of the responsible factors of the political parties, that the Four-Power Agreement of Munich should be accepted. They have made this decision because they realise that it is

[25]Karl Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 42-43.

[26]Benes, *Memoirs*, p. 273.

[27]Henri Nogueres, *Munich: "Peace for Our Time,"* translated by Patrick O'Brian (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 138-150.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessary to preserve the nation, and that any other decision is to-day impossible.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, in announcing this acceptance, declares also before the whole world its protest against the decisions which were taken unilaterally and without our participation.[28]

International law recognizes that a treaty concluded under duress, i.e., physical coercion of negotiators or the sovereign himself, is invalid.[29] When Benes' successor as President, Emil Hacha, signed an agreement in Berlin to permit the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Republic, the techniques employed to secure his consent were undoubtedly coercive in both a physical and psychological sense.[30] The same cannot be said of the Czechoslovak government's assent to the terms of the Munich Agreement. Utilization of diplomatic pressure supported by a threat of military intervention is not in itself sufficient to invalidate an international accord. Were that not so, nearly every treaty of peace would be of dubious validity. The Treaty of St. Germain, which finalized the Bohemian and Moravian frontiers of the new Czechoslovak Republic in 1919, was imposed upon Austria by the Allied and Associated Powers, yet no signatory has ever sought to repudiate this international agreement by claiming that it was concluded under duress.

Whether or not the provisions of the Czechoslovak constitution were observed is a more complex problem. President Benes did not submit the Munich Agreement to the parliament for its approval. However, when, on the morning of September 30, he convened a joint meeting of the cabinet, leaders of the major political parties, and representatives of the general staff, unanimous acceptance of the agreement was forthcoming. Later in the day the parliamentary committee of the majority coalition assembled to concur with the government's action.[31] The question of constitutionality was not raised.

International law provides that the assurance of a chief of state as to his competence to act is binding.[32] The four signatory powers accepted on the basis of a theory of confidence the declaration of President Benes that Czechoslovakia would abide by the terms of

[28]Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, translated by Ida Sindelkova and Edgar P. Young (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), p. 231.

[29]Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (4th edition, New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1965), pp. 528-529.

[30]Clive Parry, "The Law of Treaties," in Max Sorensen, editor, *Manual of Public International Law* (New York: St. Martin's, 1968), p. 202.

[31]Ripka, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-231.

[32]Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Munich Agreement.[33] The legitimacy of Prague's action in assenting to the cession of the Sudetenland was confirmed on November 20, 1938, when Czechoslovakia and Germany signed the final act delimiting their new frontiers.

Undeniably, the Munich Agreement and its implementation did constitute a breach of existing international accords. Germany had pledged herself by the Treaty of Locarno (1925) to accept peaceful arbitration as a way of resolving international disputes. The Czechoslovak Republic, for its part, had not fulfilled the minorities treaty into which it had entered in 1919. Finally, the Covenant of the League of Nations provided a means for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Yet the League remained inactive in this instance. The Munich Agreement supplanted treaties regarded as vital to the European international system and signaled a return to great-power diplomacy as a means of securing stability on the Continent. The concept of collective security had been proven inoperative. Nevertheless, the agreement itself had been negotiated in accordance with the principles of international law; and as Quincy Wright has observed, no basis exists for declaring it invalid *ab initio*.[34]

The final argument to which Kiesinger alluded in his 1966 address to the Bundestag, that of nullification through Hitler's action in occupying Bohemia and Moravia, is the most convincing from the standpoint of West German-Czechoslovak relations, if not from an abstract legal point of view. The Munich Agreement was immediately followed by an Anglo-French declaration guaranteeing the Czechoslovak Republic.[35] International lawyers dispute the proposition that the guarantee was an integral part of the Munich Agreement.[36] The principal Western governments concerned adhere to the interpretation advanced in the British note of August 5, 1942 to the Provisional Government:

> . . . as Germany has deliberately destroyed the arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia reached in 1938, in which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom participated, His Majesty's Government regard themselves as free from any engagements in this respect. At the final set-

[33]Otto Kimminich, "Munich and International Law," *Sudeten Bulletin,* July-August 1963, pp. 238-240.

[34]Quincy Wright, "The Munich Settlement and International Law," *American Journal of International Law,* January 1939, pp. 17-31.

[35]For the text of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-French guarantee see Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,* Series D (1937-1945), Vol. II: *Germany and Czechoslovakia (1937-1938)* (Washington: GPO, 1949), pp. 1014-1015.

[36]Kimminich, *op. cit.,* pp. 245-247.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tlement of the Czechoslovak frontiers to be reached at the end of the war they will not be influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938.[37]

The Eden statement not only was premised on the validity of the agreement, but also suggested that the question of Czechoslovakia's postwar frontiers with Germany remained to be settled.[38] That the frontier was undecided may have encouraged Benes and his colleagues in the Provisional Government toward the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians on the supposition that the *fait accompli* would eliminate any justification for altering Czechoslovakia's pre-1938 borders. Undoubtedly this was not Eden's intention, yet Benes knew well the small-power tactic of forcing a desired policy on a great power by precipitous action.

Issued a month later, the statement of the French National Committee in London was more categorical than that of the British government, yet the precise legal meaning of General de Gaulle's pronouncement remains unclear. The text reads:

> . . . the French National Committee, rejecting the agreements signed in Munich on September 29, 1938, solemnly declare that they consider these agreements as null and void as also all acts accomplished in the application or in consequence of these same agreements. Recognizing no territorial alterations affecting Czechoslovakia supervening in 1938 or since that time, they undertake to do everything in their power to insure that the Czechoslovak Republic within the frontiers prior to September, 1938, obtains all effective guarantees for her military and economic security, her territorial integrity, and her political unity.[39]

The validity of the Munich Agreement was not challenged. Instead the Free French committed themselves to the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and to a return of the territories lost to Germany, Hungary and Poland.

Viewed from historical and legal perspectives, the Munich Agreement emerges as a valid international act, despite continued Soviet and Czechoslovak demands that it be declared void *ab initio*. The Soviet government in particular has made such a unilateral West German declaration a precondition for a détente in Central Europe.[40] Seemingly, the point is a moot one, yet it is fundamental to a normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and West Germany.

[37] *American Journal of International Law: Official Documents,* Vol. 37 (1943), pp. 2-3.

[38] Pergler, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

[40] *Europa-Archiv,* August 25, 1968, pp. D364-368.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SUDETEN GERMAN EXPELLEES AND THEIR CITIZENSHIP

German expellees from Eastern Europe comprise 15 per cent of the Federal Republic's population, and the government must be politically sensitive to the demands of the well-organized League of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen* — BdV) and one of its principal components, the Sudeten German Associations (*Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaften* — SL).[41] Under the leadership of Walter Becher, a member of the Christian Social Union's parliamentary group in the Bundestag, the *Landsmannschaften* have an estimated membership of over 300,000, a total exceeding that of the Christian Democratic Union. Expounding the doctrine of the right to one's homeland (*Heimatrecht*), they assert that the Sudeten Germans are entitled to recover their lost property in Bohemia and Moravia,[42] and point out that the charter of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) commits that institution to assisting displaced persons to regain their homeland.[43] The Sudeten German goal is not one of revenge or even necessarily the revision of existing frontiers; it is rather to prevent a diplomatic settlement with Prague that would abrogate all rights of former German citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic. Significantly, the *Landsmannschaften* have not associated themselves with the National Democratic Party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei* — NDP) and its condemnation of all efforts to negotiate with the Czechoslovak government.[44] On the contrary, prominent Sudeten Germans have organized in Austria academic conferences attended by Czech and Slovak scholars. Halting as discussion in such forums may be, it is still a positive step toward reconciliation.

Domestic pressures are only one reason for Bonn's rejection of the *ab initio* interpretation. The West German government still hopes one day to be able to offer its claim for restitution of Sudeten German losses as a counter to Czechoslovak demands for World War II reparations.[45] Out of concern for such a claim, Prague refuses to accept the Federal Republic's assertion that it

[41]Frederick H. Hartmann, *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 153.

[42]Theodor Veiter, editor, *Vertreibung, Zuflucht, Heimat: wissenschaftliche Ergenisse des 11. Kongresses der Forschungsgesellschaften für Flüchtlingsfragen* (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1962), pp. 18-21.

[43]United Nations, Department of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-47* (Lake Success, N.Y., 1947), pp. 810-819.

[44]"Die tschechoslowakische Republik," *Deutsche Nachrichten,* October 4, 1968, pp. 3-4.

[45]Heinrich Kuhn, "Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938 und seine Folgen," *Dokumente und Kommentare zu Ost-Europa-Fragen,* September 1968, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alone represents the interests of the German nation and insists that the Munich Agreement was never valid. Brandt's policy is one of waiting until an international conference on the German question provides a setting in which maximum diplomatic advantage can be gained from concessions on the matter of Sudeten German claims.

The refusal of the Federal Republic to declare the Munich Agreement invalid *ab initio* derives its justification from the international law of treaties as well as from a desire not to forfeit the rights of individual Sudeten Germans, whose legal relationship to the Czechoslovak state remains vague.[46] The legality of the expulsion is far from established. Assuming the initial validity of the agreement and the subsequent annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany, the majority of the Sudeten Germans were citizens of the Reich until the Czechoslovak Republic was re-established in 1945. After the German army surrendered, the inhabitants of the Sudetenland were entitled to the protection the law of land warfare affords to all those governed by a foreign occupying power. Specifically, the Second Hague Conference (1907) determined that although occupation authorities constitute a legitimate government over the territory under their control, they remain bound by the laws of the land in question (Article 43), and that "no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly or severally responsible."[47] The Italian delegation had wished to include a proscription against the expulsion of an indigenous population, but withdrew its motion when other participants pointed out the illogicality of banning an act already recognized as contrary to the law of land warfare.[48]

The Treaties of Versailles (Articles 231-232), St. Germain (Articles 177-178) and Trianon (Articles 161-162) all forbade the deportation of ethnic minorities. On January 13, 1942 nine Allied governments, including that of Czechoslovakia, condemned population transfers forced by the National Socialist regime as being "irreconcilable with the generally accepted principles of warfare as administered by civilized states and nations."[49] In his

[46]Alard von Schack, "Zum nächsten Abschnitt deutscher Ostpolitik," *Aussenpolitik*, February 1968, p. 87.
[47]U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Second International Peace Conference Held at The Hague*, 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, Document No. 444, p. 110.
[48]Otfried Nippold, *Die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz*, Part II: *Das Kriegsrecht* (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1911), pp. 19-20.
[49]Kurt Rabl, "Mass Expulsions and International Law," *Sudeten Bulletin*, August-September 1960, pp. 208-209.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study of war and international law Julius Stone unequivocally concluded that "mass forcible transfers" of enemy nationals are forbidden. Even the internment of a civilian population is a course of action open to an occupying power only in the event of a proven threat to its security.[50]

In view of the above, the question of Sudeten German citizenship between 1938 and 1945 is of decisive importance, yet it is precisely on this matter that the official Czechoslovak attitude varies with vicissitudes of the moment. In 1948 the International Court of Justice rendered a decision on a Sudeten German's claim for compensation for his property confiscated by Czechoslovak authorities during the expulsion. The Court noted that President Benes had declared all Sudeten Germans to be citizens of Germany.[51] Only Czechoslovakia's adherence to the Munich Agreement could have provided the legal basis for this position. Five years earlier, while still in London, Benes and his cabinet had asserted, "Our State has never ceased to have a legal existence and none of its citizens were relieved of their responsibilities towards it."[52] That the Sudeten Germans were included in the "citizens" category is evident from Benes' unsuccessful effort to persuade the British Foreign Office to accept September 29, 1938 as the day on which World War II began and thereby to acknowledge the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic within its pre-Munich frontiers. After 1945 the Czechoslovak government insisted that September 17, 1938 (the date of sporadic civil disturbances in the Sudetenland) be taken as the internationally recognized day on which the war began. Indeed, Czechoslovakia's reparations treaties with Belgium (March 19, 1947) and Great Britain (September 28, 1949) are based on this date.[53] If we accept the validity of the Munich Agreement and the international financial accords ratified by President Benes and then by his successor, Klement Gottwald, we cannot escape the logic that the Sudeten Germans were citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic and entitled to its protection. The expulsion was therefore wholly illegal.

Neither the International Refugee Organization nor the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg accepted Benes' continuity doctrine, and neither regarded the Sudeten Germans as

[50]Julius Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict* (London: Stevens, 1954), pp. 704-705.
[51]H. Lauterpacht, editor, *Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases: Year 1948* (London: Butterworth & Company, 1953), pp. 24-26.
[52]Benes, *Memoirs*, p. 313.
[53]Uschakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 518-519.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Czechoslovak citizens. The IRO's charter specifically excludes the German expellees from the category of refugees.[54] The Military Tribunal, in decisions rendered in 1948 and 1949, advanced the interpretation that the Sudetenland did not constitute German-occupied territory in the sense of a belligerent occupation as defined by the Hague Convention.[55] The court recognized German sovereignty over the Sudetenland from 1938 to 1945 and, by implication, the validity of the Munich Agreement. In conclusion, there can be no doubt that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak government was either a violation of the rules of war as established by the Second Hague Conference or an illegal act by a constitutionally bound regime against its own citizens. The Sudeten German problem presents an impasse that the combined efforts of the Czechoslovak and West German foreign ministries have so far been unable to overcome.

The Search for a Modus Vivendi

The founding of the Federal Republic presupposed the creation of a political force sufficient to bring about German reunification.[56] Adenauer's foreign policy sought to strengthen the integration of Western Europe and thereby to summon the support in depth essential for the success of the West German effort to induce a Soviet withdrawal beyond the Oder. This policy failed primarily because the great powers found the status quo a reasonable, if presumably only temporary, solution to the German question.[57]

Erhard understood the need for a fresh approach to the governments of Eastern Europe and renewed a diplomatic initiative aimed at rapprochement. On May 17, 1964, when the former Speaker of the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaften*, Hans Christoph Seebohm, addressed a rally in Nuremberg and called for a return to the "homeland," Erhard, who was in the United States, reacted quickly by stating:

> Today, the only direct neighbor of the Federal Republic among the East European countries is Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany toward Czechoslovakia has recently not been clear.

[54] *Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-47*, p. 817.
[55] F. Münch, "The Pseudo-Statal Regime," *Central Europe Journal*, December 1968, p. 370.
[56] Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterland Verlag, 1966), pp. 551, 675.
[57] Friedrich Brand, "Zur regionalen Analyse deutscher Aussenpolitik: Die Bundesrepublik und ihre Nachbarn," *Die neue Gesellschaft*, January 1968, pp. 67, 73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I, therefore, state explicitly and clearly: the Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn to pieces by Hitler. The German Government has no territorial claims whatsoever with regard to Czechoslovakia and separates itself expressly from any declarations which have given rise to a different interpretation.[58]

Shortly after taking office Kiesinger reiterated with emphasis his government's adherence to the Erhard interpretation and added that the agreement, which he characterized as having come into being "under threat of force," was "no longer valid."[59] The Federal Republic's position on this point is sufficiently clear that Brandt has not felt it necessary to repeat the declaration of his predecessors. He continues to build upon the policy begun by him as foreign minister: renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine (1955) which prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations with any government recognizing the GDR as a sovereign state has quietly been accomplished. The first successful West German initiative was toward Rumania, and on January 31, 1967 the two states instituted full diplomatic ties.

Alexander Dubcek's assumption of leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KPC) in January 1968 augured well for the success of Bonn's new eastern policy. Initially, the idea of exchanging diplomatic missions received little attention. Instead the Czechs and Germans concentrated on improving cultural contacts in the belief that they would produce an atmosphere favorable to a political settlement.[60] Typical of this understanding at the cultural level was an article by Jiri Hajek which appeared in the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit* on December 12, 1967. The noted Czech diplomat declaimed equally against professional anti-communists in the Federal Republic and those of his countrymen who also thrive on the hysteria of the Cold War.[61] Discontent within the Czech and Slovak intellectual communities was expressed partially in a demand for increased contacts with the nations of Western Europe.

Cultural exchanges led to a marked increase in trade between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. In 1965 Wenzel Jaksch, President of the League of Expellees (BdV) and a Social Democratic

[58]*The Bulletin* of the German Embassy, Washington, June 16, 1964, as quoted in Ferenc Vali, *The Quest for a United Germany* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 240.

[59]Vali, *op. cit.*, p. 240n.

[60]Alexander Ort, "Ist die Kultur ein Faktor der Entspannung in Europa?," *Europa-Archiv*, July 10, 1968, p. 483.

[61]Rudolf Urban, "Der verwegene Geist. Der IV. Kongress tschechoslowakischer Schriftsteller und seine Folgen," *Osteuropa*, March 1968, pp. 196-197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

member of the Bundestag, had published a report in which he called for a "Marshall Plan" in Eastern Europe.[62] His avowed purpose was to stimulate economic development in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in order to draw these three states into a close relationship with the European Communities. Improved communications were a vital feature of the plan, which incorporated a proposal for a Rhine-Main-Danube canal. An analogous canal system linking the Danube with the Elbe and the Oder remains equally attractive, so much so that Czech engineers have begun work on detailed construction plans.[63] In the wake of the events of August 20/21, 1968, these projects may appear fanciful. Yet they represent a tangible link with the noncommunist world and consequently continue to exert a strong appeal for nations whose sense of pride is, in many respects, a reaction to Western Europe's tradition of indifference.[64]

The year 1967 had begun with a West German ambassador presenting his credentials in Bucharest. During the summer Foreign Minister Brandt followed this success by sending a personal envoy, Egon Bahr, to Prague. Despite vigorous criticism of the Bahr mission and, by implication, the eastern policy of the Grand Coalition in such newspapers as the *Bayern Kurier* and the *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung* (official organ of the *Landsmannschaften*), the Kiesinger-Brandt government steadfastly pursued its policy of rapprochement. On August 3, after scarcely two weeks of negotiations, Bahr succeeded in settling the terms of a trade agreement. The Berlin clause remained a matter of dispute, but one both parties agreed to shelve. Limited to a period of two years, the agreement specified that the Federal Republic would establish a trade mission in Prague, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) one in Frankfurt. The signatories accepted the principle that their missions would confine themselves to performing consular functions, e.g., the issuance of visas. The economic impact of the agreement would have been to increase trade between the countries from $200 to $250 million a year in addition to stimulating the already burgeoning Czechoslovak tourist industry.

From the Czechoslovak perspective, the agreement's purpose

[62]Wenzel Jaksch, *Westeuropa-Osteuropa-Sowjetunion: Perspektiven wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit* (Bonn: Atlantic Forum, 1965), pp. 71-74.

[63]Gilbert von Aue, "Von der March bis an der Donau," *Politische Welt*, January 1968, p. 10.

[64]James H. Billington, "Force and Counterforce in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968, p. 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was solely to increase trade. *Rude Pravo,* the main newspaper of the KPC, noted on August 4, 1967 that the CSSR would attempt to develop its trade with all countries irrespective of their social systems. Accordingly, the negotiations signified only a limited success. They did not lay the groundwork for a political settlement, which can only be achieved when the fundamental differences between the two governments have been resolved. Radio Prague's comment was somewhat more optimistic:

> The fact that the negotiations have now ended successfully by overcoming all possible obstacles and hindrances shows that the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual advantage — which are the basic principles of Czechoslovak foreign policy — can be successfully carried out through patient negotiations.

Indicative of the problems Ambassador Bahr faced was that of determining the official designation to be used for West Germany in the text of the agreement. Instead of the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Federal Republic of Germany), the Czechoslovak foreign ministry insisted upon *Deutsche Bundesrepublik* (German Federal Republic) — a name that suggests parity with the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic) and therefore negates Bonn's claim to be the sole legal spokesman for the German nation. Notwithstanding the political implications of phraseology, one could insist that "Federal Republic of Germany" when translated into Czech becomes "German Federal Republic." Thus, the terminology is equivocal; and much the same can be said of the diplomatic implications of the agreement itself.

Nevertheless, the eastern policy of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition was making progress. As early as the fall of 1965, a survey of Czech opinion revealed that 67 per cent of a sample comprising 7,500 interviewees between sixteen and sixty years of age believed that differences dividing communist and capitalist societies need not lead to a major war.[65] The rise of the European Economic Community (EEC) so strengthened the belief in coexistence that a theory of convergence between Eastern and Western Europe became popular. Advocates of European unity through the building of supranational communities had long called for acceptance of the Eastern states either as full or associate members of regional economic organizations.[66] The economic integration of

[65]Ludwig Auerbach, "Krieg und Frieden: Zu einigen wehrsoziologischen Untersuchungen in Polen und der Tschechoslowakei," *Osteuropa,* April 1968, p. 304.

[66]Sicco L. Mansholt, "Perspektiven der EWG für Gesamteuropa," *Europa-Archiv,* May 25, 1968, pp. 355-356.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Six was growing into a countervailing force which could potentially decrease the dependence of communist governments on Moscow. The West German-Czechoslovak trade agreement was one of several that the West hoped would lead to multilateral economic arrangements such as the Jaksch plan envisaged.

Then developments in international trade engendered a reaction in the form of intensified East European mutual security arrangements. In March 1967 Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland signed a multilateral assistance pact designed to create an "Iron Triangle" as the basis for the Warsaw Treaty Organization's (WTO's) strategic concept in the northern European plain.[67] Despite the rhetoric which accompanied the signing of this pact, the Czechoslovak government appeared less than fully convinced of its utility. From October 23 to 26, 1967 Czechoslovak Premier Josef Lenart paid a state visit to France, the first of its type since 1945. While in Paris he made public a plan for a new Central European security system to include Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and possibly Hungary.[68] According to this proposal, Soviet force levels were to be reduced, both NATO and the WTO disbanded, Central Europe declared an atom-free zone, and nonaggression pacts concluded among all the states of the region. To bring about these developments Lenart wished to secure an improvement in relations between Prague and Bonn, and he intimated that a reduction in tension in Central Europe could eventually lead to a solution of the German question.

The implications of these statements could have been viewed as provocative by the Soviet Union. The idea of a Central European regional organization was strongly reminiscent of Georgi Dimitrov's ill-fated plan for a Danubian federation, and it was to prove as unacceptable to the Soviets in 1968 as it had twenty years earlier.[69] Moreover, the process of conflict resolution in the communist state system of Eastern Europe is a bilateral one involving negotiations between Moscow and the government in question. The attempted internationalization of Czechoslovak security arrangements violated the rules of the system.[70]

[67]Isaac Don Levine, *Intervention: The Causes and Consequences of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia* (New York: David McKay, 1969), p. 15.

[68]"Sicherheitsmodelle für Europa: Eine Studie des Centre d'Études de Politique Etrangère, Paris," *Europa-Archiv,* January 25, 1968, p. 57; "Chronik," *Osteuropa,* August-September 1968, p. 655.

[69]Dietrich Möller, "Der Traum von einer Donauföderation," *Aussenpolitik,* July 1969, pp. 424-431.

[70]Wolf Oschliess, "Die Tschechoslowakei nach Dubcek: Der 'verspätete' Januar," *Osteuropa,* August 1969, p. 587.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During this period the attitude of the Czech elite toward the Sudeten Germans began noticeably to mellow. In Prague the German-language newspaper *Volkszeitung* published, on February 6, 1968, an article which defended the language rights of the estimated 140,000 ethnic Germans still in the CSSR—an expression of editorial opinion unheard of since 1945. The paper added that the ousting of Antonin Novotny as leader of the Communist Party had improved the status of the German minority. By June 1968 the climate of opinion was such that there was little amazement when the prominent historian Jan Prochazka called for a normalization of relations with the German nation by recognizing the error of the expulsion. The director of the KPC's political school in Prague, Milan Huebl, openly condemned the expulsion with the statement: "By removing the Germans we destroyed our political traditions. We crossed out humane and cultural solutions in one stroke."[71]

Dubcek enunciated his government's policy on the German question when he announced, symbolically on the twentieth anniversary of the KPC's coup d'état in 1948, that he was seeking better relations with all states regardless of their social systems. The program of the KPC echoed this sentiment in April 1968.[72] A direct result of these developments was the creation of an anxious atmosphere in Moscow. The Czechoslovak response to West Germany's overtures was sufficiently positive that the Soviet Union felt its own security to be threatened.[73] Moreover, the West German elite's public support of the Dubcek government's efforts to relax political controls and to decentralize the national economy suggested to the Soviet leadership that liberalization in Eastern Europe was basically another form of German "revanchist" politics.[74]

The five-power occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20/21 received its formal justification under the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968), which defined "counterrevolution" not only as a fundamentally capitalist effort, but also as a pitfall facing all except rigidly orthodox communist parties. The doctrine is based on a concept of limited sovereignty which permits armed intervention by the members of the WTO if one of their number appears

[71] *Washington Post,* June 2, 1968.
[72] "Aktionsprogram der Kommunistischen Partei der Tschechoslowakei vom 5. April 1968," *Europa-Archiv,* July 10, 1968, p. D303.
[73] Jens Hacker, "Konstanten in der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik," *Osteuropa,* May-June 1968, pp. 424-425.
[74] John R. Thomas, "U.S.-East European Relations: Strategic Issues," ORBIS, Fall 1968, pp. 755-757; Philip Windsor, "Die Grenzen der Detente in Europa," *Europa-Archiv,* June 10, 1969, p. 381.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

overcome by "counterrevolutionary" forces.[75] A corollary is the WTO declaration of October 31, 1969, to the effect that Article 2 of the United Nations Charter still applies and therefore provides a justification for Soviet intervention in the Federal Republic whenever political circumstances there warrant.[76] International legal arguments notwithstanding, there is little doubt that strategic concerns have created a new militancy among the Warsaw Pact states. Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz announced on August 31, 1968 that the occupation of the CSSR was essential in order to prevent the exposure of the WTO's southern flank.[77] The East German government elaborated on this view by pointing out that the WTO was compelled to take military measures in Czechoslovakia as a means of preserving the balance of power in Central Europe and of preventing a revision of the territorial status quo – an event which would have meant war.[78]

Prospects

The present political situation in Czechoslovakia suggests that the Federal Republic's eastern policy is overly ambitious in that it encourages the premature development of liberal forces which are then crushed by the Soviet Union. On April 17, 1969 Dubcek was ousted from his position of leadership in the KPC, and fifteen months later he was formally expelled from the party itself. In his place is the Slovak nationalist Gustav Husak, who has reassured Moscow and its allies by reversing his predecessor's policy of rapprochement with the Federal Republic. Characteristically, the present Czechoslovak government has fully endorsed the Brezhnev Doctrine and its use against "counterrevolutionary" elements in the KPC.

The prospects for future West German-Czechoslovak negotiations are, however, not without hope for a revision of the status quo which the Ulbricht regime in Pankow seeks so desperately to preserve. Adenauer's eastern policy presupposed a static communist social order that permitted little flexibility in dealing with

[75]Boris Meissner, "Die 'Breshnew-Doktrin,'" *Osteuropa,* September 1969, p. 639; Robin Alison Remington, "Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact," *East European Quarterly,* September 1969, pp. 330-332; Alexander Uschakov, "Die militärische Intervention in der Tschechoslowakei und das Völkerrecht," *Europa-Archiv,* November 10, 1968, pp. 776-778.

[76]Heinrich Bechtoldt, "Zur Ostpolitik der neuen Bundesregierung," *Aussenpolitik,* November 1969, p. 642. Article 2 authorizes preventive action against member as well as nonmember states even if the threat to international peace should arise from internal political developments.

[77]Wolfgang Wagner, "Europäische Politik nach der tschechoslowakischen Krise," *Europa-Archiv,* September 25, 1968, p. 653.

[78]Bernd Hartmann, *The Events in the CSSR in the Light of Marxism* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1968), p. 50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the governments of the Soviet bloc. Brandt has recognized that internal change in Eastern Europe necessitates a new approach, one which places a high value on negotiations for their own sake. The technical problems that impeded the launching of diplomatic missions in the past no longer exist.[79] Within three months after he took office, Brandt's emissaries were actively seeking solutions to long-standing problems by conducting negotiations in Moscow and Warsaw. Predictably, Bonn also showed a readiness to open a dialogue with Pankow.

On February 25, 1970, during a debate on the budget in the Bundestag, Brandt declared: "The foreign policy of my government is primarily European, but not only West European. We seek to orient it toward all of Europe." West German public opinion, heavily influenced by such interest groups as industrialists seeking increased trade in Eastern Europe, appears ready to accept important compromises in the interest of a détente. The question of recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier is no longer one of principle, but of diplomatic advantages to be gained through propitious timing. Similarly, a settlement of Sudeten German indemnity claims and a joint West German-Czechoslovak declaration on the Munich Agreement are secondary to the efforts of both states to achieve a reconciliation.

The national interest of the Czechoslovak state posits the establishment of a Central European security system, which necessitates a diplomatic settlement with the Federal Republic. As late as March 29, 1969, Dubcek had publicly expressed interest in an accord with West Germany. His removal from the leadership of the KPC three weeks later may well have been a Soviet-inspired reaction to this nascent attempt at reviving the trend toward rapprochement. As Dubcek's successor, Husak adheres to a policy of caution on the German question, but he has not failed to keep the lines of communications open. Notably, the West German trade mission remains active in Prague.

The Czechoslovak concept of a desirable security system is one that will receive the support of both the Soviet Union and the United States. In particular, the Czechs fear the exclusion of American influence from Central Europe and the possible simultaneous rise of West Germany to a position of dominance among the continental Western allies.[80] Franz-Josef Strauss' pro-

[79]Hans Buchheim, "Aussenpolitik und Planung," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* June 1968, p. 266.

[80]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, p. 266.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

posal for the creation of an independent Anglo-French-German nuclear deterrent force is precisely the kind of development the Czechoslovak government dreads. Should Brandt's eastern policy fail, Strauss might succeed in making foreign policy the decisive issue in the German parliamentary election of 1973. Undoubtedly the Husak regime is aware that a rejection of Brandt's overtures would result in a polarization of opinion in the Federal Republic and the possible defeat of the Social Democratic Party in critical electoral contests. The outcome of the five *Land* elections of 1970, including that in North Rhine Westphalia, is an important consideration to policymakers in Prague.

West Germany is responding to Czechoslovak vacillation by stressing a concept of Europe, not from the Atlantic to the Urals, but from the Atlantic to the Vistula. The new Europe would constitute a security community rising out of a proliferation of East-West contacts similar to the West German-Czechoslovak trade agreement of 1967.[81] The government has not forgotten the ultimate goal of reunification, but it has realistically indicated a readiness to exchange the ideal of the nation-state for a relaxation of political and economic controls in East Germany.[82] Bonn hopes to stimulate liberalization in the CSSR in order to provide a model for the East Germans to emulate. Yet Brandt has failed to clarify the manner through which he hopes to attain this goal. If his method requires the disruption of the WTO, the Soviet Union will only tighten her control over the alliance.[83] Accordingly, diplomatic representations in Moscow by Brandt's principal adviser on East European affairs, Egon Bahr, are essential if the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia are to achieve a reconciliation.

For their part, the Czech and Slovak nations have not forgone their tradition of resistance to tyranny. Germans on both sides of the Berlin Wall look upon the force of nationalism within the CSSR as capable of weakening the pattern of totalitarian control in East Central Europe and thereby creating conditions leading, if not to reunification, to the end of dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic. As in the past, the fate of the German nation depends upon the will of the Czechs and Slovaks to resist oppression.

[81]Hans Dichgans, "Europa von Spanien bis Polen: Die geographischen Grenzen Europas," *Europa-Archiv*, April 10, 1968, pp. 235-240.
[82]Rainer Waterkamp, "Politische Optionen für die Europa — und Deutschland — Frage," *Aussenpolitik*, January 1968, p. 27.
[83]Karl Kaiser, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der tschechoslowakischen Krise von 1968," *Europa-Archiv*, May 25, 1969, p. 359.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY: THE LIMITS OF REFORM

by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic

BECAUSE of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet armed forces, the liberalization attempt by the regime of Alexander Dubcek seems in retrospect to have been based on naïve romanticism. Given Czechoslovakia's domestic circumstances, however, there was nothing naïve in pursuing a reformist platform. Policy changes were introduced (1) to arouse managers and workers from the lethargy of the Novotny era in order to achieve an improvement in the social and economic situation of the country, and (2) to gain the support of the masses in order to consolidate the new regime against the Stalinists in the party. While in eight months the Dubcek government had too little time to achieve significant results toward the former objective, it was successful in the latter. Only after half a year of Soviet occupation was Moscow able to restore the neo-Stalinists to power. The naïve element of Dubcek's reformism thus was to believe that the Soviet Union would tolerate the transformation of a communist party into a *de facto* socialist democratic party.

Czechoslovakia as well as other countries of the Soviet-led "socialist commonwealth" has been experiencing a protracted crisis since the mid-1950's. The Dubcek regime offered to solve or at least ameliorate this crisis by trying to reform the communist system. We will explore here the origins of this bold experiment and the power-political and ideological problems caused by it.

The Search for a New Political Model

The significance of the Czechoslovak liberalization experiment lies in the fact that the nature of the communist system of government was inadvertently put in question by the Czechoslovak communists themselves. It was at the special Central Committee Plenum Meeting of February 1967 that the politically delicate question of the role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) in a changing society was brought into the open; the Central Committee took note of the declining influence of the party and decided to appoint a research team to prepare a New Political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Model whereby interest groups could participate in the decision-making process. While the model was never put in practice by actual changes in the political structure, a diminution of the party's radius of power nevertheless took place. In the process of discussing reforms, freedom of the press was established, political opposition clubs outside the framework of the system began to flourish and were tolerated, and parties which had been adjuncts of the Communist Party began to assert themselves in the National Assembly for the first time in twenty years. In short, by the spring of 1968 Czechoslovakia had moved from a program of modest reform proposals to a national political renaissance.

Essentially, the search for a New Political Model was the consequence of the party's failure to lead the country to economic progress; it was an attempt to adjust the system to the social and economic needs of society in a "technotronic"[1] age. Beyond the quest to humanize the existing regime —"socialism with a human face" was the slogan of the intellectual movement of 1968—it ventured to bring about basic reforms of the system, by means of a new distribution of power within the society.

In their political experimentations party leaders were restrained by three factors: the paramount consideration of maintaining themselves in power, the ideological implications of reform which could change the nature of the party, and the Soviet influence. In the end, the CPCS reforms were canceled by the Soviet intervention of August 1968; but variations of the Czechoslovak political model are likely to reappear in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, for the process of change can be contained only temporarily. The developments in Czechoslovakia prior to the Soviet invasion preview what could be the long-term evolution of the ruling communist parties in other European countries.

In the twenty years between the 1948 communist coup d'état and the Soviet military intervention of 1968, the style of rule of the CPCS evolved from an assumption of party infallibility, stressed even after the demise of the era of Stalinist terror,[2] to promises to correct past mistakes, and finally to an attempt to bring about

[1]A word coined by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, signifying an advanced stage of technological development. See his new book, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technotronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1970).

[2]For the initial effects of de-Stalinization, see the author's *Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia* (New York: Praeger, 1960). As late as 1963, Party Secretary Antonin Novotny tried to defend the infallibility line by answering to critics, "If the party had not been right, it could not have been the Communist Party." Victor A. Velen, "Czech Stalinists Die Hard," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, p. 327.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

real political reforms. The only partly de-Stalinized party of the early 1960's ruled inefficiently and wastefully. It failed to improve the people's standard of living. The principal reason for this failure, besides mismanagement, was the regime's burden of international obligations. If the party had been able to put the national interest before the international interest of the Soviet Union, it could have accomplished some of its domestic economic tasks. But while in the Stalinist era the CPCS had been the collector of tribute to the Soviet Union, in the 1960's it began to have to pay economic and military tribute to Soviet interests in the Arab countries, North Viet Nam, Cuba, and assorted African countries. These additional obligations greatly taxed the national economy. The CPCS hoped to alleviate the resulting discontent by introducing economic reforms and to improve the country's situation by sharing some of its economic responsibility with interest organizations. It was soon discovered, however, that economic reforms in themselves could not assure the regime's success. Political changes had to follow. The party had to ask itself exactly what its role was in modern society. This was a most pertinent question, for the gulf between the CPCS and the nation was growing.

The New Political Model and the Party's Monopoly of Power

Until the party leadership's qualitative change into a patriotic force, brought about by its defense of the national interest against increasing Soviet pressures in the spring of 1968, the CPCS had no "proletarian" national ethos. It had, instead, a twenty-year record of rule subservient to an alien power. Beginning in the early 1960's, proposals had been made and theoretical models for political change had been debated by intellectuals who were not part of the power structure. But in 1967 the party crossed the Rubicon by carrying this debate into its own circles. Under the umbrella of constructing a New Political Model, different reform concepts were advocated. To the avid reformers in and out of the party, this meant first of all containing CPCS power by way of a freely elected parliament representative of independent political parties. It was from the midst of the youth organization that the idea of a genuine multiparty or biparty system was first voiced as the correct form for true democratization.

The more moderate reformers, in contrast, strove for represen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation of interest groups rather than an independent multiparty system. They felt that such interest groups as the managerial class, the economic research centers, the youth organizations, the trade unions and the association of farmers were economically important, and thus it was inopportune to treat them as negative forces. The moderates' rationale in their quest for a new role for the party was that if the interests of various social groups were permitted to assert themselves institutionally, this would not deprive the CPCS of its mission to run the country. On the contrary, it would be given a new objective: to serve as the moderator of group aspirations. The party would, it was hoped, become the purveyor of the total national interest, which would be put together from all the conflicting, fragmentary group interests. The new system would allow different groups to reason and argue with the party, in a give-and-take process, upon which the CPCS would make up its mind what course of action would be best for the government to take. Far from being an obstacle to party supremacy, the new model was supposed to make it easier for the CPCS to manage the country efficiently. The cost-effectiveness specialists of the socialist society tended to ignore the political implications of reforms and looked primarily at one criterion — efficiency — when favoring the New Political Model.

Neo-Stalinist opponents of the model's implementation feared that the planned concessions would gain their own momentum. They viewed with alarm commentaries by radical reformers, appearing in the press, that the party was not qualified to defend the interests of society as a whole. The older, status quo-oriented generation of party members had actually favored a great debate only to allow steam to escape from the social pressure cooker.

The CPCS' recognition of its own limitations, and tolerance of some members even questioning the principle of the party as the leading force, created an atmosphere of high expectations among the population. Party leader Alexander Dubcek did not have much choice about whether to initiate political concessions if he wished to establish a popular base for himself. But the CPCS, unwilling to give up its monopoly of power, preferred to upgrade the role of the National Assembly rather than to permit the formation of an independent political party system; in character with its total power, the party could always turn on and off the activity of the parliament. After January 1968, the state apparatus, whether executive or legislative, was permitted more autonomy. While the government structure remained a vehicle of the party's supreme

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will, it was nevertheless a separate organizational entity and had the potential of developing into a new power center.

The CPCS hoped to act as the harmonizer of various interests in the National Assembly. But to do this, it would have to assume a quasi-Olympian detachment, and could not continue to be committed to ideologically-based social concepts like the irrational preservation of the collective farm system, which had retarded agricultural progress. Thus one could not expect the party to go much beyond such concessions as occasionally desisting from tight leadership over the National Assembly. Any power-political abstinence would have been out of the question for Dubcek or any other party reformer.

If the institutional revolution had been permitted to take place it might have produced a corporate state system applied in the context of a socialist economy, where the National Assembly would have become the representative of economic interest groups. Just as Mussolini's fascism had not compromised its power by using interest organizations to aid the system in technical and economic matters, so it was believed by some that the CPCS would not have much to fear if it shared power, mostly of a technical nature, with interest groups and experts from professional organizations. The reformers argued that a distribution of power in selected sectors of national life could result in economic and social improvements.[3] This is why convinced communists advocated a New Political Model for the country.

Had Czechoslovakia been left alone by the Soviets, the New Political Model would have signified the introduction of civil rights into the system to satisfy the general longing for liberty, and the establishment of a socialist corporate state to satisfy economic interest groups.

The practical question was how much power the CPCS could afford to relinquish in the control of the economic sector without ceasing to be the leading force in the country. The Leninist principle of the leading role of the party in society was still a normative one. In the 1950's to question this norm would have been preposterous, since everyone knew what the role of the party was — it was to have total power "to build socialism." Yet after twenty years of the CPCS' grip over the country, some party functionaries, seeing the lack of economic progress, began to question

[3]Zdenek Mlynar of the Law Commission of the Central Committee of the party felt that group conflicts were natural and should be allowed political expression. See his "Problems of Political Leadership and the New Economic System," *World Marxist Review*, December 1965, p. 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether the proper role of the party in the new socialist society was to rule. Many felt that the CPCS should concentrate on overall ideological leadership rather than on running the entire state apparatus. The instinct for preservation of power would not allow the leaders to accept such counsel. Their quandary was that the minimum popular consensus which had become essential, in the absence of terror, could only be achieved by devising a system of sharing power with nonparty organizations. While articles mentioning the party's duty to render accounts to the whole nation represented an attempt to win popular respectability, the CPCS showed little inclination to start some system of formal accountability to the people; it wanted merely to terminate its own isolation.

Under Dubcek, the party succeeded in reaching the people. It was able to preserve its monopoly of power in the face of reformist pressures because it assumed the popular role of the defender of the national interest against Soviet interference. Nationalism became the unifying factor within the CPCS, and between the party and society. But the search for a truly New Political Model for the country was an arduous one, for the CPCS was willing to adapt to the new social situation only in a marginal way. If it had adapted fully, it would have ceased to be a communist party and would have become a social democratic type of party — a development that would have been more fitting to Czechoslovakia's national tradition and to contemporary social realities.

Ideological Problems

The CPCS, as we have noted, was restrained in its quest for political reforms by the primary consideration of maintaining itself in power, by the ideological implications of reform, and by Soviet influence. Relinquishing some power involved the danger of losing that share of power one intended to keep. The CPCS' readiness to reform the system led to ideological confusion about the proper party role. But the preservation of ideological unity had to be guarded, for it was essential for sustaining the party's cohesion. The reformers' departure from orthodox ideology was motivated by the pragmatic consideration of establishing a relevant relationship between the party and the population rather than by any premeditated desertion of Leninism.

This interrelationship of ideology and power was often overlooked by Western observers, owing to the widespread view

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that ideology was becoming less important to the regime. But despite the corrosion of ideology since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its function as an instrument for maintaining discipline — the key to party unity — remained crucial. The socialist constitution of the Czechoslovak state could be amended, but the regime's ideological core could be tampered with only at the risk of the party losing power over its members and eventually over the nation.

While in the past dogmatic adherence to ideology had been essential for the party's inner unity, it had also impeded improvement of the party's relation to society. Neither the Leninist principle of the absolute primacy of the party in the state and society nor the Marxian precept of proletarian internationalism had the acceptance of the workers or other segments of the Czech and Slovak population. These two concepts were nonexistent as values outside the party. The CPCS' search for a new role was a necessity if it wanted to represent the whole nation. Thus the ideological interpretation of Marxism became broader and broader. The central problem was that if the CPCS inclined fully to the sentiments of the people on the issue of party primacy and proletarian internationalism, it would cease to be a communist party. Yet if it continued to adhere dogmatically to these concepts it would fail to adjust to the social and political reality of the national conscience, with the consequence that it could not mobilize the energies of the nation to build a viable system.

The party's gradual abdication of responsibility over matters of economic development and the new concept of sharing power with interest groups necessitated careful ideological explanations. Among other things, ideology was the index by which the Soviet Union could judge whether the CPCS was still a communist party or had already become something else.

If the trend toward decentralization of power had continued, the Leninist ideology of the leading role of the party would have had to be scrapped, and this in turn would have signaled changes in the political sphere. Moscow, during the New Economic Policy of the mid-1920's, had avoided this qualitative change of system simply by terminating the policy. But the possibility was remote that the CPCS would have reversed its reformist policies in the absence of the Soviet invasion. The policies suited the anti-authoritarian temperament of the nation.

There was an ideological loophole of considerable magnitude in the Marxian conception of the party which the reformers could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use as a justification for changing its role in society. The sovereignty of the party over the working class and the whole nation was not a Marxian concept. Marx and Engels never considered the party as a vanguard or elite leading the working class. They stated in the *Communist Manifesto* that communists were not a special party in comparison with other workers' parties and represented no special principles by which the proletarian movement was to be molded. Marx clearly opposed any totalitarian spirit in the communist movement by stipulating that his and Engels' entrance in the secret communist society was on condition that everything which would foster authoritarianism had to disappear from the statutes.[4] While Lenin transformed the party into an elite vanguard and instrument of total power, he never went so far as to claim that it could not make mistakes, but rather admitted that mistakes could not be avoided in fulfilling the party's objectives.

The developments in Czechoslovakia marked a reversal from Lenin's concept of a tight-knit party controlling all facets of society to Marx and Engels' concept of a looser organization. The old-timers in the CPCS clung to Lenin's principles, while the reformers cited either Marx or Engels to justify their positions ideologically. We were witnessing a historical playback — first, away from the Stalinist principle of party infallibility to the Leninist admission that the party makes mistakes, and finally to a retreat from the Leninist principle of tight control and leadership, back to Marx and his conception of a party sharing power with other groups of workers' organizations. This could ultimately have ended in oblivion for the CPCS. The party was aware of these dangers; at the CPCS Congress of 1966 it was found necessary to stress strong party leadership in the economic sector.

Marx served as a helpful ideological guideline. Since no organization enjoys losing power, the communists had at least some consolation in the fact that Marx did not envision a strong party. The CPCS, however, if it was ready to abandon Lenin, was not really embracing Marx. In its new role of moderator between interest groups and classes, it assumed a decidedly un-Marxian function. While it was about to fulfill the Marxian vision of a party that would not dictate to the working class, it would by acting as national moderator violate the Marxian concept of a party

[4]Marx/Engels, *Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Kautsky und andere* (Moscow: Verlagsgenossenschaft Ausländischer Arbeiter in der UdSSR, 1933), from Wolfgang Leonhart, *Soviet Ideologie Heute* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer, 1962), p. 35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

representing the interest of one class only. The CPCS tried to counter this contradiction by claiming that there were no class interests in Czechoslovakia — only "interest groups"— since the country was already in the stage of building socialism.

It was not the Czechoslovak people who asked the CPCS to be the moderator between various sectors of national life; thus neither historically nor ideologically, from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, could the CPCS claim to be a moderator between proletarian and bourgeois interests. To be viewed by the nation as a genuine moderating force between the different interests of workers, managers, farmers and other occupational groups, the CPCS would not only have had to permit these groups to express freely what they aspired to, but also would have had to fulfill some of their fundamental desires. These groups wished for less state power and less party interference in the life of the nation and the personal life of the individual. On this question the CPCS could not moderate, for it was directly involved; if it had done so, it would have had to scrap the political system it had introduced in the 1948 coup d'état.

The party was in an acute dilemma: if it really wanted prosperity and sound economic development, it would have to abdicate most of its power. It could not keep supreme power and improve the economic system unless it gained the managers and experts to its side. But even so, the experts would have changed the character of the party until it ceased to be a communist party and became an organization of power-holders which the state would ultimately absorb. Thus it would appear that, had there been no Soviet intervention, the evolution of society in Czechoslovakia would have caused the party gradually to wither away.

The CPCS had indeed lost its ideological *raison d'être,* for other organizations could better perform the unifying and democratizing function the party claimed as its new province.[5] If the nation wanted the continuation of the socialist system, the socialist parties of Czechoslovakia which had freely existed before 1948 could undertake the task of socialization in a more democratic way. But in the spring of 1968 the CPCS appeared to have a new utility for the nation. While it had previously been devoid of a national mission because it was dominated by Moscow, under Dubcek it started on the way toward independence. It could have become

[5]Jan Fojtik, "The Meaning of the Activity of the Communist Party," *Rude Pravo,* July 20, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the interlocutor between the interests of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The CPCS' leading role could have served as insurance against Soviet intervention, had Soviet foreign policy accepted Czechoslovak national communism as a force with which to coexist or had the Soviet leadership adhered to its own congresses' platforms. It was not Dubcek who deviated from the Soviet Communist Party's resolutions, but rather Soviet leaders who scrapped the concept of different roads to socialism as well as their own pledges of noninterference in the affairs of socialist countries.

The Soviet Imperial Impact

While the relationship between the Soviet Union and the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is officially based on the principle of equality and mutual noninterference, nevertheless there were three rules that canceled this principle long before the Brezhnev Doctrine was enunciated. Moscow insisted that the communist parties within the so-called socialist commonwealth had to maintain (1) the primacy of the party; (2) the preservation of the socialist system; and (3) adherence to the precept of proletarian internationalism (a euphemism for allegiance to Moscow). The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was a typical preventive intervention, for the country did not violate any of the above rules. At most one could maintain that eventually the primacy of the party would have been endangered.

The Soviet Union had several options. She could approve of the liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia and adopt a similar course for the whole Soviet empire, hoping to ride the crest of the liberalization wave and preserve the socialist commonwealth intact. Or she could quarantine Czechoslovakia and cope with two dissenters, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, within the Warsaw Pact system. Or she could arrest the process of independence by intervention, as she had done in the case of Hungary.

One could argue convincingly that a Czechoslovakian system based on popular consent might in the long run have been more important to the security of the Soviet Union than the restoration of Moscow's absolute power over Czechoslovakia. But Soviet leaders apparently had their own "domino theory" apprehensions about the spread of reformist communism. The master-vassal relationship was a more comprehensible model for the unsophisticated Soviet leaders to follow. Yet, if Moscow should in the future strive to establish closer relations with Western Europe, it would not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

need Czechoslovakia as a vassal state. Such a system in Eastern Europe makes sense only if the Soviet Union is bent on further expansion. The most likely areas for Soviet expansion are the Middle East and the Balkans.

In the absence of an overall Soviet imperialistic policy, a true normalization of Moscow's relations with the West would be feasible. In this case a satellite regime in Czechoslovakia would not be necessary. An independent Czechoslovakia would not be hostile to the USSR, for friendly relations would automatically result from good Soviet relations with Western Europe. And since it should be important to the Kremlin to promote harmonious interchanges with an economically powerful Western Europe, the USSR would have acted in self-interest by leaving Czechoslovakia to her own fate. This would have strengthened the Soviet Union's image as a reasonable power; she could have achieved a true détente with the West and would have been able to concentrate on her hostile neighbor in the Far East.

The Soviets observed with apprehension as the democratic traditions of Czechoslovakia began to surface. In 1968 they noted the negation of the basic principle of the party — the monopoly of power — by the CPCS members themselves; it had taken twenty years for the dialectical process to assert itself. The question of the nature of the party's leading role progressed to the question whether there remained any use for the party in society. The Soviets believed, and perhaps rightly so, that the CPCS would eventually cease to be a communist party and would become a social democratic party. Instead of adjusting to this trend in the spirit of the Twentieth CPSU Congress' concept of the permissibility of different roads to socialism, the Soviet Union preferred the classical imperial way: to change reality by force.

We were thus witnessing in parts of Central and Eastern Europe a dual decay: of the supremacy of communist parties and of Soviet influence. The tragedy of the reformers of the CPCS was that they were searching for a new role for the party in order to save it at a time when Soviet leaders were worried about the decay of their power in Eastern Europe and in their own country. By invading Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union postponed the dismemberment of her empire for perhaps another decade. But the new generation of communists (not to mention nonparty citizens) will certainly not become Leninists or loyal subjects of the Soviet commonwealth at the point of bayonets.

The Soviet invasion was intended to force a new Communist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party upon Czechoslovakia. In this objective it succeeded, but it defeated its purpose in adding a new dimension to the crisis of the Czechoslovakian political system: the struggle against domestic Stalinism broadened into an anti-imperialistic struggle. The intervention implanted hatred in the population against the Russians, which historically had never been there. When the Chinese colossus starts to encroach on Soviet borders in Asia, the question of Eastern Europe's loyalty will become important. By opting to invade Czechoslovakia the Soviets may have impeded the evolution of Europe to the Urals, but in the long historical view Moscow's imperialism will make it more difficult for the Soviets to find a friendly Europe when from the East another design may be developed: that of China to the Urals.

The concept of a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe is obsolete politically and militarily. A belt of vassal-type states in Central and Eastern Europe can hardly protect the Soviet Union's security if her imperial posture results in a military buildup of her potential enemies in the West and East. Thus if we ask whether it was necessary or worth it for the Soviet Union to occupy Czechoslovakia the question must be answered in the negative. It can be answered affirmatively only if one considers the interests of Soviet reactionary communism. From the standpoint of the national interest of the Soviet state the occupation of Czechoslovakia was a blunder. Besides creating fourteen million new enemies for the USSR, it awakened a mutual concern among Western capitalist countries, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Communist China directed toward resisting "The New Russian Czars"— to use the current Chinese terminology.

The highest stage of Soviet communism has become imperialism. But the decay of communist systems cannot be halted by an imperial policy. The Czechoslovak Communist Party's search for a new role heralded a humanistic reformation, which would eventually have swept over the Soviet orbit of influence. In the sense of protecting Soviet despotism, the Soviet invasion was a rational decision. For the time being the battle for reformation has been lost in Czechoslovakia. The next struggle for reforming the communist system may take place in Moscow itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

by George D. Damien

EVENTS in the Chinese People's Republic are a puzzle to the Western world. "There is no major political system about which we have less data and fewer meaningful facts than that of Communist China," according to the noted Sinologist Lucian W. Pye.[1] The *New York Times,* in a long editorial significantly entitled "The China Mystery," indicated its perplexity at Mao's dialectical system of wall posters to purvey "information," and acknowledged that it was unable to understand the meaning of conflict-development in China.[2] A few days later the *Times* reported, drolly, that "Soviet diplomats [in the United States] have been asking our American specialists on Chinese affairs in recent months to learn more about what is going on in China."[3]

At a news conference at Bergstrom Air Force Base, the then Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, corroborated the inability of our responsible elite to understand the happenings in China: "These events in mainland China are obviously of the greatest importance. We ourselves don't know what they mean." To mitigate this somewhat distressing admission, he added, "But that does not embarrass us, because Mao Tse-tung obviously does not know what they mean either."[4] But Mao Tse-tung does, indeed, know what they mean, because he is the organizer, the pilot and the controller of conflict-development in China.

I

How can the pragmatic logician understand the intricacies of the Chinese communist mind when he is ignorant of the functional microstructure of the communists' dialectical mode of thinking and reasoning? No wonder the logical West is mystified when this peculiar and elusive mode of reasoning is translated

[1]"Coming Dilemmas for China's Leaders," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1966.
[2]January 18, 1967.
[3]January 22, 1967.
[4]*Ibid.,* January 27, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into a political philosophy of *becoming*—of perpetual conflict-development through endless syntheses of contradictions.

The first gross error is to mistake communist *ideology* for the communist dialectical mode of thought. Although a functional similarity and correlativity exist between them, they are two different things. The second deplorable mistake is to overlook the fact that any communist regime, be it Chinese, Soviet or Yugoslav, is pre-eminently a philosophy in action, wherein dialectics is applied to politics and international relations.

Communist leaders *understand* and *communicate* with formal logic, but they *reason* with dialectics. A noncommunist understands, communicates and reasons only with formal logic. Therefore, a noncommunist logician cannot comprehend the intricate conflict strategy of the dialecticians in Peking and Moscow unless he first knows the functional structure of the dialectical mode of thought and reasoning, and accepts as normative the concept that "*conflict is the essential form of progress.*" In the case of China, one should add to the natural Asian predilection for the dialectical mode of thought, which Orientals consider superior to static, formal Cartesian logic, the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung —an elaborate system of dialectical conflict thinking based on the philosophy of contradictions inherent in conflict-development.

Mao's political civilization is creating a new, dialectical species of men, born in conflict, living in conflict, developing in conflict. Mao's new man is one who thinks dialectically, whose mentality is specifically adjusted to the visualizing of dual, ascending and descending, categorial conflict-development as the essential law of human progress; and this mentality is totally alien to the West.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) is a valuable empirical illustration of Mao's political philosophy of contradictions in action. This philosophy proclaims that "conflict is the essential form of progress in human society" because it is "a scientific law of natural development." But why is conflict the essential form of progress to Mao Tse-tung, and what is the "scientific justification" for this normative concept?

There are in nature two kinds of motion, that of organic matter and that of inorganic matter. The dialectical mind considers living matter the essential, the supreme form of progress. From the strictly materialistic point of view, life is defined simply as "the motion of matter. . . . The unique characteristic of living matter is its uninterrupted, simultaneous, and inter-effective creating [liv-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing] and destruction [dying]."[5] Thus the tangible evidence that conflict-development is the essential form of progress is said to be provided by the dialectical interplay of life and death. "No physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as the essential element of life," and "living means dying."[6] If one accepts "living means dying" as a basic biological law, one must also accept as an irrefutable scientific truth that the physiological conflict-development between vitality and mortality is the essential form of progress for organic matter. Given life as the supreme form of progress, conflict-development is its paradigm, an absolute normative concept, a basic law.

With respect to the motion of inorganic matter, one need not be a physicist to understand that in the physical world anything that moves meets resistance—a phenomenon called friction. Dialectically, mechanical motion—which Engels called *vis viva* (living force)—disappears "in friction and impact, which differ only in degree. . . . Motion has been transformed into qualitatively different forms of motion, into heat, into electricity, into forms of molecular motion. . . . Friction is chronic impact, and impact is acute friction."[7] In this process quantity (repeated impacts) becomes quality (friction generates heat). As chronic impact, friction is destructive of matter, i.e., of the bodies in motion; and at the same time it is constructive—creative—since a new form of energy (heat or electricity) is produced.

In brief, if one accepts Engels' "motion means friction" as a basic law of atmospheric physics, one must also accept as an irrefutable scientific truth that the mechanical conflict-development of motion and friction is the essential form of progress of inorganic matter. It cannot be otherwise, since the transformation of mechanical motion into heat and electricity, which reflects progress, is inconceivable without friction.

Since the motion of both organic and inorganic matter is a process of conflict-development, the dialectical mind conceives conflict-development in both nature and human society as the essential form of progress. To the dialectician this is not a fanciful statement but a basic law, a scientific truth demonstrated by biology and physics. The real meaning of the communist philosophy of contradictions lies in the Marxist-Leninist concept of "organic correlativity"—functional dialectical complementarity—

[5]M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, *Handbook of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1949), p. 67.
[6]F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 110.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 300.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between man and nature. "If man wants to achieve success in his work," wrote Mao, "to achieve the anticipated results, he must make his thoughts correspond to the laws of the objective world [nature] surrounding him; if they do not correspond, he will fail in practice."[8]

II

Philosophically defined, communism is *"the motion of thought in opposites"* translated into a dialectical unity of mental and physical coercion; the motion reflects the functional micromechanism of dialectical conflict reasoning, while the unity of mental and physical coercion goes through various stages of the dual ascending and descending conflict-development that characterizes the relations between ruler and ruled.

In democracies, politics is pre-eminently an art, one of the most interesting of a free society's public activities. To the dialectical mind, however, politics is "scientific communism"—political materialism, or the philosophy of conflict-development as the essential form of progress. As such, it is the most important activity in a communist society. It is primarily conflict-development, because politics without enemies is "a metaphysical harmony" that simply does not exist. Furthermore, politics involves command and obedience, since it presupposes ruler and ruled. It is a dialectical process of "cooperation in dispute," of "friend becoming enemy" and vice versa. Therefore, the key to political power is the dialectics of command and obedience. Any malfunction of this intricate micromechanism produces conflict between ruler and ruled. "Politics is our foundation . . . politics should be put in command in every part of our work . . . politics should play the role of the supreme commander . . . the military should serve the political."[9]

To Confucius, the relationship between ruler and ruled was like that between the wind and the grass: "When the wind blows, the grass must bend." In the philosophy of conflict, command is

[8]Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), I, 283-284.

[9]Chief Lin Piao, Minister of National Defense, to the Administrative Council of the Military Affairs Commission (second telephone conference, December 30, 1960), cited in *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army,* edited by J. Chester Cheng (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), p. 36. This is a translation of *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun,* a secret military journal which came into the possession of the United States a few years ago. It is a voluminous compilation of documents glorifying Mao's dialectical thought as the sole normative mode of thinking and reasoning of the Chinese Army, and emphasizing that the life, indoctrination and training of the People's Liberation Army should proceed in accordance with that thought.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"motion in opposites," for it is both constructive and destructive at the same time. When command generates obedience, it is constructive. It sets in motion the complementarity micromechanism of command and obedience and the functional unity of the two components is translated into cooperation between ruler and ruled. But when command generates disobedience, it destroys that mechanism and sets in motion ascending conflict-development between ruler and ruled. That is why coercion, mental or physical, is a dialectical and functional corollary of command; command without coercion is like a gun without ammunition.

Consequently, in dialectical thought the operational definition of command is coercion-with-purpose. Coercion-with-purpose is efficiency; all the more so when the purpose is said to be a "historical necessity." Political power, translated into command, becomes coercion for the purpose of generating obedience. But obedience is not static. Like coercion, it is a complex, pluridimensional social motion, and both are constantly in a state of change. As coercion-with-purpose, command can increase the conflict intensity between ruler and ruled. Just as "living means dying," coercion means conflict-development, for coercion is collision in motion (since it is chronic impact), and on occasion it becomes acute friction. "The class struggle in the ideological field between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in China is a protracted and tortuous one which, in time, can even be very violent."[10]

In his famous speech on the functional structure of conflict-development between ruler and ruled, entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," Mao Tse-tung states unequivocally that

> Contradictions among people . . . are the very forces that move our society forward. Many people refuse to admit that contradictions still exist in a socialist society, with the result that when confronted with social contradictions they become timid and helpless. They do not understand that socialist society grows more united and consolidated precisely through the ceaseless process of correctly dealing with and resolving contradictions.[11]

To Mao, the universality of conflict-development means the universality of contradictions. "There is nothing that does not

[10]Editorial, "Study Mao's Speech Delivered at the National Propaganda Work Conference of the Chinese Communist Party," in *Liberation Army Daily* (Peking), June 22, 1966.

[11]Speech delivered to the Supreme State Conference in Peking, February 27, 1957; official text not published until June. *The New Leader,* Section 2, September 9, 1957.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contain contradictions; without contradictions, there would be no world."[12] Why? Because there are

> contradictions within the working class, contradictions within the peasantry, contradictions within the intelligentsia, contradictions between the working class and the peasantry on the one hand and the intelligentsia on the other, contradictions between the working class and other sections of the working people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other, contradictions within the national bourgeoisie. . . . Contradictions exist between the government and the masses. These include contradictions between the interests of the state, collective interests, and individual interests; between democracy and centralism; between those in positions of leadership and the led, and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain state functionaries in their relations with the masses.[13]

In the Communist Party, and in any communist society, this ubiquitous conflict-development between ruler and ruled is not unusual or catastrophic, but a normal and constant phenomenon with a variable coefficient of intensity. According to Mao, "Within the party, opposition and struggle between different ideas occur constantly; they reflect in the party the class contradictions between the old and the new things in society." Also, "If in the party there were neither contradictions nor ideological struggles to solve them, the party's life would come to an end."[14] Other dialectical thinkers have said the same thing: "The concept of socialism as a society of absolute harmony belongs to utopians,"[15] and "Socialism does not eliminate contradictions as a source of motion and progress. It subdues their obstructive and destructive aspects."[16]

The main purpose of Mao's Cultural Revolution is precisely to subdue the obstructive and destructive aspects of contradictions between ruler and ruled—i.e., to restore the command-obedience complementarity mechanism by reversing categorial conflict-development from ascending to descending.

As early as August 1937, when Mao wrote his philosophical précis "On Contradiction," which explains the operational structure of his dialectical conflict thinking, he set forth the esoteric stages of conflict-development in the following terms: "The basic

[12]Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *Selected Works*, II, 19.
[13]"On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
[14]"On Contradiction," *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[15]"On Contradictions in Our Development," *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), No. 9, 1966, p. 17.
[16]"The Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites—Nucleus of Dialectics," *ibid.*, No. 12, 1966, p. 114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contradiction in the process of development of a thing . . . will not disappear until the process is completed; but the conditions of each stage in the long process of development of a thing often differ from those of another stage." According to Mao,

> at the various stages in the long process of development, the basic contradiction assumes an increasingly intensified form. Besides, among the numerous big and small contradictions determined or influenced by the basic contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially solved or mitigated, and some emerge anew. Consequently, the process reveals itself as consisting of different stages.[17]

The stages, or categories, of conflict also reflect the complementarity micromechanism of command and obedience. Conflict-development by stages, betokening the structural developments of an uninterrupted revolution, has been officially corroborated by Li Fu-chin, member of the Chinese Politbureau and Chairman of the State Planning Committee: "We advocate both the doctrine of revolutionary development by stages and the doctrine of uninterrupted revolution."[18] In his Report to the National People's Congress on "Drafting the 1960 State Economic Plan," Li Fu-chin again emphasized: "We are constantly bringing about rational solutions to contradictions . . . according to the Marxist-Leninist principle elaborated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung of combining the doctrine of uninterrupted revolution with the doctrine of revolutionary development by stages."[19]

III

The operational microstructure of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is reflected in the following six categories or stages of simultaneous ascending and descending conflict-development between ruler and ruled:[20]

(1) In the stage of *unity,* the functional complementarity of

[17]"On Contradiction," *op. cit.,* p. 28. In this explanation, the "basic contradiction" is conflict-development; "big contradictions" reflect stage five, the reciprocal negation of views between ruler and ruled, and "small contradictions" reflect stage two of low-tension differences of opinion and multiform progressive reticence between ruler and ruled; "some [contradictions] become intensified" means that increasing conflict intensity reflects the ascent to a higher stage of conflict-development; re-emergence of contradictions illustrates the oscillation of intensity between the stages of ascending and descending conflict-development.

[18]"Red Banner Bearers Who Carry Out the General Line," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking) and Hsinhua (Chinese News Service), February 28, 1960.

[19]*Jen-min Jih-pao* and Hsinhua, March 30, 1960.

[20]Cf. the analytical diagram of Sino-Soviet and East-West categorial conflict-development in my article "On the Philosophy of Contradictions: The Sino-Soviet Dispute as a Case Study in Communist Conflict Thinking," ORBIS, Winter 1968, p. 1216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commanding and obeying reveals an identity of views (cooperation) between ruler and ruled transcending microcontradictions which do not affect collaboration; the obedience component registers the collective conformism of 700 million Chinese with Mao's millions of party cadres.

(2) The stage of *difference* reflects low-tension differences of opinion between leaders and administration; a multiform progressive reticence develops between ruler and ruled, with fortuitous effects on cooperation.

(3) The stage of *disagreement* reflects divergence of views between ruler and ruled with perfunctory effects on cooperation but perceptible malfunction of the complementarity between commanding and obeying; it represents the first psychopolitical syndrome of the people's deteriorating conformism with party bureaucracy.

(4) The stage of *opposition* reflects intense hostility and greatly reduced cooperation between ruler and ruled. This category of conflict-development indicates serious malfunctioning of the command-obedience mechanism and a rapid deterioration of collective conformism.

(5) The stage of *contradiction* reflects reciprocal negation of views between ruler and ruled, resulting in nullifying incompatibility and virtual noncooperation; the complementarity of commanding and obeying becomes intermittent and collective conformism is in a state of disintegration.

(6) The last stage, *conflict,* contains microcomponents of cooperation, but reflects total hostility and precludes any form of practical collaboration; the complementarity between commanding and obeying has disappeared and collective conformism is destroyed.

None of these six stages is a static category of conflict. All are in a state of *becoming.* That is, they are in motion or change, since there is an uninterrupted dialectical interplay between unity, difference, disagreement, opposition, contradiction and conflict.

Furthermore, an increase in coercion intensity generates important self-complementary dialectical effects which illustrate the functional correlativity between the ascending and descending plateaus of categorial conflict-development. This reversibility is dialectical because it occurs at different moments in any of the six stages, or during the transition between any two stages. Dialectical reversibility also means that ascending conflict-development as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"one," or a whole, "divides into two," and becomes both ascending and descending at the same time. This motion in opposites is evinced by the fact that certain people have greater powers of resistance to coercion than others, who in turn have a more highly developed instinct for self-preservation. In terms of the Cultural Revolution, the intensification of coercion increases the acceleration between ascending stages of conflict for those cadres with greater powers of resistance, while for others it speeds conflict de-escalation: party and administrative cadres with less powers of resistance will immediately conform to the newly created situation and obey all orders.

Thus, as events in China from 1966 onward have amply demonstrated, for some leaders such as Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, as well as for various cadres and certain strata of the population, the categorial conflict-development was ascending, and reached the highest plateau of the conflict cycle. At the same time, for others it was descending to the lowest stage, unity, i.e., cooperation with the ruler. Today, with the intervention of Mao's People's Army, the Red Guards and the militia (coercion in motion) the categorial conflict-development is gradually descending for everyone, and Mao appears again as the indisputable master of China.

The perpetually ascending and descending stages of conflict-development characterizing the relations between Mao, his party bureaucracy and the Chinese population in general, and the dialectical structure of the GPCR in particular, may be roughly compared to the mechanical ascent and descent provided by escalators and elevators for customers in a large department store. Many people use escalators or local and express elevators to ascend to upper floors; simultaneously, other escalators and elevators are taking people down. While some passengers go up to the top floor, just as certain Chinese leaders and cadres have reached the highest stage of conflict-development between themselves and Mao, others may "reverse" this ascent, stop in between, go back to the "second or third floor" by escalator, then take an elevator and rapidly descend to the "main floor." This up-down movement of customers is somewhat similar to the dialectical motion in opposites illustrating the process of ascending and descending conflict-development.

IV

According to Mao, "the remolding of the intellectuals remains a question of major significance throughout the course of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socialist revolution."[21] Cultural conflict-development—"remolding the thinking" of intellectuals—has proceeded without interruption in China since the early 1950's. The complexities of this "dialecticization" of minds have been commensurate with the increase of coercion involved in imposing Mao's thought on the intellectual elite. In 1964, the campaign to explain and stress the primacy of dialectics reached new heights as symposia were organized to discuss the dialectical law of "one divides into two" and the pseudo-dialectical teaching of "two combine into one." From 1964 to 1967 the "theoretical preparation for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was translated into an unprecedented glorification of Mao's thought, with utmost emphasis on the "imperative necessity" to learn dialectics and understand how and why "one divides into two."

In 1966, for example, the most authoritative Chinese dialectical journal, *Zhexue Yanjiu (Philosophic Research)*, devoted its voluminous second issue to explaining the "extraordinary and historical importance" of Chairman Mao's dialectical thought. According to the *Peking Review* of May 20, 1966, "Under the heading 'One Hundred Examples Illustrating the Law of the Unity of Opposites,' *Zhexue Yanjiu* printed 100 reflections, all throwing light from different angles on the basic law of the unity of opposites." Nineteen of these examples were published in five installments in *Peking Review*.[22] The concept most dwelt upon was "one divides into two," and the importance ascribed to this normative dialectical law is illustrated by some of the *Zhexue Yanjiu* headlines: " 'One Divides into Two' Applies to All Things in the World"; "To Fight the Heavens, One Must Understand How 'One Divides into Two' "; "Doing Business in the Light of 'One Divides into Two' "; and so on.

Since the logical mind finds such expressions incoherent, and perhaps indicative of *dementia dialectica,* a brief explanation of Mao's odd formula to describe the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites is in order. Given the normative concept of conflict as the essential form of progress, and the GPCR as an illustration of its operational mechanism, Mao's enigmatic tenet is merely the Chinese construction of Lenin's famous *"razdvoenie edinogo"*: "The division of the one and the cognition of its contradictory parts . . . is the essence . . . of dialectics."[23] And what

[21] *Peking Review,* June 6, 1969.

[22] Nos. 21 to 25 inclusive, May 20 to June 17, 1966.

[23] V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), XI, 81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does this mean? Simply that everything is in motion; motion is change; change is difference within identity; and when something is identical to and different from itself, there is contradiction—i.e., conflict-development.

The dialectician regards concepts not as static, abstract components of human thought, but as concrete processes. Thus, cooperation, revealing unity or identity of views between ruler and ruled, should be visualized as "motion in time and space." Time in this case refers to the duration of the process of cooperation, and space to the area involved, which can range from socio-economic to cultural, political, military. Again, the unity revealed between ruler and ruled is not static, but is in a state of "becoming." It changes with the passage of time, as the quality and areas of cooperation increase and/or decrease in accordance with the intensity of coercion exerted by the ruler upon the ruled. These changes in the operational command-obedience complementarity micromechanism reflect the different stages of conflict-development.

Not all Chinese dialecticians—party theoreticians or the academicians to whom Mao refers as "doctrinaires"—have understood completely the intricate and elusive micromechanism of "one divides into two." Some, like Yang Hsien-chen, former President of the Higher Party School of the Central Committee, began as early as November 1961 to lecture on an alternative doctrine, "two combine into one."[24] According to information provided by *Hongki* (*Red Flag*) and other theoretical party journals, Yang's lectures proved him a pseudo-dialectician who did not understand how and why "one divides into two," since he gave "a logical interpretation" of the law of the unity of opposites—his premise being that since opposites are said to unite, and since there are always two of them, it follows that "two combine into one."

It is difficult to form an objective judgment on this philosophic controversy without reading at least one of Yang's lectures *in extenso*. But the doctrine of "two combine into one," as explained by *Hongki*, is wrong, and has nothing to do with dialectics. Opposites do not unite or combine into one, nor can the contradictions between them be reconciled or combined into one. For example, as "one," a piece of iron changes under atmospheric conditions; it "divides into two," becoming both iron and rust; thus there is difference within the identity of iron. The contradiction

[24] "A New Debate on the Philosophical Front," *Hongki* (Peking), No. 16, 1964.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or conflict-development is empirically visible and tangible. It demonstrates that both opposites, iron and rust, are in a state of dialectical becoming reflecting their unity and struggle. This unity is pre-eminently dialectical and cannot be mechanical, because the inorganic matter called "iron" has changed and at the same time remained the same. If the doctrine that "two combine into one" were true, it would be possible to take rust and amalgamate it with iron; but even if one glues rust to iron, one cannot obtain a dialectical unity of difference within identity, i.e., rust within iron. The iron that changes and yet remains the same reflects the motion of inorganic matter; thus "one divides into two" reflects the conflict-development (struggle) between iron and rust as the essential form of motion, or progress. For sooner or later, if no precautionary measures are taken, the conflict-development between identity (iron) and difference (rust) will end with the disappearance of the iron. That is why contradictions, in terms of conflict-development between them, cannot be reconciled, but only resolved. The same is true of cooperation between ruler and ruled, if precautionary measures—mental and physical coercion—do not reverse the categorial conflict-development from ascending to descending and thus restore the operational complementarity micromechanism of command and obedience.

Reconciliation of contradictions implies mutual concessions, and, therefore, logical and commonsense thinking imbued with Christian ethics to end the conflict-development. In the light of dialectical materialism or objective dialectics, conflict-development never ends, for it is the essential form of progress. "Reconciliation" of contradictions, whether antagonistic or not, is impossible. That is why the dialectical mind speaks of "resolution of contradictions," which means self-criticism. Resolution of contradictions, embodying confession of wrongs by the ruled and recognition of the ruler's thesis as the right one, is a dialectical process of "destructive construction": by destroying himself through self-criticism, one "reconstructs" himself by accepting the party's thesis. As such, resolution of contradictions is a case of dialectical reversibility in conflict-development.

From 1961 until 1964 Yang Hsien-chen taught his doctrine of "two combine into one." Then, after a symposium sponsored by *Hongki* on August 21-24, 1964, "with the participation of many cadres and students of the Higher Party School," he was dismissed from his positions as president of the school and senior

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lecturer in dialectical philosophy, on the grounds that "he did not understand, and therefore could not explain" the functional structure of Mao's dialectical conflict thought.[25] *Hongki* compared Yang to Bukharin, who was liquidated by Stalin because he too did not understand dialectics. Quoting Lenin's letter about Bukharin, who "has never studied, and I think he has never fully understood dialectics," Stalin said: "Thus he [Bukharin] is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. . . . You can well understand, Comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn . . . that he is a theoretician who has not yet fully assimilated dialectics—and dialectics is the soul of Marxism. . . ."[26]

What *Hongki* did not say is that Stalin applied "mechanical destruction" (execution) in Bukharin's case, while Mao applied "dialectical negation" (destructive construction) in the case of Yang. So far as is known, Yang was "destroyed" economically by being deprived of his livelihood, but there remained the possibility of his "reconstruction," provided he changed his way of thinking. Mao's policy of "destructive construction" is part of the functional structure of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It provides that intellectuals in Yang's category "should be allowed to correct their errors and be encouraged to make amends for their crimes by good deeds, unless they are anti-party, anti-socialist elements who persist in their errors and refuse to correct them after repeated education."[27]

V

Governing hundreds of millions of Chinese is a monumental task. Even the problem of ensuring their daily bread generates chronic malfunctioning of the command-obedience complementarity micromechanism. However, such malfunctioning is more than evidence of major, permanent conflict-development between ruler and ruled. Since it reflects the unique social, administrative and technical complexities of the rudimentary Chinese system of food production and distribution, it also points up the successes and failures Mao and his administration have had in trying to solve vital economic problems with primitive means. Evidence shows that food production is one of the impulses for setting the Cultural Revolution in motion; at the same time an increase in

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 276.

[27] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, reprinted in *Peking Review*, May 5, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

food production is one of the principal goals of that revolution. According to the sixteen-point "Decision" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of social productive forces in our country. Any idea of counterposing the great cultural revolution against the development of production is incorrect."[28] In the Central Committee's special letter of February 20, 1967, Mao called on Chinese peasants "to take firm hold of the revolution and promote production conscientiously."[29]

In Mao's philosophy, coercion is the most powerful and the most rewarding form of social development, since it regulates, guides and controls the relations between ruler and ruled with almost mechanical precision. It does so because, being preeminently dialectical, it destroys and at the same time restores the operational complementarity of command and obedience, which is the *conditio sine qua non* of Mao's political power. Mao's Cultural Revolution is, therefore, coercion in motion. This is demonstrated by the effects of coercion intensity on the Chinese party bureaucracy and people.

There is an absolute functional correlativity between command, as coercion-with-purpose, and coercion as conflict-development. Command is a form of mental coercion, implying threats. The mere presence of a gun frightens some people and makes them obey; others will not obey until the gun is actually fired at them, i.e., when coercion becomes physical. A great many men tend to rebel under coercion, and to disobey the orders of the ruler. But obedience can also be "destroyed" by endless instances of "mal-obedience"—not disobedience, merely inefficient implementation of orders. Commands poorly implemented because of incompetence, or carried out sluggishly because of bureaucratic indifference, are in effect, though not admittedly, disobeyed.

Communist bureaucracy is characterized by what I have called "decisionism"—the fragmentation of decisions through interpretation by many department heads. Such fragmentation leads to confusion, and confusion to inefficiency, a form of mal-obedience. Decisionism causes malfunctioning of the command-obedience mechanism, for it tends to destroy the cohesive and simultaneous

[28]"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese People's Republic Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," adopted August 8, 1966 (*Peking Review*, August 12, 1966).

[29]*Peking Review*, February 24, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

character of various government activities. It contributes to the disruption of unity (cooperation) between Mao and his multitudinous bureaucracy. Mao then resorts to coercion (disciplinary measures, dismissal of cadres) in order to destroy decisionism and restore the efficient implementation of orders. This coercion, however, creates new contradictions between ruler and ruled. An increase in coercion intensity generates a psychological chain reaction. Cadres and population move from lassitude (physical and mental) through incertitude and anxiety to fear. This complex syndrome destroys the will of the people to disobey or mal-obey, and leads to resignation, which takes the form of collective conformism. Nevertheless, cooperation between ruler and ruled is only a temporary dialectical unity; the struggle, or conflict-development, between commanding leaders and obeying cadres and/or populace is constant.

Mao's coercive power, as illustrated by the Cultural Revolution, is impressive, for its functional components constitute an unprecedented *vis viva*. In peacetime, according to Western military experts, the armed forces of a nation represent, on the average, between one and two per cent of its total population. If the People's Liberation Army (PLA) represents even one per cent of the total population of China, Mao and Lin Piao have at their disposal a military force of 7,000,000 men. To this must be added the people's militia, or police forces, which are said to number some twenty-five million well-armed, well-trained men and women, as well as the secret political police. Nor should it be forgotten that Mao controls a powerful propaganda machine, which exerts efficient mental coercion on the party bureaucracy and the population through newspapers, the radio, and the unique dialectical poster system that can be used to "inform by misinforming."

Mao also has the Red Guards, which evolved after the General Political Department of the PLA was assigned the task of increasing membership in the Youth League "to about 65 per cent of the youth in 1961."[30] By demographic standards, the youth of a nation represents 23 to 25 per cent of the total population. Therefore, Red Chinese youth comprises some 175 million individuals, and 65 per cent of that number amounts to 113,750,000 young people. Several million of them have been selected for political education, guidance, control and indoctrination by the General Political Department of the PLA. Known simply as "members of

[30]*The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit.*, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the China Youth League" in 1961, the millions selected for training by the army are now called *Hung Weiping* (Red Guards). They constitute a potential new army for Mao, and have already been used to promote the Cultural Revolution.[31]

On February 22, 1967, the Congress of the Red Guards in universities and colleges in Peking adopted a "Declaration." Significant excerpts include: "The Red Guards . . . are a political shock force, showing a dauntless revolutionary rebel spirit. . . ." "We, the Red Guards, are the firm and reliable reserve force of the People's Liberation Army. . . . The great invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung is our guiding thought."[32] From the "Declaration" of the Red Guards' Congress in Tsinan, Province of Shantung, come such statements as: "Our oath is, 'We would rather shed our blood and break our necks than discard Mao Tse-tung's thought! . . ." "The Red Guards are a strong and dependable reserve force of the People's Liberation Army. . . ." "The revolutionary Red Guards are Chairman Mao's Guards and young red soldiers."[33]

The West ignores the fact that the Red Guards are a paramilitary organization representing a multimillion-member coercive force adroitly manipulated by Mao and Lin Piao. Although Western press reports speak of them as "hoodlums," implying lack of control, the Soviets have noted that "Instructors of the PLA have been guiding the actions of the *Hung Weiping,* leading them in frontal assault on party and state agencies."[34]

VI

To understand how coercion both destroys and restores the operational complementarity of command and obedience, it should be borne in mind that the power of resistance varies throughout the bureaucracy and the population in general.

Coercion is functionally ubiquitous. Its intensity is threefold: vertical, horizontal and diagonal. Vertical coercion intensity originates with Mao, the Politbureau and the Central Committee, and descends to central departments, party committees and ministries; horizontal coercion originates in ministries and central departments and spreads through administrative and party cadres all

[31]See *ibid.* for valuable information about their indoctrination and military training.

[32]*Peking Review,* March 10, 1967.

[33]Hsinhua, May 12, 1967.

[34]*Pravda,* March 11, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the country; diagonal coercion originates in administrative and party cadres and is exerted directly on the population.

As Mao's *vis viva politica,* coercion destroys unity and develops unity; by creating contradictions it destroys contradictions, and by destroying obedience (collective conformism) it restores obedience. Thus the coercion intensity mechanism of the Cultural Revolution also illustrates Mao's conflict thinking: an increase in coercion intensity operates as a dual dialectical process, at the same time "destructively constructive" and "constructively destructive" of Mao's political power.

What does destructive construction mean, and how can destruction be constructive? The answer, though apparently complex, is actually rather simple. Consider, first, destructive construction. An increase in coercion intensity is *destructive* because, while it eliminates the resistance of some, it destroys the obedience of others (unity, or cooperation between ruler and ruled) and sets in motion an ascending categorial conflict-development between them. *Construction* results because only coercion, mental or physical or a synthesis of both, is instrumental in the dialectical process of changing disobedience into obedience, and thus restoring the command-obedience mechanism. The greater the coercion intensity, the lesser the ability to resist and disobey orders, and therefore the faster the process of reversing conflict-development from ascending to descending. In other words, by reducing the resistance of the Chinese party bureaucracy, the cadres, and the population in general, an increase in coercion intensity develops Mao's power; for him it becomes a "construction" of power, in terms of a gradual restoration of the command-obedience complementarity mechanism.

As for constructive destruction, it is *constructive* because an increase in the intensity of mental and/or physical coercion restores the obedience component (collective conformism) in party cadres and population; it is termed *destruction* because an increase in coercion intensity destroys (i.e., resolves) the contradictions between ruler and ruled and sets in motion a descending categorial conflict-development leading to a new functional unity between them. "Chairman Mao teaches us that destruction means criticism and revolution; destruction comes first, and construction comes in the course of destruction."[35] "Criticism" is mental coercion, and "revolution" is physical coercion. Thus, by being de-

[35] *Liberation Army Daily,* April 11, 1967, as quoted in *Peking Review,* April 14, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structive of popular resistance, coercion becomes constructive, restoring obedience "in the course of destruction."

It is interesting to note that Mao remains close to Lenin in his usage and justification of coercion, in spite of Soviet propaganda claims to the contrary. Since revolution is justified, coercion, which is the living soul of revolution (i.e., conflict-development), is *ipso facto* fully justified. Here again, Lenin's justification for the use of coercion is pre-eminently dialectical, since the very concept of coercion is a dialectical paradigm.

> As an unsurpassed dialectician, V.I. Lenin did not proclaim as absolute a single form of the class struggle, including armed insurrection. He indicated that under particular historical conditions, other forms besides armed struggle can and will be used, that is, peaceful forms of implementing the revolution. Of course, the peaceful development of a revolution by no means excludes the use of force; in both cases (peaceful and non-peaceful) it will be a revolutionary struggle meaning coercion. . . . What can differ are the forms of coercion, peaceful and non-peaceful, the selection of which depends on the concrete historic conditions. . . . The tactics of the revolutionary struggle demand from the communist parties flexibility of the dialectical approach in assessing the situation, an adroit and timely recourse to the different (peaceful and non-peaceful) forms of struggle. . . .[36]

As a dual dialectical concept, coercion is both *potentia,* motion in rest, or power that generates results without action, and *potestas,* power in action. *Potentia* is mental coercion, a "peaceful form" of implementing revolution (in this case the GPCR), while *potestas* is physical coercion. Since one of the purposes of the Chinese Cultural Revolution is to increase agricultural and industrial production, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued two letters inviting peasants and workers to increase production in their respective fields. Both letters give tangible proof of how mental coercion (*potentia*) operates as a dialectical process of "destructive construction," and compels an increase in production; at the same time, the letters illustrate the extraordinary efficiency of so-called peaceful forms of implementing the revolution.

On February 20, 1967, the Central Committee "invited" Chinese peasants to "take part in the spring cultivation" in order to increase agricultural production. The letter, addressed to "poor and lower-middle peasants and cadres at all levels in rural people's communes all over the country," also stated that "landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists,

[36] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*) (Moscow), November 5, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

former cadres removed from office . . . must diligently continue to reform themselves through labor, under the supervision of the poor and lower-middle peasants." It continued, "at the same time, we . . . recommend that *units of the People's Liberation Army stationed locally, and military organizations at all levels, should make great efforts to support and help with the work of spring cultivation.*"[37] (Emphasis added.)

A month later, on March 18, the Central Committee addressed a letter to "the revolutionary workers, the staff and revolutionary cadres in factories, mines, and enterprises throughout the country," inviting them to "stimulate production at the present stage," and again decreed the presence of Chinese military units: "The Party Central Committee has decided that the People's Liberation Army should make a great effort to help the civilians and should support their work in industrial production."[38] The idea was, as *Hongki* explained clearly, to "Make revolution a motive force to develop production, and place revolution [coercion] in command of production."[39]

Units of the PLA—not to mention the militia in the millions—are everywhere in China, and their presence in field and factory is visible evidence of how the application of mental coercion stimulates production. It also illustrates how coercion, as *potentia,* destroys the resistance of peasants and workers and restores the command-obedience complementarity mechanism (destructive construction). The mere presence of army, militia or Red Guard units constitutes a "peaceful form of implementing the revolution"—in strict accordance with Lenin's teaching.

There are endless examples illustrating how the Cultural Revolution functions as coercion in motion. On February 25, 1967, *Jienfangjun Bao* (*Liberation Army Daily*) published an elaborate editorial on how to implement the "Directive to the Army to Give Localities All-out Assistance and Do a Good Job in Spring Farm Work," issued on February 23 by the Military Commission of the Central Committee.[40] On March 19, Chou En-lai, addressing a meeting of peasant representatives in Peking, said: "Many members of the Peking garrison have been sent to assist you with the spring farming. . . . They are best in the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works, and with their help

[37] *Peking Review,* February 24, 1967.
[38] Hsinhua and *Jen-min Jih-pao,* March 18, 1967.
[39] *Hongki,* March 22, 1967.
[40] *Peking Review,* March 3, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . you will study Chairman Mao's works . . . better."[41] On March 22, *Jienfangjun Bao* posed a rhetorical question: "How shall we assist factories, mines, and other industrial enterprises in grasping revolution and stimulating production?," and answered it thus:

> The essential thing is for us to assist them politically and ideologically, and arm the minds of the working masses and revolutionary cadres with Mao Tse-tung's thought. . . . The People's Liberation units stationed in Shenyang, Wushi, Chungking, Harbin, and other cities have dispatched a great number of cadres and army men to local industrial and mining enterprises with the purpose of assisting them in grasping revolution and stimulating production.

On the same day Hsinhua reported that "the propaganda team of Mao Tse-tung's thought dispatched by the army command in Shenyang visited more than 160 factories, mines, and other industrial enterprises during the past few weeks." On April 20, *Jienfangjun Bao* reported that "in people's communes outside Peking, the commanders and fighters have given much attention to helping the poor and lower-middle peasants and cadres solve all kinds of problems" by presenting the peasants with

> many copies of Chairman Mao's works, booklets of quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung's writings, and portraits of Chairman Mao. Together with these peasants the army men studied Chairman Mao's works and propagated among the peasants the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the Communist Party's policy and principles.

There is no doubt that the Liberation Army's "support and help" are pre-eminently political. It has been clearly stated that "The Army must not only cooperate with local authorities in controlling agriculture, but also in controlling industry";[42] and that "The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution."[43]

Mao's power is also strengthened by a political phenomenon generated by the Cultural Revolution—the policy of the "revolutionary three-in-one combination." This is a new dialectical unity in which the three main components of Mao's power of coercion, the army, the Red Guards and the militia, are considered to be complementary. The PLA is already deeply involved in Mao's bureaucracy, and will for years to come condition the functional structure of the administrative and party apparatus of Communist China. Under the new three-in-one combination, representatives

[41] Hsinhua and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 20, 1967.
[42] *Hongki*, Issue No. 8, 1967.
[43] *Peking Review*, February 3, 1967, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the army, the Red Guards (semi-army) and militia (still another form of army) will constitute the commanding nucleus of Mao's cadres.

> At various levels, in those departments where power must be seized, representatives of the armed forces or of the militia should take part in forming the "three-in-one" combination. This should be done in factories and rural areas, in financial, trading, cultural, and educational departments (universities, middle schools, and primary schools), in party and government organizations, and in people's organizations.[44]

Consequently, the fervent representatives of Mao's army and militia will be ubiquitous, controlling and guiding every public activity in the Chinese People's Republic, from primary schools to academic, rural, industrial and financial institutions. "They should and can play the role of nucleus and backbone of the organ of power. . . . Representatives of the armed forces should be sent to the county level or higher, and representatives of the militia should be sent to the commune level or lower."[45] The "lower level" extends the militia's control to the smallest and most remote villages in China.

"Revolutionary Committees" reflecting the new dialectical three-in-one alliance were immediately formed, and committee leaders from Shanghai municipality, the new Peking municipality, and the provinces of Shansi, Kweichow, Heilung-Kiang and Shantung met with Mao.[46] In 1969, "Revolutionary Committees" were formed in all Chinese provinces.

Does this mean that the Cultural Revolution has come to an end? Certainly not, since the revolution is a functional component of the categorial conflict-development which is the essential form of progress between ruler and ruled. According to Lin Piao, "the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . is very great indeed. But we must in no way think that we may sit back and relax. Chairman Mao pointed out in his talk in October 1968: 'We have won a great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle. . . . Therefore, we cannot speak of final victory. Not even for decades.' "[47]

To Mao, the solution of the many socio-economic and political problems in China cannot be found in, or visualized as, a static expression of a given momentum; it can be found only in "becoming," i.e., in the revolutionary transformation of the socio-eco-

[44] *Hongki,* reprinted in *Peking Review,* March 12, 1967.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Peking Review,* April 28, 1967.
[47] Report to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking, April 1, 1969, *Vital Speeches,* June 1, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic and political regime. And this should be a guided motion, in terms of conflict-development between ruler and ruled. Thus, problems and their solutions are conceived of as temporary, "perishable" products of the uninterrupted conflict-development between Mao, his party bureaucracy, and his 700 million subjects. In other words, ascending and descending categorial conflict-development generates constantly new problems and at the same time new solutions.

It should once more be emphasized that the main purpose of the GPCR is to restore the collective conformism of cadres and population as a new unity between ruler and ruled—the *conditio sine qua non* for increasing production and strengthening Mao's power. Point Five of the Central Committee Decision Concerning the GPCR clearly stressed Mao's certainty that "by the end of the movement, we shall achieve the unity of more than 95 per cent of the cadres and more than 95 per cent of the masses."[48] The seventh issue of *Red Flag,* as reported by Hsinhua on July 3, 1970, officially proclaimed that

> after four years of the GPCR . . . our Party has now become stronger and more purified, more united, and more vigorous than ever before. . . . The GPCR, personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao, is a movement of open-door party consolidation carried out through revolutionary means. It is unprecedented in scale, the broadest and most thorough-going party-consolidation movement in the history of our party.

Besides strengthening his political power and the structure of the Communist Party in China, Mao wants to demonstrate that, as a conflict-control development, the Cultural Revolution is a functional component of progress and a brilliant illustration of the "dialectics of inner-party contradiction." The *Red Flag* proclamation echoed Lin Piao's statement that "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the most broad and deep-going movement for party consolidation in the history of our party."[49] "Party consolidation" is, indeed, the greatest progress that communists can achieve through revolution. As Mao explained the process:

> A human being has arteries and veins through which the heart makes the blood circulate, and he breathes with his lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen, that is, getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh. A proletarian party must also get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, for only thus can it be full of vitality. Without eliminating waste matter and absorbing fresh blood, the party has no vigor.[50]

[48] *Peking Review,* August 12, 1966.
[49] Report to the Ninth Congress, *op. cit.*
[50] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lin Piao added: "With this vivid analogy, Chairman Mao has expounded the dialectics of inner-party contradiction. 'The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics.' "[51]

Consequently, according to Lin Piao,

> opposition and struggle between the two lines within the party are a reflection inside the party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the party and no struggles to resolve them, and if the party did not get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, the party's life would come to an end. Chairman Mao's theory on inner-party contradiction is and will be the fundamental and guiding thinking for the consolidation and building of the party.[52]

So immensely important was Mao's dialectical thinking that three days after the explosion of the first Chinese H-bomb (June 17, 1967), this historic event fell almost into oblivion. On June 20, the People's Republic of China began celebrating, with unprecedented solemnity and a fanfare of propaganda, the tenth anniversary of Mao's historic speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." Peter J. Kumpa, Hong Kong correspondent of the *Baltimore Sun,* reported:

> So heavy has been the volume of praise for Mao's thesis that the celebrations over China's first successful hydrogen bomb explosion have been pushed aside. The entire essay has been published in all Chinese newspapers. All radio stations have laboriously read out every word of the ten-year-old document, taking well over two hours.[53]

All the rumors and opinions in the West about Chinese convulsions, disintegration, fragmentation, chaos and civil war cannot change the fact that Peking exploded an H-bomb in June 1967. Had those fanciful reports been true, it would have been quite impossible for the Chinese to increase their agricultural and industrial output and to detonate both an atomic and a hydrogen bomb within the six months between December 1966 and June 1967. But the Western pragmatic logician finds it nearly incredible that such results can be achieved under conditions of "revolution"—the symbol of disorder and near-chaos. Such achievements presuppose the existence not only of order, but of meticulous scientific and technical coordination and organization. How could order and organization be maintained in Sinkiang Prov-

[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Baltimore Sun,* June 21, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ince, where the 1967 nuclear explosion took place, when it was reported in the West to be "occupied by a Chinese general who was Mao's enemy"? Among the names mentioned was that of Wang En-mao, military commander of Sinkiang. Certainly order and organization could not be present if, according to Henry Gemill, Washington correspondent of the *Wall Street Journal,*

> China may be breaking into fragments. A world that has never felt comfortable seeing two Chinas . . . may before long be dazed by three, six, or more than a dozen Chinas. This analysis and forecast . . . is gaining currency among senior Sinologists and high officials in the U.S. government. . . . Disintegration of [Communist China] is already far advanced and perhaps beyond the point of return.[54]

Robert Keatley, Hong Kong correspondent of the same newspaper, wrote: "Maoism is dead. That blunt, simple statement contains for most Sinologists here the essential truth behind the confusing power and policy struggle raging in communist China."[55] *Homines in quod volunt credunt.* Julius Caesar was right: men believe what they wish to believe. To which I will add a remark by Tacitus: "One believes more easily what one does not understand."

Many people in the West today believe China is in a state of disintegration because they do not understand the intricacies of the philosophy of contradictions. Since in this philosophy "contradictions are a natural, permanent phenomenon inherent in nature and society,"[56] the Chinese Cultural Revolution (a complexity of contradictions between ruler and ruled) is a natural phenomenon in Mao's society. A convinced mind is a dormant mind; it is reluctant to think. Such a mind will accept any empirical evidence adroitly introduced by Mao's system of the motion of information in opposites regarding the situation in China. The Chinese nuclear achievements and the successful indoctrination of millions of Chinese youths attest to the vitality of Mao's regime. They constitute objective evidence that ignorance of the functional structure of dialectical reasoning precludes comprehension of the fact that in Mao's conflict strategy the Cultural Revolution, as offensive, is *par excellence* defensive, and actually strengthens his regime. In the light of Western logic and common sense this is nonsense, since "offensive" is the negation of "defensive," and the two opposites cannot be true at the same

[54] *Wall Street Journal,* January 30, 1967.
[55] *Ibid.,* February 7, 1967.
[56] "The Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites—Nucleus of Dialectics," *Novo Vreme, op. cit.,* p. 108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time: the revolution may be either offensive or defensive, but it cannot be both.

Mao's Cultural Revolution has important implications for U.S. foreign policymakers. Communist China is developing into a new socio-economic and political civilization, in which Mao's philosophy of contradictions is the motivating factor. The revolution is actually modifying the peripheral strategy and security system of the United States in Southeast Asia. As a guided conflict phenomenon, it is being projected into Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, in which the "people's armed struggle" is gradually increasing in intensity. We in the West tend to forget that one out of every two Asians is Chinese.

The intensification of this "people's struggle" will cause a serious breakdown of the U.S. security structure in Southeast Asia, and, progressively, our position will be rendered difficult, it not untenable. There is an abundance of signs anticipating this development. In regard to Viet Nam, the Chinese Cultural Revolution is destined to illustrate the superiority of Mao's dialectical strategy of conflict-development. "The Vietnamese people have applied Chairman Mao's doctrine of people's war and his strategy and tactics to their own practical fighting . . . and thus set yet another splendid example of people's war."[57] No clearer statement of the international implications of the Chinese revolution can be imagined.

VII

There is no objective evidence that Communist China is in "a process of fragmentation" and that the regime is disintegrating. Furthermore, a country possessing an H-bomb can no longer be ignored or called "underdeveloped." Communist China's international role is increasing, and it will continue to increase. "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution . . . will powerfully augment China's strength to support and aid the revolutionary struggle of the world's people," said Vice Premier Chen Yi.[58]

One must not live under the illusion that the regime will collapse after Mao's death, or that his dialectical philosophy of conflict-development as the essential form of progress will be discarded as "intellectual trash" by the new rulers of Communist China, who, in the opinion of many Western observers, would

[57]From a front-page editorial on the Viet Nam war in *Jen-min Jih-pao,* July 21, 1967.

[58]*Peking Review,* February 24, 1967, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"inevitably be pragmatists." The present glorification of Mao is a dialectical process in which the temporary is functionally projected upon the permanent. It is not Mao himself who is being "eternalized," for his existence is by definition temporary; it is his dialectical mode of conflict thought and reasoning that is becoming permanent, not only for the immense Chinese nation but also for all of Asia.

Political conflict phenomenology in Communist China demonstrates that political truth is not simple and accessible to everyone, especially when it is bound up in intricate conflict thinking and strategy. If the United States really wants to comprehend the abstruse operational microstructure of conflict as the essential form of progress, our political elite must learn to "think differently." They must come to know and understand Mao's dialectical mode of conflict thinking and reasoning, and, from this, the significance of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Simple logic and common sense are inadequate—not to say primitive—tools with which to grasp the meaning of Mao's strategy. Mao is making history; and to his way of thinking the velocity of historical development depends upon the velocity of categorial conflict-development. But the philosophy of conflict is alien to the pragmatic West, and that is why the West is puzzled by Communist China.

Our great technological achievements are the magnificent product of the American scientific intellect. But our inability to understand and cope with the intricacies of communist conflict thinking will be translated into a complete failure of the American political genius if our political epistemology does not redress the situation in time. Just as our industries take steps to meet the challenge of the future with new equipment and products, so our political intelligence must devise new mental equipment and intellectual tools with which to meet the challenges of the most baffling political civilization of the twentieth century and its philosophy of conflict as the essential form of progress. Knowledge of the dialectical mechanism of the motion of political thought in opposites, so well illustrated by conflict-development in Communist China, has become vital to the security of the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews

Individuals, Classes, Institutions and Revolutions*

by James C. Davies

Analysis of the causes of civil disturbance, including revolution, has undergone a transformation in recent years. Metamorphosis might be a better word, because the appearance and substance of the new analysis are so very different from the old.

Following a tradition that goes back, via Karl Marx, to Rousseau and Locke, analysts have been so preoccupied with the visible circumstances of revolution as to pay little attention to the actors and the nonvisible reasons for their acts. Circumstances are indeed major causes, and it would be a blunder analytically to throw the bathtub out with the bathwater. But the new analysis of civil disturbance is avoiding the chronic error of neglecting the baby.

It used to be considered enough to say that revolutions are caused by class conflict that gets aggravated to the point of widespread and concerted violence. Old-school environmentalists have added or substituted racial and religious conflict—to explain violence arising in relations between colonials and colonized, between white and black people in the United States, and between Protestants and Anglicans in seventeenth-century England or Muslims and Hindus in twentieth-century India. Old-school analysts of circumstance have talked about the adaptability of old institutions (which thereby avoid civil violence) and their breakdown (which leads to or accompanies violence). There may be, and usually is, class, racial and religious conflict in connection with revolution. Institutions may adapt or break down.

But circumstances, including institutions, vary in ways that are hard to categorize for all times and places. The sixteenth-century Catholic Church is not the twentieth-century Catholic Church is not the Catholic Church in America is not the Catholic Church in Brazil. The universal factors helping to produce civil violence are more inside the heads of human beings than outside in their environments. This is not to say that revolutions occur independently of circumstance, which is of course impossible. It is rather to say that the universal variables for the most part are to be found in the human mind and that these interact with environmental variables which differ greatly.

It is about time analysis shifted from man's outside to his inside. Marxism has provided the thesis that revolution is virtually inevitable as capitalism develops to maturity and to its own contradictions. Marxism strangely has become the dominant ideology not in mature

**Why Men Rebel.* By Ted Robert Gurr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 421 pp. $12.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economies but in regions of the world that are least developed economically. If workingmen in highly developed capitalist countries like France, England and the United States tend to become conformist "Tories" and turn angrily against young people who oppose war on grounds that it is capitalist exploitation, then the traditional class-conflict explanations of civil violence seem to lack something.

Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* is the latest in the new trend toward psychological analysis of civil violence. It is the best effort to date and one which is likely to last a long time. It develops its theory rigorously but not dogmatically. It uses and generously acknowledges ideas and data from sources ranging from Aristotle to unpublished Ph.D. dissertations. In so doing, it succeeds, not definitively but in a thorough and grand manner, in summarizing and synthesizing the state of the art and science of systematically studying revolution. The individual, not the government or other social institutions, is the unit of analysis. The degree of the individual's relative deprivation thus becomes the crucial individual factor in ascertaining the likelihood of civil violence.

Gurr defines relative deprivation as not "the discrepancy between what men want and what they have but between what [men] want and what they believe they are capable of attaining." More polysyllabically he describes relative deprivation as the discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.

Developing his thought from ideas that go back to Abraham Maslow's need hierarchy, he gives a threefold categorization of values (welfare, power, and interpersonal values). While it strikes me as being less logically consistent and clean than it need be, some such categorization is a necessary part of his or any psychological analysis of civil violence: it indicates that people turn angrily against their government for reasons that cannot be reduced to economic or interclass analysis.

More crucial to his analysis is his threefold categorization of the form relative deprivation takes in real-life circumstances. The kinds of deprivation are decremental, aspirational and progressive. Decremental deprivation occurs when value expectations remain constant while value capabilities go down. Aspirational deprivation occurs when value expectations go up and capabilities remain constant. Progressive deprivation occurs when value expectations rise and capabilities fall.

This classification seems wrapped in words that are too long, but it sticks to the central issue and presents three logical alternative ways in which the gap between what Gurr calls expectations and capabilities can arise. (It is not clear what is gained by using the terms value expectations and value capabilities when one could more simply, and I think accurately, talk about what man wants and what he gets.)

The more important question is whether in fact civil violence is most likely to break out when the gap arises from declining gratifica-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions or from rising expectations or from a combination of rising expectations and declining gratifications. Gurr asserts that decremental deprivation "has probably been a more common source of collective violence than any other pattern of relative deprivation." The kinds of such deprivation he cites include the Black Death, which catalyzed violence in the Middle Ages, and the disruption of traditional societies, which produced violence in Africa, China (long before 1949) and Russia (long before 1905 or 1917). The occasional rebellions of desperation in Nazi concentration camps may be best categorized as instances of expectations remaining constant (survival and only survival) and gratifications going down (because of the threat to survival itself).

On the other hand it seems increasingly clear that virtually all major revolutions since at least the Protestant Reformation, and likewise many contained rebellions — including the Black Rebellion in the United States in the 1960's and the student uprisings in China and Japan, France and America in the 1960's and 1970's—involve a combination of rising expectations and declining satisfactions. In America black people, following a long-range increase in economic opportunities, and after legislation and court decisions favoring their recognition as human beings of equal worth, were met with police dogs and fire hoses in Birmingham and housing and educational discrimination in northern communities. Many of these hostile actions on the part of white people were new—that is, they were actions which represented a decline in what black people were actually getting.

Gurr nevertheless strikes this reviewer as going to the heart of the matter when he says that relative deprivation is a central factor in the analysis of revolution and logically depicts three relationships between what men expect and what they get. These basic hypotheses are the foundation for a brilliantly elaborated set of derived hypotheses and corollaries that spell out not all but a wide variety of implications of the central concepts. The tendency to use big words is a minor defect that we have had to live with in social science and is a tendency from which natural science has not been altogether free. (A space scientist once said, when a spaceship just launched was picking up speed, that it was experiencing incremental velocity.) Despite this tendency, there is a cleanness in Gurr's definitions and in the structure of his thought that is unusual in social science and therefore delightful.

The book overall is a somewhat austere writing. It does not read like a text on set theory or like a grammar of Euclidian geometry; its elegance of exposition suggests the formal, contained composing style of J. S. Bach rather than the rich color of Brahms or Prokofiev or the combination of austerity and color of Beethoven. But this austerity happily is accompanied by numerous insights reminiscent of two colorful writers, Eric Hoffer and Hannah Arendt. Gurr notes, for example, that violence can be or become a tradition in a society, that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bending ideas to circumstances makes them more potent, and that extravagant promises (the stock in trade of Latin American and much Soviet Russian and Chinese communist rhetoric) increase frustration and the likelihood of revolution when they are not fulfilled. More basically he says that violence is apt to become revolution when the forces arrayed for and against the government are about equal.

He also produces some not very fundamental but dubious comments, like the old saw that rough terrain (preferably mountainous) facilitates revolution. This may have been so in Cuba's case and perhaps China's. However, the Nazi Revolution—and before it the Russian Revolution and after it the violence in Montevideo, Uruguay —have involved intensive violence in nice, flat, accessible cities, which are about the best place to hide there is. Moreover, Antonio Conselheiro, the backlands rebel of late-nineteenth-century Brazil, was clobbered in the backlands. This head-for-the-hills insight is in the same league with the gap-toothed old saw about Russia being so often invaded because of the wide-open plain between it on the one side and Scandinavia and France and Germany on the other. Sawyers with such equipment forget that the same wide-open plain has existed since time immemorial—between Scandinavia and Central Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other.

Gurr's book rather nicely concludes with a series of "strategies" for incumbents, revolutionaries, and for the discontented. This Machiavellian touch to me reveals the values of a very advanced and sophisticated social scientist. To me it reveals his hidden but passionate concern for meeting the expectations of people and his conviction that only thus will the tragedy of lives broken by the perpetrators of violence be avoided. Machiavelli (and Sorel and Pareto) have often been damned as heartless, amoral intellectual manipulators of men. They weren't. Gurr isn't. It is to be hoped that this book of his will serve the scientific and curative purposes it is designed to serve. After all, doctors of medicine are at once impersonal, clinical and humanitarian. Social scientists cannot afford to be otherwise. Gurr's book is the latest and best to prove that they can be both scientific and concerned.

Amalrik's Complaint*

by Kurt L. London

Andrei Amalrik is a lone wolf among dissenting Soviet intellectuals. When his criticism of the Soviet Union and his apocalyptic predictions first appeared in Western papers, they created quite a stir, although I have the feeling he was not taken as seriously as Academician Zakharoff, and correctly so: Zakharoff's dissent was a highly rational scientific analysis, while Amalrik's subjected intellect to emotion. As Amalrik himself admits, his essay, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?*, is based

**Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* By Andrei Amalrik. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 93 pp. $4.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on observation and reflection rather than scholarly research, and from the academic point of view "may appear to be only empty chatter." He did not write for Soviet citizens but for "Western students of the Soviet Union," for whom this discussion "should have the same interest that a fish would have for an ichthyologist if it suddenly began to talk." He did not realize that we have heard many Soviet fish talking.

Amalrik's essay is divided roughly into two parts. The first discusses conditions within the Soviet Union; the second is predominantly concerned with the problems posed by Red China and the relations between Moscow and Peking.

The first part begins with the proposition that between 1952 and 1957 the USSR underwent a kind of "revolution at the top." This "loosened up the monolithic system created by Stalin" and thereby produced stirrings in Soviet society which brought into being new forces that Amalrik calls "cultural opposition." The government was unable to stamp out cultural opposition completely. Remnants of it produced the so-called *samizdat*, an ingenious method of circumventing censorship by disseminating typewritten copies of books and pamphlets. Many of these manuscripts found their way to the West, and presumably Amalrik's essay followed the same route. He believes *samizdat* has developed a "new independent force which can already be regarded as real political opposition to the regime or at least political opposition in embryo." He names this opposition "democratic movement." However, we may well ask ourselves whether this is in fact a "movement." Such a term implies the marshaling—organized or spontaneous—of like-minded forces; it is highly unlikely that such a development exists. Certainly, *samizdat* is not a "movement."

Amalrik proceeds to say that this democratic movement relies on what he calls a "middle class," an extremely questionable term when applied to the Soviet social scene. If there is a "middle class" in the USSR, it comprises a much wider social stratum than merely a small group of academicians and artists. The Soviet middle class, if such a distinction is permissible, would not, as a whole, be in the ranks of the dissenters: its investment in the system is too high.

The regime, Amalrik holds, is on the defense. It wants to preserve the status quo. Its motto seems to be, in Amalrik's words, "Don't touch us and we won't touch you." (A typical middle-class position.) I am convinced the Soviet bureaucratic elite is not that passive. It, too, has a high investment and will defend it aggressively. It will prevent any development toward *genuine* rule of law if its interests are endangered.

Amalrik, who apparently has never been outside the Soviet Union, seems to have become enamored of American and Western democracy. He feels that its concepts are misunderstood by Soviet citizens who "have not benefited from Europe's humanist traditions." At the same time he warns Americans not to expect early "reasonable changes." He does not be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lieve that "the gradual improvement in the standard of living, as well as the spread of Western culture and ways of life will gradually transform Soviet society." He foresees a clash between a regime that becomes progressively weaker and the two forces which are already undermining it: the middle class (in Amalrik's interpretation) and the irresponsible lower class. He thinks a clash can only be prevented if the regime decisively rejuvenates itself and is not content with half-measures of economic reforms. This could happen if the military were to take over and revamp the ideology and change it from communism to nationalism, or perhaps "slavophile reformation." But he has no illusions that this could happen in the near future because regimes such as the Soviet party and government can survive a long time, even in a precarious situation. Moreover, a future prognostication might well depend on relations between Moscow and Peking.

This leads us to the second part of the Amalrik essay. He submits that the logic of revolutionary events is causing Chinese leaders to seek a solution of their problems in a war which he considers almost inevitable. Chinese attacks against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism are almost equally aggressive, but Amalrik feels that the possibilities of a head-on conflict will lead to a Sino-Soviet war rather than a war directed against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States does not start a war with China. He implies that the U.S. presence in Asia denies China the necessary freedom of action to start a war and, therefore, that she will not seek to expand south or east, but north, into the sparsely-populated Soviet Far East. Amalrik seems to feel that the ultimate goal of the Chinese is an integrated Eurasia combining the Chinese and Soviet states. This idea was submitted by Peking to the Soviet Union in 1949 but was turned down. If the Chinese really want to implement that plan, they can do so only by military means.

China will begin no such effort before she has accumulated a sufficiently large arsenal of nuclear weapons. Amalrik fixes the danger point between the years 1975-1980. Action would begin as a conventional war because both parties wish to avoid mutual destruction, unless the Soviets decide on a preventive war before China is ready, which he does not think likely. Any war between Moscow and Peking, except one leading to mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, would be protracted. In a case of Sino-Soviet war, Amalrik regards the position of the United States as most important, but he thinks a real rapprochement between the United States and the USSR should not be undertaken before the trend toward democratization in the Soviet Union has developed. Otherwise, any attempt at "friendship" would bring the United States nothing but trouble. A "genuine rapprochement must be based on similarity of interests, culture and traditions and on mutual understanding." These do not now exist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of particular interest, Amalrik apparently doubts whether in the event of a protracted conflict between the Soviet Union and Red China, the USSR could maintain sufficient strength on its western border to prevent a possible German unification and, coincidentally, a de-Sovietization in East European countries. As the Soviet regime's difficulties mounted during a long-drawn-out war with China, the "middle class" would flex its muscles and the nationalist tendencies of non-Russian peoples would increase. Gradually the Soviet bureaucracy, unable to cope with the rising unrest, would dilapidate and, if there were any major defeat at the front, collapse. This might happen between 1980 and 1985. But since the "democratic movement" would still be far too weak to assume control, it could pass into the hands of extremists, causing the mood of the country to "disintegrate into anarchy, violence and intense national hatred."

With these apocalyptic visions, Amalrik leaves us wondering whether his views are shared by other dissenters. This reviewer doubts it. With all respect to the young man's courage—and that of his attractive wife—Amalrik seems to be unique. His sociological analysis of Soviet dissenters and his forecast of Soviet doom have been overestimated in the West, where real and would-be Sovietologists are prone to listen with alacrity to any dissent in the Soviet Union. Nor can I believe that Amalrik has found much support among Soviet intellectuals. By arresting Amalrik in May 1970, the Soviet authorities demonstrated again that they are quite capable of keeping dissent under control. He probably is regarded as a crackpot and most likely will share the fate of those dissenters who have been forcibly shunted into a psychiatric ward.

But Amalrik is not a crackpot. He has the mentality of a Western man who happens to be a Russian. Such things happen. His implied admiration of the United States (perhaps sparked by his friend Anatole Shub) is not necessarily shared by other dissenters. He is a somewhat freakish but fascinating phenomenon. Perhaps his greatest merit is not to be found in his essay but rather in his uniqueness, which demonstrates that Soviet leaders have not succeeded in creating uniformity. It is good to know that rugged individualists still exist in the Soviet Union.

International Law Studies and Foreign Policy*

by Stuart S. Malawer

Professor Richard A. Falk's *The Status of Law in International Society,* companion volume to his earlier work, *Legal Order in a Violent World* (Princeton, 1968), is essentially concerned "with developing appropriate tools of analysis for the study of international law." (p. vii.) In it the author elaborates on the political setting, authority and effectiveness of international law. He also discusses the means of strengthening the study

**The Status of Law in International Society.* By Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 678 pp. $15.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of international law and the effectiveness of the international legal order.

Falk rejects the views of those who predict change in the international system and maintains that he has no vision of the future except that the present system will continue. For example, "The only part of this analysis that is mildly predicative is the assertion that [the] present international legal order is likely to persist approximately as we know it throughout the foreseeable future, unless there occurs some cataclysmic event of the proportion of a third world war." (p. 538.)

Without examining the validity of this assertion, or of Falk's argument that the present role of the United States in the international community is imperialistic — he dedicates his work to "the people of Vietnam (and elsewhere) who have been victims of Pax Americana" (p. v)—this review will discuss the author's views on American unilateral actions and policy formulation in general, and his attempt to formulate new methodologies in international legal studies.

Falk contends that American activity in the field of commercial trade can benefit from U.S. unilateral regulation. "American unilateral regulation could eliminate flagrant restraint from the vast majority of foreign trade markets in which there exists an important United States concern." (p. 315.) He points out that "America has been chided for the apparent inconsistency of stamping its feet when a foreign corporation violates the Sherman Act, while closing both eyes to its own forms of restrictionist activity. This is a manifestly unfair evaluation since American industry often suffers most from antitrust regulation." (p. 317.) Subsequently he states that many practices of American industries abroad are violations of the marketing, pricing and securities provisions of the anti-trust laws; however, for "noneconomic reasons" extraterritoriality is often not applied. "[M]any noneconomic forces inspire toleration of certain practices in a foreign context that would be condemned in a domestic context." (p. 319f.)

To this reviewer, the above statements are contradictory. The point that American industry may suffer most from anti-trust regulation would seem to be disputable. If our anti-trust legislation is applied to all foreign corporations doing domestic business, but not to all U.S. corporations doing business abroad, are not foreign corporations the ones disadvantaged by this practice?

Later, in his discussion of U.S. security policy, Falk argues that American interest in international security cannot benefit from unilateral actions taken by the United States. His case in point is that interminable issue, the Viet Nam war, and stresses "the error of our unilateral intervention. . . ." (p. 582.)

Thus, in recommending specific policies to meet current problems, he favors U.S. unilateral action in the commercial sphere and criticizes such unilateral action in the security sphere—except when it disengages the United States from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a too-deep involvement. In both spheres, unquestionably, collective international action is desirable. But a much stronger case can be made for unilateral action in security matters than in commercial activities. Certainly unilateral action is demanded when a state's existence or vital security interests are threatened.

On another level, the author clearly rejects a national interest approach as the basis of policy formulation. Terming U.S. actions in Viet Nam "genocidal" against the Vietnamese people (p. 579), he asserts that "it is a cynical form of political romanticism to revive . . . a balance-of-power approach as the viable policy alternative to Pax Americana (p. 575). . . . The idea of grounding foreign policy on national interests realistically conceived rests on an obsolete nineteenth century image of statecraft and political consciousness." (p. 582.)

Falk is at this point dismissing a more accurate evaluation of the U.S. national interest as but "a cynical form of political romanticism," yet he advocates extraterritorial application of the U.S. anti-trust laws when there is "an important United States concern." Why should national interests be a consideration in formulating a specific commercial policy but not in formulating a general approach to decide matters of international security? While he rejects the assumption of rationality inherent in the balance-of-power approach—that decisions rationally weighting national interests can achieve an optimal policy—he implicitly utilizes such an approach in discussing a specific policy for the United States.

This is not to say that Falk is arguing for an aggrandizement of U.S. commercial interests. It is intended to evidence that the book is essentially a collection of articles he has written over the last decade. Most of the articles are quite good, taken individually. The summary of Myres McDougal's works that appears in the appendix and Falk's discussion of the various methodological approaches to international legal studies are particularly significant. But the work as a whole adds up to a loosely structured analysis of the status of law in international society. The overall product is not as well done as its constituent parts.

The only attempt made to integrate the articles is to include brief introductions to each of the book's five sections. Each section contains several articles on otherwise unrelated topics. For example, in Part Two, comprising six chapters with a single three-and-a-half-page introduction, the topics treated are Sukarno's Malaysian campaign, the South West Africa Case in the International Court, the use of outer space, the legislative competence of the General Assembly, and American anti-trust regulations.

The book's real value lies in Falk's attempt to formulate a policy-related approach to the study of international law. When the chapter entitled "The Relevance of Political Context in the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View" appeared in its original set-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ting (*The Relevance of International Law* [Schenkman, 1968], edited by Stanley Hoffmann and Karl Deutsch), this reviewer commented: "While Professor Falk presents an excellent critique of the inadequacies of the traditional and modernist approaches to international law, he neither takes the next step of formulating new approaches, nor fully develops his arguments concerning the role of international law, as providing for social change or communications. . . . None of these leading scholars (including Professor Falk) offer [*sic*] a framework classifying variables—neither an evaluative framework for the scholar nor a policy-oriented one for the policy-maker —relating international law to foreign policy or international politics."[1]

Falk has since gone beyond the ideas then presented. In his more recent work he again provides excellent summaries of the views of several outstanding authorities on international law, among them Wolfgang Friedmann and Morton Kaplan. But he also offers several sets of guidelines relating international law to foreign policy in one of its most important areas today, the role of the new states in the international system.

In Chapter XIX, titled "The Recently Independent States: A Framework for Systematic Inquiry," Falk states: "From the perspective of international law it is essential to gain a more sophisticated sense of what the participation of these recently independent, modernizing states signify [*sic*] for the future of the international legal order." (p. 513.) He argues that "To improve the tools of analysis at the disposal of international lawyers is to improve the prospects for international law itself. . . . If international law is to be a developing field of knowledge that keeps abreast of other perspectives of inquiry, it should modernize its methodology." (pp. 514-515.) He does not quite construct a framework of inquiry to be applied to an analysis of the new states, but the two sets of eightfold guidelines he has established will help in formulating the proper framework.

One set of guidelines has to do with determining "relevant national profiles" of new states. In evolving it he considers, for example, patterns of investment, the political system, and the indigenous legal tradition. More significantly, he proposes methods of analysis to clarify the nature of the new states' participation in the international legal order, concerned with such indicators as attitudes toward state succession and strategic war-peace issues. In this latter category he considers attitudes toward collective security, "rules of order" (i.e., aggression, self-defense and armed attack) and the "just war" doctrine.

Despite Falk's explicit rejection of the national interest approach to policy formulation, his implicit assumption in these guidelines is to the contrary. He assumes that new states reject certain rules of international law and favor other rules according to the dictates of their

[1] *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,* Winter 1969, pp. 353-354.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national interests. He maintains that this attitude is evidenced by their practice in the codification conferences sponsored by the United Nations. "It is also revealing to detail the participation of the state in large international conferences of a law-making character. The conferences dealing with draft conventions on the law of the sea and consular immunities are obvious examples." (p. 523.)

Falk continues: "Traditional notions of obligation in international law have accorded a virtual veto to the sovereign state by making its expression of consent to be bound an indispensable precondition of a legal obligation. . . . It would be useful to gather any evidence of thought and action by the new states in relation to these issues." (p. 524.) He points out quite correctly that the new states often question the traditional notions of obligation and state consent, but state consent should not be emphasized as the sole basis of international obligation under traditional legal theory. Oscar Schachter argues that at least a dozen bases other than state consent have been alleged by traditional legal theorists as the foundation of international obligation.[2]

In light of the recent exercise of the United States' first veto in the Security Council by Ambassador Yost, and the completion in Vienna of the Convention on the Law of Treaties in May 1969, it is imperative that the role of the new states in the international system be evaluated. That a leading international lawyer has chosen to stress the development of new modes of legal analysis in this context is a matter of policy relevance. By applying rigorous directives to important areas of analysis, the author hopes to modernize the study of international law as a factor in foreign policy decision-making.

Falk clearly identifies the shortcomings of the existing approaches to study and presents the beginnings of a new approach,[3] for which he has developed specific sets of guidelines. He wants to systematize behavioral variables in order to relate international law to foreign policy and international politics. What should now be undertaken is the next step. Conceptual frameworks based on Falk's guidelines need to be posited and refined, and indicators of validity and reliability need to be developed. These methodological tools must then be applied to series of case studies in order to induce generalizations advancing the relationship between legal and political variables.

While one may not agree with Falk's vision of the future, or his view of American unilateral actions and his approach to policy formulation, none can disagree with the necessity to restructure and redirect the study of international law so as to make it more scientific and more relevant to policy formulation. Professor Hans Kelsen argued in the interwar period that there can be a pure science of international law discussing only legal variables. Falk

[2] *Virginia Journal of International Law,* April 1968, p. 301.

[3] Arthur Rovine (*Cornell Law Review,* July 1969, p. 976) has described it as a "limited contextual approach."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has more than adequately refuted that argument by assessing international law in a more general systemic context.

Professional Views of the Foreign Service*

by Willard Barber

Much is spoken and written these days about the policies—traditional or innovative—that mark the conduct of the United States government in its relations with other countries. The subject receives deserved priority from the mass media, the universities and political and governmental leaders. Fresh insights and objective examinations of the ways and means by which U.S. policies are carried out abroad are therefore welcome.

Current American ambassadors, such as Keating from New York and Annenberg from Pennsylvania, may lack the illustrious aura of their diplomatic forebears John Jay or Benjamin Franklin. The almost instantaneous transmission of news to governments and governed alike requires today's diplomat to be more an agent than an oracle. But it is a fact that, in the United States' present-day engagements in all parts of the globe, forceful and winning personalities who are found within the career Foreign Service contribute notably toward achieving the nation's objectives. Of this there is ample evidence in Ambassador Blancké's *The Foreign Service of the United States.* At the same time Dr. Harr's *The Professional Diplomat* recognizes a requirement for management tools, selective personnel procedures and information retrieval systems which lend themselves to the professionalism he so ardently desires in American diplomacy. The people actually engaged in Foreign Service tasks also openly seek to improve both the human and the administrative components of the diplomatic establishment. Who doubts that the best men and the best machinery are none too good for the monumental efforts the future may demand of the service?

Entering the service of his country as a clerk in 1942, W. Wendell Blancké rose steadily through the ranks as vice consul, second secretary of embassy, consul, first secretary, counselor, consul general, foreign service inspector and ambassador. Posts in his nearly thirty years of diplomatic activity included Buenos Aires, Berlin, Havana, Hanoi, Frankfurt, Monterrey, and Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo. His assignments were to economic, military, public relations, consular, diplomatic and administrative functions. His language talents included French, German and Spanish. Obviously equipped with a strong *esprit de corps* in his devotion to the career Foreign Service of the United States, a happy embellishment was his eye for detail, his ear for nuances of meaning, and

**The Foreign Service of the United States.* By W. Wendell Blancké. New York: Praeger, 1969. 286 pp. $7.95.

The Professional Diplomat. By John Ensor Harr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 404 pp. $11.50.

Toward a Modern Diplomacy. A Report to the American Foreign Service Association. By the Association's Committee on Career Principles. Washington: The American Foreign Service Association, 1968. 183 pp. $1.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a saving sense of humor and of the ridiculous. His lively, chatty account of the care and feeding of North American diplomats (and their wives and children) is revealing of the diversity of atmosphere to which the career officer must accommodate himself. The cardinal requirement, it stands to reason, is catering to the personalities and idiosyncrasies of a variety of higher ranking officers within the State Department and the Foreign Service—not as a sycophant seeking advancement, but perforce to maintain an orderly and effective operation in a diplomatic post abroad. Blancké's experiences and insights are, in a word, relevant.

The Ambassador clearly states his interests: people and operations. A score of photographs illustrate the activities of consulates, embassies and couriers, from checking the roster of ships and visiting a jailed merchant seaman to eating a formal dinner without benefit of tableware. An early chapter sketches the development of the separate Consular and Diplomatic Services, their consolidation in the Rogers Act of 1924, the 1939 amalgamation into the modern Foreign Service of Commercial and Agricultural Attaches, and the reorganizations of 1946 and 1960. Explanations of the categories of Reserve Officers, Staff Corps and locally-hired employees, their functions, numbers, ranks and origins, are explicit. Another short section delineates the complementary responsibilities of Chiefs of Mission and subordinates in the career service, and the concept of the "Country Team" incorporating representatives of military and other branches of the federal government which assign their personnel to overseas duties.

After emphasizing the coordination abroad of all agents and functionaries of our government, Blancké underscores the ever-evolving relationship of the career officers with members of Congress. He relates incidents of near-disaster proportions when expanding or relaxing Congressmen on junkets abroad have misbehaved in one way or another. Testimony of foreign service officers before Capitol Hill committees, when they are on duty in Washington, at once offers opportunities to the astute and pitfalls to the unwary. But the exposure of the legislators pays off, on balance, both abroad and at home. Of equal delicacy, and with even greater leverage for help or injury to existing policy, is the diplomat's attitude toward the working press. Here the shadow cast by security rules, backed by statutory sanctions, tends to make his path a murky one.

In his concluding chapter, "Winds of Change," Blancké selects for comment the issues of a unified service, an elite corps, and undigested bulges in the personnel pyramid. He views as desirable the unification of the separate systems of foreign aid and information officers (AID and USIA) with the existing career Foreign Service. He holds to the belief that "if ever the country needed a select, well-trained, highly motivated and disciplined career service, it does now." The problem of better shaping the top-heavy personnel pyramid is not without solution. Blancké

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recommends periodic weeding-out, and the adoption of a scientific inventory of personnel needs. For serious readers there are unusual appendixes listing the laws and executive orders relating to the Foreign Service, descriptions of the oral and written entrance examinations, and the stages in a career pattern.

Dr. John Ensor Harr, now in private business, worked on the staff of the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel in 1962 and subsequently as an employee of the State Department's Management Planning Staff. His *The Professional Diplomat* reflects this background, and relies heavily on the presentation, in chart and tabular form, of data he used in his former assignments. He also devised an opinion survey which was administered to a 20 per cent sample of the officer corps, comprised solely of officers stationed in Washington. The book's appendixes contain the text of the survey questions, together with an exposition of the author's methodological approach.

Harr's catalogue of world forces that call for changes in our diplomatic establishment is formidable. He cites East-West rivalry, frequent crises, the increasing complexity of foreign affairs, and the growing role of the military in the decision-making process. The question thus emerges: Is our country well served by existing personnel and management arrangements? If not (and our author thinks that it is not), what remedies need to be applied?

In five chapters dealing with the composition, origins and attitudes of the foreign service corps, a statistical analysis shows the corps' growth, categories, age groups, methods of entry, rates of attrition and promotion, functional assignments and area specialization. Applying sociological criteria, other data concern geographical origin, urban and rural background, family income, fathers' occupations, university training and political orientation. Regarding Negro members, the author concludes that "the corps has moved steadily . . . to become more socially representative of American society at large." It appears to Harr, however, that officers drawn from the eastern part of the country have undue numerical weight.

In a more sensitive psychological evaluation of the survey results, Harr examines career motivation and the concepts of status and elitism held by younger officers. He perceives strong organizational pressures to conform, increasing realization that one has a stake in career as the years of employment add up, and a paternalistic attitude among members of the senior ranks. As might be expected, the replies to the questionnaire ranged over a wide spectrum. The survey's results are ambiguous, probably due in part to the choice of information requested.

The inquiries found that only a few career officers come from farm homes. More than half are from families with annual incomes of less than $10,000. One-third are sons of businessmen; another third, sons of professional men. Sixty-five per cent are Protestants. Sixty per cent hold themselves to be "liberal" or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"somewhat liberal." The competitive oral and written examinations normally given each year to 6,000 applicants determine the 250 who are ultimately commissioned. Both women and Negroes form rather small minorities.

In penetrating the bureaucratic maze following a succession of investigations and reorganizations, Harr concludes that the Hoover Commission of the 1940's, the Wriston Report of the 1950's and Secretary Herter's reforms of the 1960's have left a record of halfway measures, sometimes indifferently implemented. Out of this emerges Harr's own "Managerial Strategy for the Future." He proposes a permanent manager of the career Foreign Service. Other recommendations are a merger of AID and USIA with the State Department, increased financing of the whole operation, and the adoption of an integrated planning-program-budgeting system.

In several respects, this book covers a well-trod trail, with data and interpretations that have been published before (for example, in Arthur Macmahon's *Administration in Foreign Affairs* [University of Alabama Press, 1953]). It is somewhat redundant in content, and strongly evocative of academe in style. Inadequate attention is devoted to the Foreign Service Institute and its remarkable language training program. The problems of USIA and AID receive sympathetic but only peripheral regard. Even less space is accorded to the Peace Corps and the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency. The final disappointment is Harr's conclusion that the White House and the State Department should "do whatever is required" to professionalize the diplomatic corps. This lack of specifics comes as a sharp letdown. The early chapters, pinpointing issues and difficulties, followed by the chapter on future managerial strategy, have led the reader to expect more. To say "do whatever is required" amounts to nol-prossing the case. What is the "whatever" required to improve the Foreign Service? Is it public opinion that is wanting? Should there be Congressional hearings? Are new laws, or executive orders from the President, or revised foreign service regulations the sources of a solution?

For nearly two years, beginning late in 1967, the American Foreign Service Association's Committee on Career Principles conducted an intensive in-house evaluation of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The association is a voluntary nongovernmental society of individuals working in (or retired from) the area of U.S. foreign policy. Through its Career Principles Committee it undertook to glean from members of every category and age group ideas which could contribute to constructive change. The committee made use of reports by Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. Hearings, discussions and redrafts of proposals repeated themselves despite the plan to organize the studies — and recommendations — within limited parameters. The entire range of personnel problems, management, career planning,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

training, benefits and promotion was studied. Innovative techniques and systems analyses were proposed.

Of necessity, such an investigation covered many of the issues being examined at about the same time by Blancké and Harr. The committee's report to its membership, under the rubric *Toward a Modern Diplomacy,* was an extensive presentation of proposals, alternatives, minority views, tentative recommendations and some self-serving conclusions. Tables of organization, salary scales, and promotion and attrition rates were included in charts, appendixes and annexes.

But the introspection and debate had scarcely begun. A veritable flood of articles, and of briefer comments and suggestions, has appeared in issues of the *Foreign Service Journal* since the publication of the committee document. In January 1970 the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration made a lengthy response to the association—issued as a departmental press release[1]—on aspects of the committee proposals that the administration had put into effect or was studying. His statement ranged over the familiar ground of the earlier commissions and reorganizations in pointing out the needs of a progressive and flexible diplomatic establishment. Diversity of language and technical skills, oral examinations for potential recruits based on functional criteria, a reduction in the number of Reserve Officers, improving the managerial capacities of senior officials, and reducing the compulsory retirement age for Career Ministers from sixty-five to sixty—these and a dozen other reforms and priorities in the ordering of human and material resources were mentioned. Unfortunately, as in the association committee's report, a number of ideas were drowned in a torrent of words. In an effort to respond to all existing calls for change, there is no focus, only confusion.

The academic community, meanwhile, has busied itself in the conduct of symposia and polemics on the shortcomings of the national diplomatic apparatus and formulations for its improvement. Valuable articles on the "Administrative Problems of Multipurpose Diplomacy," by Herbert Emmerich, Charles Frankel, Don K. Price and others, appeared in the November-December 1969 issue of *Public Administration Review.* In March 1969, and again in March 1970, *International Studies Quarterly* published critical discussions of the functioning of both the State Department and the Foreign Service, by Andrew M. Scott, John Harr, Norman Palmer and Raymond Platig, capped by intellectual name-calling in Raymond Tanter's "An Activist vs. a Hippie." While these critiques were being made public, Congress passed a reform measure dealing with retirements, and Senator Fulbright withdrew his previously introduced resolution calling for a commission on reform of the diplomatic service, presumably to wait for the dust to settle. Early in 1970, a score of task forces were

[1]State Department Press Release No. 9, January 14, 1970, reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin,* February 2, 1970, pp. 130-141.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

created in the hope of reaching consensus and enlightenment on a future course.

Not the object of much comment, but undoubtedly contributing to the contemporary malaise, is the existence of more than 1,400 Foreign Reserve Officers, mostly appointees of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, without benefit of Civil Service or Foreign Service competitive examinations. They exacerbate the controversies regarding recruitment and appointment, form a glut at the higher levels, and impede the promotion of career officers to positions of responsibility.

In summary, the Blancké volume is clear, explicit, brief, and illustrates the variety of ways in which a diplomatic officer is called on to relate to people and situations produced by alien cultures and interests. Harr is hampered by the complexities of his approach, and his avoidance of the four-letter word ("Rusk") in his criticisms, both profound and superficial. The committee report is prolix and does not focus.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Churches and the Nations. By O. Frederick Nolde. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970. 184 pp. $7.50. In these addresses and papers, Dr. Nolde, Director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches from 1946 to 1969, sets forth his own understanding of the relevance of the Christian faith and ethic to the task of effective statesmanship; records the contribution of the churches to world politics; and shows how Christians, individually and collectively, can take increasing responsibility in the quest for world peace, justice and harmony. He treats such issues as human rights, Korea, Viet Nam, the Middle East and disarmament.

International Finance. Edited by R. N. Cooper. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. 384 pp. $1.95 (paper). This collection of readings on balance-of-payments problems, their causes and remedies, contains David Hume's treatise entitled "Of the Balance of Trade" and fifteen other essays written between 1949 and 1967 by such specialists as Robert Triffin, Harry Johnson, Gottfried Haberler and Ragnar Nurkse.

Natural Resource Information for Economic Development. By Orris C. Herfindahl. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1969. 212 pp. $7.00. This study is concerned with the role of natural resources development in general economic growth and its dependence to a large extent on the quality and quantity of information on which plans and programs must be based. The author analyzes the effectiveness of various information-gathering programs under differing circumstances, discusses current techniques, and offers some guidelines which governments may find useful in developing and executing programs suited to their particular needs. Although the study deals primarily with Chile and Peru, it is designed to be of value to both developing countries and more advanced countries in all parts of the world.

New Trade Strategy for the World Economy. Edited by Harry G. Johnson. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969. 344 pp. 45/-. The four major studies in this volume, written by Gerard and Victoria Curzon, Lionel Gelber, Maxwell Stamp and Harry Cowie, and David Robertson, are concerned with the more general aspects of the proposal for a free trade association in industrial products among North Atlantic countries. The nucleus of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) would be the United States, Canada and Britain and other members of EFTA, but the plan would be "open-ended," providing for the participation of the EEC countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Policy Analyses in Political Science. Edited by Ira Sharkansky. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. 476 pp. n.p. An introduction to the "field" of policy analyses. Major topics include basic conceptions in policy analyses, the measurement of policy, evaluation of public policy, and determinants of public policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science and Public Policy. Edited by Austin Ranney. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968. 287 pp. $5.95. Papers presented at two conferences sponsored by the Social Science Research Council explore what the discipline of political science can contribute to the content of public policy. The discussions focus on four topics: concepts and issues, domestic policies, foreign policies, and pitfalls and possibilities. Contributors include the editor, Vernon Van Dyke, Aaron Wildavsky, James Rosenau, Lincoln Bloomfield, Lucian Pye and David Truman.

Pugwash—The First Ten Years. By J. Rotblat. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 244 pp. $5.50. Printed in Prague, this study by the Secretary General of the Pugwash Continuing Committee tells the history of the Pugwash movement from its inception in 1957 through the 16th conference in September 1966. The appendixes contain a listing of each conference statement. Additional material includes a complete list of participants and observers; the work of the continuing committee; organization and finances; data on other study groups, national groups and regional conferences, special conferences; contact with organizations such as the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); and the future of Pugwash.

The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa. By W. Howard Wriggins. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 275 pp. $10.00. Elites in developing countries continually face the problem of staying in power. The combinations of ways they use to maintain their primacy are reviewed with concrete examples in this far-ranging generalist study.

The United Nations: A View from Within. By Ralph Townley. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. 353 pp. $6.95. A serving international official, an economist who has been a member of the UN Secretariat for seventeen years, has written an authoritative study of the origins, structure, theory and practice of the UN and its associated agencies. The book has been prepared for the general reader and for the student who needs a supplementary text on international organizations, and provides many insights into the practical problems inherent in the daily tasks of the international public servant.

World Migration in Modern Times. Edited by Franklin D. Scott. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 177 pp. $4.95 ($2.95, paper). An examination of the varieties of modern migration—voluntary, refugee, labor, economic, religious—in all regions of the world. The contributors, including Oscar Handlin, Bruno Lasker and Margaret Bourke-White, probe the reasons for each migration and its effects on the immigrant, the receiving country and the country of origin.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

The American Threat: The Fear of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. By James L. Payne. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. 241 pp. $4.95. In this study of the threat of war as an instrument of foreign policy the author discusses threats and the appeasement theory, how a threat fails, the demonstration of will and the problem of commitment. He provides several case studies and innumerable examples. A central theme is, "How coercive does our threat to resist our opponents' aggression have to be to prevent more and larger wars in the future?"

Arms Beyond a Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Cowles Book Company, 1970. 210 pp. $5.95. A discussion of how the arms race is accelerated by the introduction of the MIRV and the ABM. Dr. Lapp provides insight into the Congressional challenge to ABM deployment and explores the role of scientists in defense policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II. By Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 303 pp. $6.95. Five of the most critical intelligence failures of World War II are analyzed: the German invasion of Russia, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the disaster at Dieppe, the parachute drop at Arnhem, and the Battle of the Bulge.

Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Edited by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup. Pugwash Monograph No. 2. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 246 pp. $7.50. This study contains the papers and the discussions that followed their presentation to the Pugwash Symposium on ABM. It describes the development and characteristics of ABM systems, presents the arguments for and against deployment, and analyzes the effects this extension of weaponry may have on the arms race, superpower relations, and Third World countries and Europe. A concluding section by the editors is concerned with the strategic implications of ABM deployment.

Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament: Application of Mathematical Structures in Politics. By Thomas L. Saaty. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968. 190 pp. $10.95. This volume in the Publications in Operations Research Series examines arms control and disarmament problems within the framework of mathematical models.

Missile Madness. By Herbert Scoville and Robert Osborn. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970. 77 pp. $4.95. An artist and a former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official have combined their efforts to present a straightforward and simple discussion of the issues, dangers and consequences of the strategic arms race. Their central thesis argues that deployment of MIRV's and ABM's will set the present arms balance spiraling beyond control. To avoid this, they urge that the balance be stabilized at its present level.

Politics and the Community of Science. By Joseph Haberer. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 337 pp. $5.50. Dr. Haberer examines the community of science in terms of some of its fundamental political and moral problems. He does this through a series of case studies dealing with the emergence of modern science in the 17th century, the German scientific community between the world wars, and the American scientific community, including the case of Dr. Oppenheimer.

Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. By Earl F. Ziemke. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968. 549 pp. $4.50. The first to be completed of three projected volumes covering military operations on the Eastern Front in Europe during World War II.

Warfare. By Robert Leckie. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 206 pp. $5.95. A pithy survey of the history and principles of armed conflict. Besides discussing the issues of dissent and pacifism, and the influence and ideas of great military leaders, the author describes the essentials of strategy, tactics, military formations and organizations, the evolution of weaponry, the causes of wars and their relationship to politics.

III. United States and Canada

The History of Canada. By Kenneth McNaught. New York: Praeger, 1970. 336 pp. $7.50. Dr. McNaught, Professor of History at the University of Toronto, has written a modern political, social and economic interpretation of four centuries of Canadian history. He examines the impact of an ever-expanding frontier, the French influence, the military struggles of the 17th and 18th centuries, the problems of welding scattered communities and provinces into a self-governing federation, the building of railroads and industries and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exploitation of vast national resources, the crucial economic and social changes of the 20th century, the part Canada played in two world wars, and the process by which the Dominion evolved a new role in international affairs and new relationships with Britain and the United States.

A History of Presidential Elections. (Third edition.) By Eugene H. Roseboom. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 639 pp. $10.00. This updated edition of a valuable guide and reference book on American presidential elections, including that of 1968, covers the campaigns, the successful and defeated candidates, the Vice Presidential nominees, key Congressional figures, state and city bosses, and "the developments in each administration that influenced the work of party conventions and determined the character and outcome of the campaigns."

Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920. By Warren F. Kuehl. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969. 385 pp. $8.95. Professor Kuehl focuses on the role of American internationalists in bringing the concept of "world order" almost to the point of political reality in 1920. He rejects the stereotype of Woodrow Wilson as a prophetic world statesman; Wilson is viewed here as an unyielding and uninformed leader who only latterly embraced the cause of internationalism and who isolated himself equally from those who opposed and those who had long supported and worked for the creation of a league of nations.

The Way We Go to War. By Merlo J. Pusey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 202 pp. $4.95. The author examines how the war power in the early years of our nation's history contrasts with the use of this power today. He urges Congress to exercise its responsibilities regarding the declaration of war by developing a new formula for the nuclear age. His suggestion is the enactment of a War Powers Act which would define the President's right to send troops abroad but would require him to inform Congress of any emergency involving a risk of war and to abide by Congress' decision.

The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda. By Thomas C. Sorensen. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 337 pp. $6.95. A former Deputy Director of USIA traces the history of U.S. propaganda efforts beginning shortly before the First World War. Sorensen describes our clumsy propaganda activities in World Wars I and II, the continuing battles with Congress over information programs and their cost, and the attacks on propaganda operations by Senators Joseph McCarthy and Lyndon Johnson. One-third of the book focuses on Edward R. Murrow's years in USIA.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Battle Over Britain. By Francis K. Mason. New York: Doubleday, 1969. 636 pp. $14.95. Beginning with the German air raids on London in 1917, Mason explains the twenty-three-year evolution of the British air defense system which withstood the German onslaught in the summer and fall of 1940. Based on primary sources, rather than any of the official histories, *Battle Over Britain* is unprecedented in its scope and detail.

The Chanak Affair. By David Walder. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 380 pp. $7.95. A dramatic account of the Greek-Turkish confrontation from 1919 to 1922 and the disastrous British role in the Chanak crisis of 1922. Mr. Walder, historian, barrister, author, and Conservative Member of Parliament from 1961 to 1966, uses Cabinet papers and testimonies of participants to authenticate this tale of international intrigue and diplomatic bungling.

The Economy of Greece, 1944-66: Efforts for Stability and Development. By Wray O. Candilis. New York: Praeger, 1968. 238 pp. $15.00. This comprehensive analysis of Greek economic affairs from World War II to 1966 is divided

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into four parts: background, efforts for stability, efforts for development, and prerequisites for growth. Dr. Candilis, an economist in the Department of Economics and Research of the American Bankers Association, examines the efforts of successive governments to halt inflationary pressures and achieve monetary stability; the effects of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan; and economic and social factors such as the balance of payments, capital market, fiscal policy, emigration, production, education, association with the EEC, and planning for development.

Modern Iceland. By John C. Griffiths. New York: Praeger, 1969. 226 pp. $6.00. The author, Assistant General Manager of the British Press Association and author of *Afghanistan,* examines the main features of Icelandic history, geography, culture, economy and social institutions. He devotes considerable space to Iceland's precarious fish-oriented economy, her tenacious attitude toward her fishing limits, and her "cod war" with Great Britain.

Modern Scotland: The Nation Since 1870. By James G. Kellas. New York: Praeger, 1968. 284 pp. $6.50. In this survey of the history of Scotland since 1870, Dr. Kellas, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow, analyzes the factors that serve to keep Scotland a separate and distinct nation, despite 260 years of union with England. He points out the marked contrasts between the English and Scottish social and economic structures, cultures, and institutions of religion, education, law and government, and the less determinate distinctions rooted in national character, temperament and custom.

The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-45. By J. S. Conway. New York: Basic Books, 1968. 474 pp. $10.00. Dr. Conway, Associate Professor of History at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, has examined the archives of the Reich Chancellery, the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and the private papers of leading Nazis to produce this important study of the policies and methods used by the Nazi authorities to subvert the churches. In explaining why the churches succumbed to Nazism, the author finds that "the true story of the Church of Germany is not an unrelieved epic of faith and courage; it is to a large extent a sad tale of betrayal, timidity and unbelief."

The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force: History of the Luftwaffe in World War II. Edited by W. H. Tantum, IV, and E. J. Hoffschmidt. Old Greenwich, Conn.: We, Inc., 1969. 422 pp. $8.95. Prepared by the intelligence section of the Royal Air Force, this is the long unpublished operational history of the Luftwaffe from 1933 to 1945. It recounts in some detail the progress of the principal campaigns and traces the problems encountered both in the field and in the direction of the air war at the higher staff levels.

Russia and the Austrian State Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe. By Sven Allard. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970. 248 pp. $7.95. Sven Allard was the Swedish Ambassador in Austria from 1954 to 1964. As the representative of a neutral nation, he was confided in by Soviet and Western officials who wanted to test the reactions of the opposite side to contemplated proposals. From his experiences he has written an illuminating account of the complexities of negotiating a treaty with the USSR. In his view Moscow signed the Austrian Treaty in order to popularize the concept of neutrality, forestall the expected increase in West German influence, and promote the strategic goal of undermining NATO.

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Communist International Economics. By P. J. D. Wiles. New York: Praeger, 1969. 566 pp. $12.50. The author, a professor at London University, has undertaken "to build out the theory and the generalized description of international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economics to include Communism, or, alternatively, to build out Sovietological economics to include all international aspects." In the attempt he covers many of the most important modern developments bearing on either subject: the "activation" of subordinates in a command economy, the special position of small countries and of underdeveloped countries, trade in technology, and blocs of countries. He omits discussion of factor-prize equalization, the communist analysis of the West, and the banks that communist countries have established on foreign soil.

Communist Studies and the Social Sciences. Edited by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. 481 pp. $5.95 (paper). Using the Soviet Union as a case study, this collection of essays deals with a variety of methodological questions, problems of conceptualization, and discussions of selected areas of empirical social science theory.

The Czech Black Book. Edited by Robert Littell. Prepared by the Institute of History, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. New York: Praeger, 1969. 303 pp. $6.95. An account of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia compiled from eyewitness testimony, official announcements and documents, union bulletins, speeches, leaflets, broadcasts from the free Czechoslovak radio stations, newspaper articles, statements by participants in official government and party proceedings, and notes from high-level clandestine meetings, covering the period from the night of August 20 to the evening of August 27. The book, called *Seven Days in Prague* in the original Czech, was at first secretly circulated throughout the country. Mr. Littell, general editor of *Newsweek* magazine, brought a copy of it out of Czechoslovakia.

Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics. Edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 163 pp. $7.95 ($2.95, paper). The lead essay of this volume is Brzezinski's article, "The Soviet Political System—Transformation or Degeneration?," which appeared in *Problems of Communism.* It seeks to ascertain whether apparent changes in Soviet leadership and society are indications of degeneration or whether the Soviet Union is transforming itself into a new, as yet undetermined state. The *leitmotif* essay is followed by thirteen brief statements written by men of various political, national and substantive backgrounds. In his "Concluding Reflections," Brzezinski disagrees with those who doubt that the revolutionary element of the Soviet Union will degenerate. A majority of the contributors believes in a "conservative adaptation" of the system to the course of gradual evolution rather than in a collapse of the Soviet state. No space was given to those Soviet specialists who foresee little change in the USSR, at least during the 1970's, except a growing orthodoxy fostered by the present regime and particularly by Brezhnev.

Marxism in the Twentieth Century. By Roger Garaudy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. 224 pp. $5.95. A former member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the French Communist Party, Roger Garaudy is a Marxist philosopher who has gained new prominence because of his heretical efforts to "humanize" Marxist analysis. Throughout this book he is appealing for greater consideration to be given to the individual and to individual needs as a focus for analysis. There are chapters on "Marxism and Ethics," "Marxism and Religion," and "Marxism and Art."

The New Russian Tragedy. By Anatole Shub. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 128 pp. $4.50. This book contains a series of articles the author wrote for the *Washington Post* after his expulsion from the Soviet Union. Shub reports at first hand on the reappearance in the USSR of the old forms of oppression, the small group of dissidents, and the underground papers and manuscripts. He discusses the crisis in leadership at the top, the deadening effect upon the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consumer of the Soviets' own military-industrial complex, the sharpening of the struggle with the West and the concurrent preparations for a possible war with China.

Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power. Edited by Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher. New York: Praeger, for the Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses, 1969. 200 pp. $6.50. A collection of articles describes the framework in which the present intellectual "ferment" is taking place in the Soviet Union; examines the evidence of a recently growing interest in religion among the intelligentsia; and explores the Communist Party's continuing struggle with institutional religion. Churches other than the Russian Orthodox often confront the party with the problem of non-Russian nationalism. The regime is likely to feel itself increasingly threatened by the revival of religion as a component in the new intellectual and nationalist stirrings, both of which have resulted from the loss of ideological cohesion in the post-Stalin era.

Russia from 1812 to 1945: A History. By Graham Stephenson. New York: Praeger, 1970. 467 pp. $10.95. An examination of some of the most characteristic and important features of Russian history from Napoleon to Hitler, written by the head of the History Department at Sherborne School, Dorset, England. This is not primarily a chronological history; rather, the emphasis, especially before 1917, is on themes—e.g., the plight, emancipation and discontent of the peasants; the role of the Russian intelligentsia in the 19th century; the era of Witte; Russia, Turkey and Europe, 1812-1917; and Czarist imperialism in Asia.

Soviet Agriculture in Perspective: A Study of Its Successes and Failures. By Erich Strauss. New York: Praeger, 1969. 328 pp. $8.50. A concise history of Soviet agricultural policy, viewed within the context of the Soviet society and the Soviet political system.

Stalinism in Prague: The Loebl Story. By Eugen Loebl. Translated by Maurice Michael. New York: Grove Press, 1969. 327 pp. $6.00. Dr. Loebl, one of three survivors of the November 1952 Slansky tribunal, here documents the circumstances of his arrest, imprisonment, interrogation, trial, sentence, conditional release in 1961, and final rehabilitation in 1963. At the time of his arrest in 1949, he served as Czechoslovakia's Deputy Foreign Trade Minister and was a member of the Economic Commission of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. After the Soviets invaded his country in 1968, he left it for the United States, where he is teaching at Vassar.

War Between Russia and China. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 224 pp. $4.95. A well-known author develops the historical, political and strategic background of the current Sino-Soviet confrontation. In his view the most recent incidents fraying Russian-Chinese relations are but a continuation of events whose origins go back as far as the Mongol invasion and whose future resolution may end in nuclear war between the two communist giants.

VI. Middle East and Africa

The Biafra Story. By Frederick Forsyth. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. 237 pp. $1.45 (paper). A British foreign correspondent reports on the Biafran revolt from the Biafran standpoint. He first recounts the history of Nigeria to show how this nation was formed by Britain out of irreconcilable peoples and how the structure left behind by the British was unable to contain the explosive forces of the new country. In the larger part of his book, dealing with the Biafran breakaway, the author examines the character of Biafra, the progress of the war (to March 1969), the role of Britain, the problems of refugees and starvation, the question of genocide, the peace conferences, and the role of the press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Haile-Selassie's Government. By Christopher Clapham. New York: Praeger, 1969. 218 pp. $7.50. In this study of Ethiopia's central government and its development from 1941 to 1967, Dr. Clapham, a research fellow at the University of Manchester (England), describes the land and the people, the development of the Ethiopian polity, the Imperial system, the constitutional framework, the Emperor as ruler, political groupings and high officials, the Imperial Secretariat and its decline, parliament and legislation, and government spending.

Iraq Under Kassem: A Political History, 1958-1963. By Uriel Dann. New York and London: Praeger and Pall Mall Press, 1969. 405 pp. $10.00. The lessons of the short-lived Kassem regime for contemporary Iraq are detailed with commendable thoroughness in this absorbing study. The author has captured the manifold characteristics of Arab politics and provided a valuable case history of revolution and counterrevolution. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the Communist Party under Kassem, and to the ways in which traditional institutions and loyalties affect the struggle for power among unstable elites.

Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami. By Geoffrey Furlonge. New York: Praeger, 1969. 244 pp. $6.95. The story of a Palestinian Arab whose humanitarian efforts on behalf of his people were destined to be frustrated by the exigencies of politics and the upheavals of war. His life, as traced in this book, has been intimately linked with every phase of the drama of Palestine, from the last days of the Ottoman Empire, through British rule, UN partition, and the Arab-Israeli wars.

The Political Awakening in the Middle East. Edited by George Lenczowski. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1970. 180 pp. $5.95 ($2.45, paper). Professor Lenczowski states that the purpose of his book is "to present, through the medium of selected readings, the political transition of the Middle East from traditionalism to modernism." This is a sizable task, in the accomplishment of which he has made a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the Middle East. Brief but excellent introductions precede the collected works of leading scholars and participants in the movements under study. The book can serve as a survey for the beginner or as a valuable guide to review for the advanced student.

The Suez Expedition of 1956. By André Beaufre. Translated from the French by Richard Barry. New York: Praeger, 1969. 161 pp. $7.00. General Beaufre commanded the French troops for the Suez expedition. In describing this disastrous operation from its inception in August 1956—how the British were reluctant to act without U.S. support, how the Israelis were "brought in," and how the expedition failed—he traces the evolution of a coordinated strategy and discusses the effects political events have on a military objective.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair. By Ishwer C. Ojha. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 234 pp. $5.95. In this analysis of Communist China's foreign policy, Professor Ojha of Boston University reviews the historical sources of China's conduct and the "nationalism of cultural despair"—the failure of Chinese syncretism to meet the 19th-century challenge of the West and the humiliations and defeats that have had an impact on the Chinese outlook. He examines Sino-American misperceptions, Sino-Soviet antagonisms, China's search for national boundaries, and her relations with Third World countries.

An Economic Profile of Mainland China. Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. New York: Praeger, 1968. 684 pp. $18.50. The papers that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make up this volume, prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, shed valuable light on the production potential of major economic sectors of China and trace the dramatic changes in her economic policies since 1949. Some of the topics treated are planning, management and economic development; economic implications of China's defense establishment; her mineral resource base; development of electric energy resources; agriculture and fisheries; money and banking; population growth and distribution; education policies and problems; scientific and engineering manpower; research and development; international trade and balance of payments; and foreign aid to less developed countries.

Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965. Edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 505 pp. $13.50. This valuable collection of more than one hundred excerpts from speeches, articles and pamphlets authored by Indonesian leaders is organized under fifteen topics, including parliamentary democracy and its critics, guided democracy and its critics, radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islam, democratic socialism, communism, national unity, the economic order, the role of the army, and Indonesia in the world.

International Politics of Asia: Readings. By George P. Jan. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969. 380 pp. n.p. This useful compendium of papers on Asian affairs contains articles on problems of nationalism, economic development, communism, neutralism, China's foreign policies, Japan's resurgence and larger role, U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia and policy toward China, the Sino-Soviet split, the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, and regional cooperation.

Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon. By George Jan Lerski. Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1968. 288 pp. $2.85 (paper). The unique role of Ceylon's Equality Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party) as the official opposition for more than thirty years of the island nation's recent history has prompted the author to examine in depth the origins (1935-1942) of this Trotskyist movement and its considerable influence on the Ceylonese drive to national independence and development of national institutions. Dr. Lerski spent two years at the University of Ceylon as a Visiting Professor and is now an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of San Francisco.

The Politics of Foreign Aid in India. By P. J. Eldridge. New York: Schocken Books, 1970. 289 pp. $9.00. The author examines the foreign aid policies of the principal donor countries—the USSR, the United States and Great Britain —as they apply to India, and then evaluates the impact of the aid on Indian policy and elite attitudes. He argues that the donors have adapted their aid-giving to Indian requirements and that they have not been able to translate foreign aid into political influence. The questions raised are significant, but the data used are regrettably from the late 1950's and early 1960's.

The Road to Communism: China Since 1912. Edited by Dun J. Li. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970. 403 pp. $6.40 (paper). This collection of documents traces the factors and developments that led to China's embrace of communism as a state ideology. The readings are arranged under topics, such as political disintegration and intellectual ferment before 1925; the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration and split; the Nanking government, 1927-1937; the Communists' struggle for survival; Sino-Japanese relations; the Nationalists and Communists during the war; Communist ascendancy; and Communist China, its government, economic and foreign policies, family, society and culture.

A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia. By Richard Allen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 306 pp. $6.50 ($2.50,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paper). This brief survey of Southeast Asian political history concentrates on the colonial period and on the Indochina conflict since 1946. Sir Richard Allen was formerly Head of the Southeast Asia Department of the British Foreign Office and British Ambassador to Burma from 1956 to 1962.

VIII. Latin America

Argentina. By H. S. Ferns. New York: Praeger, 1969. 284 pp. $7.50. A Professor of Political Science at the University of Birmingham (England) and specialist in Anglo-Argentine relations has produced a valuable political and socio-economic history of Argentina. The first half provides an account of Argentina's development as a nation to 1930, when the Great Depression undermined the basis of her prosperity and forced her to seek new economic and political solutions. In the second half, the author deals with the upheavals of the past four decades and "the sense of malaise which afflicts Argentina, and manifests itself in political instability and economic stagnation."

The Economic Development of Guyana, 1953-1964. By Wilfred L. David. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 399 pp. $11.20. This revision of a doctoral thesis at Oxford University provides a comprehensive survey of the Guyanese economy and an analysis of some of the more important problems facing a small, open and dependent economy. The author divides his study into sections dealing with national income, expenditure and investment; population, employment and the labor force; agriculture and forests; mining; foreign trade and payments; financing of economic development; public expenditure and the development process, and economic planning.

An Introduction to Argentina. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1969. 197 pp. $6.50. Dr. Alexander, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, first surveys the land and resources of Argentina and summarizes her history from 1516 to the fall of Peron. Then in separate chapters he describes the country's economy, politics and government, people and society, cultural affairs, and foreign relations.

Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia. By Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus and Hans C. Buechler. New York: Praeger, 1969. 464 pp. $18.50. This study, which focuses on the diverse problems of each of Bolivia's three major regions, discusses the administration of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1953 and its effects on the labor force; size and distribution of landholdings; legal restrictions on property owners; wage policies; production levels and goals; patterns of migration among the regions; and the role of cooperatives.

Roads to Power in Latin America. By Luis Mercier Vega. New York: Praeger, 1969. 208 pp. $6.00. In this provocative study, the author argues that the political elites of Latin America, the military, the students and the oligarchy, each seek to create a society whose support can give them a power base. But it is the state which alone is capable of bringing about change and which is emerging as the most potent force in Latin America. Mr. Mercier also examines the impact of change on traditional classes and assesses problems relating to the continued persistence of the oligarchic spirit. The work includes an in-depth description of recent political struggles in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico.

Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey. By Marvin Alisky. New York: Praeger, 1969. 172 pp. $6.50. After briefly tracing Uruguay's historical heritage, the author discusses such topics as modern Uruguay's government, finances, social structure, educational institutions and culture, the 1966 constitutional reform, and the country's relations with Cuba and other communist states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monographs and Reports Received

An Analysis of Chinese Communist Infiltration and Subversion Abroad. By Chang Wei-ya. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, September 1969. 116 pp. $1.20.

Approaches to the Notion of International Justice. By Julius Stone. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace, January 1970. 89 pp. $2.50.

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA SP-4010, 1969. 427 pp. $2.00.

Automation: Some Pioneering Military Applications. By David C. Phillips. Santa Monica, Calif.: Systems Development Corporation, SP-3465, January 1970. 39 pp. n.p.

The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936. By George Schwab. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970. 174 pp. n.p.

Criteria for the Evaluation of Arms Control Options. By Richard Perle. Waltham, Mass.: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group, ASG Monograph No. 3, April 1970. 19 pp. n.p.

Development Assistance, 1969 Review: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. By Edwin W. Martin. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 1969. 325 pp. $7.00.

The ENDC and the Press. By Loyal N. Gould. New York: Humanities Press, for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm Papers, No. 3, 1970. 77 pp. $3.50.

France: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1970. 86 pp. 80 cents.

Germany: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 1970. 71 pp. 80 cents.

Growth and Development in Pakistan, 1955-1969. By Joseph J. Stern and Walter P. Falcon. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 23, April 1970. 94 pp. $2.75.

Higher Education in Developing Countries: A Select Bibliography. By Philip G. Altbach. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 24, April 1970. 116 pp. $3.75.

Important Documents of the Third World Anti-Communist League Conference. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, February 1970. 27 pp. n.p.

The Law of the Sea: National Policy Recommendations. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 23-26, 1969; edited by Lewis M. Alexander. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, March 1970. 533 pp. $7.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Multinational Corporation. By Sidney E. Rolfe. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 199, February 1970. 62 pp. 85 cents.

Netherlands: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 1970. 53 pp. 80 cents.

Preface to Disarmament: An Appraisal of Recent Proposals. By Marion H. McVitty. Washington: Public Affairs Press, published in cooperation with The World Law Fund, 1970. 72 pp. $1.00.

Seismic Methods for Monitoring Underground Explosions. Report by a Study Group; David Davies, rapporteur. New York: Humanities Press, for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm Papers, No. 2, 1970. 99 pp. $3.50.

Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget. By Charles L. Schultze, with Edward K. Hamilton and Allen Schick. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970. 192 pp. $2.95.

Some Dimensions of Middle East Oil: The Producing Countries and the United States. By Ragaei El Mallakh. New York: American-Arab Association for Commerce & Industry, Inc., March 1970. 19 pp. n.p.

Technology and World Power. By Victor Basiuk. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 200, April 1970. 63 pp. $1.00.

Toward a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement. By Herbert Scoville, Jr. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970. 47 pp. $1.00.

United States: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1970. 46 pp. 80 cents.

United States Industrial Policies. Observations presented by the U.S. Delegation before the OECD Industry Committee at its Sixth Session. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1970. 169 pp. $4.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to this Issue

Victor Basiuk, Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies and Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Columbia University; author of *Technology, the Future, and American Policy* (forthcoming).

Leon Gordenker, Professor of Politics, Princeton University; recipient of grant from the Social Science Research Council which enabled him to observe field operations of the UN system.

Harold Karan Jacobson, Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Organization Program, University of Michigan; recipient of grant from the Social Science Research Council which enabled him to observe field operations of the UN system.

Morton A. Kaplan, Professor of Political Science and Chairman, Committee on International Relations, The University of Chicago; Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute; author of *Dissent in the State in Peace and War: An Essay on the Grounds of Public Morality* (Dunellen, forthcoming) and *On Historical and Political Knowing: An Inquiry into Universal Law and Human Freedom* (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

Robert R. Sullivan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The John Jay College of the City University of New York.

O. M. Smolansky, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Lehigh University; currently preparing a study on Soviet policy in the Middle East.

Ciro Zoppo, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles; consultant to The RAND Corporation; author of forthcoming book on Turkey in the twentieth century; formerly, Associate Director of the UCLA Arms Control Research Program.

Donald W. Mitchell, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Northeast Missouri State College; author of *History of the Modern American Navy: 1883 Through Pearl Harbor* (Knopf, 1946), *Civil Defense: Planning for Survival and Recovery* (GPO, 1966), and numerous articles on strategy and contemporary international relations.

James H. Wolfe, Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland; author of *Indivisible Germany* (Nijhoff, 1963).

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia; currently, Senior Fulbright Research Fellow, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, University of Munich; author of *Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia* (Praeger, 1960) and *Political Trends in Brazil* (Public Affairs Press, 1968).

George D. Damien, Lecturer of Philosophy and Phenomenology of Conflict at The New School, New York; consultant to the Foreign Policy Research Institute; formerly, lecturer in the Program on East and Central European Affairs, Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

James C. Davies, Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon; author of *Human Nature in Politics* (John Wiley & Sons, 1963).

Kurt L. London, Emeritus Professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University; founder and first director of the Institute. Member of the Research Council, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

Stuart S. Malawer, Instructor, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; Member of the Bar of the State of New York and the International Bar Association.

Willard Barber, Lecturer in International Affairs, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland; formerly, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who served on several recruitment and administrative boards.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ÖSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations.

Recent issues contain articles by:

Georg Winckler, Neue Entwicklungen in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen

Daniel Frei, Aussenpolitische Strategien zur Erzeugung von Sicherheit

Kenneth M. Lewan, Rhodesien und die Zuständigkeitsgrenzen der Vereinten Nationen

Documents on the Council of Europe and Greece

Chronicle of Austrian foreign policy

Reviews

Annual Subscription $8.50—six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

APRIL-JUNE 1970 **ISSUE NO. 42**

The Taxation System of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 1938-1945 — Michael Lindsay

Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform during the Cultural Revolution — Marianne Bastid

The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Economic Elite — Richard K. Diao

Industrial Production in Communist China: 1957-1968 — Robert Michael Field

The Red Guards and the World Student Movement — Richard W. Wilson and Amy A. Wilson

The Chinese Communist Youth Movement: 1949-1966 — Victor C. Funnell

COMMENT BOOK REVIEWS QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office: 24 Fitzroy Square, London W. 1

Subscription Agents: Research Publications Ltd., 11 Nelson Road, London S.E.10

Subscription rates: £3 or U.S. $7.50 a year

For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00

Individual copies: 15s. or $2.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

Contributors to recent issues:

Raymond Aron
William C. Bark
General Andre Beaufre
Louis I. Bredvold
Yale Brozen
Lev E. Dobriansky
M. Stanton Evans
Lawrence Henry Gipson
Ernest van den Haag
Will Herberg
William R. Kintner
Russell Kirk
Wm. Oliver Martin
Ludwig von Mises
Gerhart Niemeyer
Stefan T. Possony
Leo Strauss
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Frank N. Trager
Eric Voegelin
Simon N. Whitney
Francis G. Wilson

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, eight dollars; three years, eleven dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN CAMBODIA *by Michael Leifer*

IN SEARCH OF A *MODUS VIVENDI* FOR BERLIN *by Dieter Mahncke*

CHINA, AMERICA, AND ARMS CONTROL *by J. H. Kalicki*

THE PROBLEM OF LAOS *by E. H. S. Simmonds*

HUNGARY AND POLAND: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM *by Andrew Shonfield*

Annual Subscription: 45s. (U.S.A. and Canada $6.50). 4s. per issue.

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London N.W.10.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation providing a lively forum for scholarship on international organizations and for analysis of current literature and research methods in the field

SPRING 1970 VOLUME 24, NUMBER 2

ARTICLES

The Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency ..... George H. Quester

Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations, 1954-1965 ..... Donald J. Puchala

Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815-1964: A Quantitative Description ..... David Singer and Michael D. Wallace

Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's "Proposals for the Avoidance of War," 1914-1917 ..... Martin David Dubin

Political Aspects of Transnational Business Collaboration in the Common Market ..... Werner Feld

REVIEW ESSAYS
by Gary Wynia and Robert Matthews

NOTES ON THEORY AND METHOD
by Edward Miles and Richard Mansbach

$7.50 a year
$2.50 a copy

$19.00 for three years

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108

The Journal of Politics invites you to join its ever-increasing circle of readers

The February 1970 issue contains:

The "Withering Away" of the State: A Reconsideration
Richard Adamiak

Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran
James A. Bill

Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid
Gilbert R. Winham

American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology
Darryl B. Baskin

Relations Among National Interest Groups
Robert L. Ross

Electoral Instability and the American Party System
Richard M. Merelman

Leadership Perceptions and Voting Behavior in a One-Party Legislative Body
Harlan Hahn

Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments in a Southern Urban Electorate
Anthony M. Orum and Edward W. McCranie

The Effect of Recruitment upon Metropolitan Voting Cohesion in the House of Representatives
Burton M. Atkins and Michael A. Baer

Published Quarterly by

The Southern Political Science Association

Peabody Hall, University of Florida • Gainesville, Florida 32601, U.S.A.

Subscription and Membership Fee: $8.00 U.S.A.; $8.60 Foreign; $5.00 for students registered in universities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED